Why I don’t see any Russian plot behind the Boston bombings

I’ve been struck in the past 48 hours how many journalists’ queries I’ve fielded that seemed to take seriously the idea that the Russian state (or local agents in the North Caucasus) could somehow be responsible for the terrible Boston bombing. (I’m talking 6 serious journalists: not the kind of lunatics who, for example, claimed the real bombers were Navy SEALs.) The idea would seem to be that by encouraging, facilitating or downright arranging the attack, they demonize the Chechens, legitimize their brutal security campaign in the North Caucasus, and create a new, more favorable environment for dealing with the USA, in one fell swoop. A cute idea, worthy fodder for some lurid airport thriller, but in my opinion very, very hard to believe.

I can understand why the Tsarnaevs’ family and friends might want to believe that Tamerlan and Dzhokar were framed or set up. It’s the same impulse that leads to the disbelieving and perplexed statements that “he was a lovely man” or “he kept himself to himself” every time some serial killer or child abuser is arrested. Evil thoughts and plans, alas, do not always or even usually manifest themselves through sinister manner and demented cackles.

However, if we look at these particular suggestions (some of which also come from Russians), they seem to rest of a few basic assertions:

  • The FSB had suspicions about Tamerlan Tsarnaev, so the fact that they let him into the country shows that they had some ulterior motive.
  • Putin was willing to blow up Russian apartment buildings in 1999 for political purpose, so he’d have no more compunction seeing terror in Boston.
  • The Russians want to make the world stop hassling them about their tactics in the North Caucasus: this gives them a perfect way of demonstrating that they are simply fighting evil jihadists.
  • In the most ridiculously extreme cases, it’s asserted that the Kremlin just hates the USA anyway, and likes seeing mayhem there.

Of course Moscow will seek to make political capital out of this event; that’s what countries do (I remember when offers of assistance to the USSR after Chernobyl were also accompanied by patronizing suggestions about how this wouldn’t have happened if the Soviets were less Soviet and more Western). That certainly doesn’t mean that “hardliners in Russia might want another Cold War with America, and they may even secretly rejoice at the idea of mayhem in the West.” The pragmatic art of diplomacy is often about making the best from whatever fate presents.

The Kremlin has not shown itself averse to the use of violence in domestic and international politics (I’m inclined to accept the 1999 apartment bombings were state terrorism), but this is a world apart from actually trying to instigate an attack on US soil. The risks so outweigh the potential advantages that I don’t think it would even have been seriously considered. There is one basic rule of covert operations: at some point, they become covert no longer. If Tamerlan had been an active, aware agent, what would have happened if he had been captured? Even assuming that he was instead a dupe, groomed for the purpose by Russian undercover agents posing as jihadists, what happens when the US authorities–who, we can safely assume, are turning the full weight of their massive intelligence capacity onto this case–get a sniff of this? Any political advantages are likely to be transient (think how quickly the post 9/11 amity evaporated); any political risks astronomical.

Besides which, the FSB flags up potential individuals of concern all the time. They don’t necessarily bar them from the country. One could just as easily (and foolishly) suggest that the FBI’s failure to pick up on the brothers’ jihadist sentiments in 2011, after the FSB had passed on a warning about them, showed that somehow the US authorities were involved. (And for the record, while the inevitable inquiry will say for sure, we need not assume the FBI “failed” here–Tamerlan may not have been fully radicalized by then, the FBI get many such warnings, and in any case they are often rightly skeptical of FSB tip-offs as the Russians often claim people are “terrorists” on the flimsiest grounds or just to smear political oppositionists.)

The world is usually a simpler place than people think, and covert actions less common and less attractive than the movies suggest. We’ll wait and see, but to me this is a case of an alienated young man looking for answers and sadly finding them in the ideology of global jihad, and apparently bringing his brother into the cause. In some ways this is harder to understand than deep plots and cunning stratagems, because it requires us to accept that the Western liberal democratic model does not satisfy everyone and that we cannot control the vagaries of lost souls…

(Oh, by the way: North Korea has denied being behind the bombing, too. So that’s alright, then.)

Moscow bans Preet Bharara because he does his job…

Image

…and, it seems, the Kremlin’s patience

В русском языке

At least the latest Russian response to the Magnitsky List wasn’t quite as petulant, spiteful and foolish as its previous asymmetric ‘tit for tat,’ barring US parents from adopting Russian orphans. That is, however, about the most positive thing one can say about the new “Bout List.” It targets 18 former and current officials involved in the cases of arms dealer Viktor Bout and convicted drug trafficker Konstantin Yaroshchenko (and a few connected with GITMO), including US Attorney for the Southern District of New York Preet Bharara, who led the Bout prosecution.

Whether this kind of response does anything but worsen already-poor US-Russian relations (it doesn’t) and make Russia look clumsy and ugly (it does) is grist for others’ mills for the moment. I wanted very briefly to note the irony of targeting Bharara. Sure, he oversaw the Bout prosecution. But what else has he done:

  • Targeted insider trading and abuses within the US financial system, such that Time, in its usual understated way had a cover blaring that “This Man is Busting Wall Street.” Moscow has long complained about double-standards in US statements about Russian financial crime and called for the Americans to clean up their own act first.
  • Highlighted abuses in NY State politics, warning that “It becomes more and more difficult to avoid the sad conclusion that political corruption in New York is indeed rampant,” as “a show-me-the-money culture in Albany is alive and well.” Frankly, give this man a slot on RT!
  • Prosecuted Al-Qaeda terrorist Faisal Shahzad. Last time I checked, Moscow thought Al-Qaeda (which, rightly or wrongly, they see at work in the North Caucasus) was their enemy too.

I don’t know Bharara myself, and I’m sure he’s also driven by the usual combination of hubris, ambition and professionalism that pushes the rest of us, too. But what does seem clear is that he has done far more than most to identify many of the abuses and flaws within mighty US institutions. Of course, he has done so from the point of view of a believer in the system, looking to correct them, but nonetheless what Moscow needs, frankly, is not to ban and castigate people like him, but rather to find its own Preet Bhararas. After all, although I am hardly the greatest fan of lawyers, honest and effective prosecutors can be extraordinary forces for change and progress. Consider the Italian magistrates Falcone and Borsellino who did so much to undermine the Mafia in life and arguably even more after their deaths.

Ah. Maybe that’s the point.

The Navalny Case and the Final Battle between Good and Neutrality?

Yes, Navalny needs YOU!

Yes, Navalny needs YOU!

It’s been too busy a time for me of late to post, but nonetheless something that has struck me has been the relatively low-key response to Navalny’s imminent trial on what seem thoroughly spurious embezzlement charges. Of course, it’s been reported, especially since his declaration that he wanted to stand for president. However, the contrast with the massive and at times thoroughly hysterical and hyperbolic coverage of the Pussy Riot case, even before their trial, has been evident. I find this slightly surprising and distinctly alarming and a cause for what I might call some “navalny-gazing.”

No wonder, I suppose, that the subtitle on Navalny’s blog is “The final battle between good and neutrality.”

After all, while the Pussy Riot defendants were undoubtedly the victims of a kangaroo court (the very notion that they could be found guilty under the technical terms of hooliganism rather than some lesser charge was ridiculous) and comported themselves with impressive dignity in court, nonetheless they were hardly important in and of themselves. The importance, I would suggest, lay in what the trial said about the wider processes at work: the lawfare of the courts in their use against expressions of opposition thought and sentiment, the heavy-handedness of Putin’s state, the role of a conservative and assertive Russian Orthodox Church. Let’s be honest, had the authorities simply patronized them as publicity-seeking little women, slapped them with a fine, and used this as an opportunity to present the opposition as being full of blasphemers and exhibitionists, it would have been a two-day wonder.

Whether or not Navalny is the potential savior of the nation or a nationalist opportunist who has spotted a potential chance to rise is irrelevant (and for the record, while I don’t believe him to be perfect, I certainly believe him closer to the former than the latter). He is undoubtedly at present the driving force behind the opposition, however inchoate and drifting it currently may be. He has brought the issue of the corruption elite into the center of Russian politics, and has done more than anyone else to connect that with the United Russia bloc, that bastion of the cynical, the careerist and the corrupt. At present, there is no one else who can assume his mantle, no one else who has a chance–no more than a chance–of being able to turn the middle-class metropolitan opposition into a credible political force.

Which is, of course, why the Kremlin wants him out of the way, whether in prison or, much more likely, smeared and given a suspended sentence which will preclude him from standing for political office. It also explains why attack-dog Bastrykin–a man also with a clear personal animosity against Navalny–has been given such a long leash. They fear him in a way that they don’t fear socialite-seditionist Kseniya Sobchak or leftist firebrand Sergei Udaltsov.

Less comprehensible is quite why the Russian opposition is not more active and why Western democrats who want to see Russia move away from authoritarianism are nowhere near as excited as they were during the Pussy Riot case. Sure, maybe things will be different once the court case starts, but at present there seems little real enthusiasm for Navalny’s cry for protests on the streets in Russia, and far less media attention, let alone op. ed. outrage in the West.

Is it that everyone is getting tired of protest that seems to get nowhere, and Kirov is a way away rather than just a couple of streets away in Moscow? (If so, welcome to the real world: regime change is a hard slog, not a New Year’s resolution.)

Is it that people dislike or mistrust Navalny? (Sure, there are some questions to be asked, from his nationalist politics to what he’s doing on the Aeroflot board, but to be honest it’s hard to see any such antagonism towards him from any but elements of the elite.)

When it comes to the Western media and Russia-watchers, can it really be as banal as that one guy who blogs about corruption is a less exciting topic to discuss that balaclava-ed punkettes? That “People got interested in Pussy Riot on a global scale because it included so many themes – feminism, gay rights, religion” but that the bedrock issues of power and freedom aren’t as widely appealing? (Sadly, there is probably more than a little truth here.)

Whatever the reason, I cannot help but feel there is a potential opportunity here that risks being squandered. When Brian Whitmore and I were discussing the case in a Power Vertical podcast (you don’t subscribe to it? You should!) we agreed that the trial could represent a turning point for the opposition, a chance to get its act together after over a year of drift, a chance to cohere around a high-profile case, a chance to use it as a platform to seek to reach out to the disgruntled elements in the wider population (and we know they are there) and seek to build a common cause. Of course, that means they have to do it. And outsiders who want to encourage them–though ultimately this must be a domestic phenomenon, there certainly is no scope for the kind of “revolution plotted from abroad” beloved of pro-Kremlin conspiracy theorists–at the very least need to keep up the pressure and the attention, because that will help make this case significant, signal to the authorities that they cannot just pick off whomever they want with impunity.

This is unlikely to be the final battle, but it is an extremely important one. Given that “neutrality” is often a synonym in such cases for apathy or despair, perhaps this is time for action…

‘Zap’ Soghoyan, Post-Soviet Gangsters in the Czech Republic, and the new Criminal Merchant-Adventurers

He doesn't look worried. Sadly, he probably had good reason...

He doesn’t look worried. Sadly, he probably had good reason…

The conviction in absentia of Andranik Soghoyan in Prague Municipal Court in many ways exemplifies the place and role of Eurasian organized crime in Europe today.

Soghoyan (also known as ‘Zap’ or ‘Zaporozhets’, after the aged Russian car) is an Armenian gangster who has been convicted of the attempted murder of another Armenian in 2007. According to the indictment, he and his accomplices Gilani and Magomed Aliyev hired Ukrainian Timur Tretyakov, an assassin of bloody inclinations but poor aim. The would-be hitman stabbed one wrong man in Wenceslas Square (fortunately his life was saved by medical intervention). Then Soghoyan’s henchmen Arsen Kakosyan and Arsen Arakelyan gave him directions to the target’s house and a gun, respectively. Tretyakov managed to shoot and kill another innocent bystander, in this case a man who drove the same kind of car as the target.

Gilani Aliyev—a Chechen—was acquitted but otherwise Soghoyan’s accomplices received various sentences, with Tretyakov being sentenced to 22 years in prison. Soghoyan himself was charged with organizing a murder and blackmail. He was acquitted twice by the lower court over doubts about the only informant, himself a convicted extortionist, and the ambiguity of wiretap evidence (at which point he wisely left the Czech Republic), but convicted in the municipal court on appeal.

So, what does this case demonstrate?

1. Oranges are not the only fruit, but they are increasingly common. The 45-year-old Soghoyan is part of the ranks of the vory v zakone, the ‘thieves within the code’ who once represented the elite of Soviet organized crime, but is increasingly an empty honorific more often bought than earned. Soghoyan appears to have been ‘crowned’ a vor in Moscow in 1994, but nonetheless he seems not to be a traditionalist. His 20-year-old nephew was reportedly made a vor at a ceremony in Gyumri (Soghoyan’s home base) last year: there would have been no way such a youth would have been ‘crowned’ in the old days. Instead he is an apelsyn, an ‘orange’ as those gangsters who simply paid their way into the vor hierarchy are disparagingly known by the traditionalists. It seems that Soghoyan, like many gangsters from the Caucasus, is happy to retain the forms of the old vorovskoi mir (‘thieves’ world’) but not its rules. This is a general pattern; while the language of the vory survives, its forms do not, and the modern Eurasian criminal is either an avtoritet criminal-businessman or, like Soghoyan, a gangster increasingly hard to distinguish from his counterparts in Italy, Mexico or almost anywhere else.

2. There are gang, ethnic and phylum divisions. Ultimately, Russian criminals deal with Chechens, Uzbeks with Italians, Chinese with Mexicans. Nonetheless, within the global criminal economy there clearly are affiliations and groupings. Within Eurasian organized crime, there is a growing differential between the Slavic and Caucasus (‘mountaineer’) criminals, something all the more significant since Aslan Usoyan’s death earlier this year. Soghoyan, an Armenian, relied not just on other Armenians, but also the Chechen Aliyevs.

3. Russian organized crime, Russian-speaking organized crime, Eurasian organized crime… Soghoyan was an Armenian, but nonetheless some accounts have made this a ‘Russian organized crime’ story. Of course, there is Russian OC in the Czech Republic, and it may well be growing, but it is much more a criminal business, the world of the avtoritety rather than the bandits: wholesale drug trafficking, money laundering and the like. The rather clumsy term “Russian-speaking organized crime” gets used (is it true? I’d be surprised if Soghoyan talked to his fellow Armenians in Russian), with “Eurasian organized crime” favored by others, but it begins to raise the question of whether or not we can still talk about everyone from Belarusian smugglers and Russian avtoritety to Georgian gangsters and Tajik drug traffickers in the same breath. It’s something I’m thinking about as I write an Adelphi Paper on this, and just as “Post-Soviet organized crime” has an increasingly antiquated sound, I feel that the commonalities created by a shared political and economic model are of diminishing explanatory value.

4. Whatever you call it, it is a significant problem in Europe in general, Central Europe in particular. The initial onrush of the 1990s created a predictable moral panic, and not without reason. This was the age of the bandits, a sudden influx of gangster gangs turbocharged by seemingly inexhaustible economic resources and a guaranteed haven at home. However, the most aggressive inroads were beaten off, sometimes quickly, and we saw a rollback of Russian (etc) criminal power in Central Europe, Italy, the Baltic States.

Since then, though, they are back, even though with a new model gangsterism: has as merchant-adventurers rather than conquistadors. The Russians, Ukrainians, Armenians and so forth have sifted in sometimes as predators but more often offering criminal services—drugs, women, money-laundering, computer hacking, etc—to indigenous gangs and local populations. The overt violence, indeed the overt gangsterism overall, is far, far less in evidence. Even if we take this case, Soghoyan was targeting a fellow Armenian in Prague who had not paid over $500,000 the gangster felt he was due. It was also an attempt to intimidate the local Chechen criminals, or at least to strengthen the Aliyevs’ position within them. (Which raises the question of quite who was using whom…) In other words, this was a crime primarily within the Eurasian community, which only touched a Czech because Tretyakov was such an incompetent killer.

Otherwise, the Eurasian criminals tend to be much less obvious, much more prone to be the facilitators, suppliers and partners of local criminals. Of course, that doesn’t make them any less dangerous, but rather than their danger is measured as much as anything else through how they empower other gangs…

Talking about Russian organized crime in Prague, March 19

Invite Mark Galeotti

With post-Soviet (Armenian) organized crime boss Andranik Soghoyan being convicted in absentia to 22 years in prison in Prague Municipal Court, and with the commercial rivalry over the Temelin nuclear power initiative leading to inevitable dark mutterings about Russian criminal and espionage activities in the Czech Republic, I’m especially pleased to be speaking about the myths and the realities of Russian organized crime in Prague in a couple of weeks’ time. It’s a public event organized by NYU’s Prague Center and PIDEC, the Prague Institute for Democracy, Economics & Culture, and is open to all (please RSVP if you plan to attend, but the email address on the poster may not be working, in which case please use pidec.nyu@gmail.com).

I’ll cover developments in Russia a little, but mainly look at how Russian and Russia-based organized crime has — and has not — spread internationally, and what its real relationships with the intelligence services are. Considering that I think Prague and the Czech Republic risk becoming a renewed focus of their operations, it seems to be a timely opportunity to discuss these guys.

Russian prisons getting more lethal

Lasciate ogne speranza, voi ch'entrate?

Lasciate ogne speranza, voi ch’entrate?

To use the mildest of understatement, Russian prisons are not pleasant places. They are over-crowded, often antiquated, rife with violence, petty abuses and disease (including strains of drug-resistant TB). That said, the prison population has begun to fall, which is an encouraging sign, and there have been some limited efforts made to reform the system overall. So is the news good?

Not really. Let’s briefly unpick the depressing news that 4,121 prisoners died in prison or pre-trial detention in 2012. The combined prison and pre-trial detention (SIZO) population as of June 2012 was 731,000, suggesting a mortality figure of 564 prisoners per 100,000 inmates. If we look at US death rates as of 2008-9 (the last compiled by the Bureau of Justice Statistics), then the total death tally was 4,755 (admittedly from a substantially larger prison population), with a death rate ranging from 257/100k in state prisons, through 229/100k in federal prisons, to 127/100k in jails).

Given that the death toll back in 2010 was 4,150, then this might look like a slight improvement. But while the death toll has fallen just 0.7%, in that time the prison population in 746 corrective colonies, 230 SIZO, 7 prisons and 46 juvenile colonies shrunk by 17.5%. In other words, despite a falling prison population, some reform and more money, Russia’s prisons are getting even more lethal…