Who were the Georgian gangsters arrested in Europe?

I’ll complete this list as more identities become available, but to date, these are the names of the various figures arrested in the June 18 swoop on the Georgian Kutaisi gang across Europe:

Hungary

  • Merab Dzhangveladze, “Dzhango,” vor v zakone and leader of the Kutaisi
  • ?

Italy

  • Guram Odisharia, “Buya,” vor v zakone
  • Roin Uglava, “Matevich,” vor v zakone
  • Gia Gurchiani, vor v zakone
  • Aleko Imedadze, vor v zakone
  • Beso Kuprashvili, vor v zakone
  • Akaki Tugushi, “Enzo Batumi,” vor v zakone
  • ?

Czech Republic

  • Alexander Kartsivadze, vor v zakone
  • ?

Lithuania

  • Givi Gordeladze, “Givi Tol’styi” (“Givi the Thick”), vor v zakone [Gordeladze is again at large; the Lithuanian court, for reasons still not wholly clear, released him on bail, not deeming him a flight risk on grounds of his age (65) and health. Surprise, surprise: he flew.]
  • Temur Nemsitsveridze, “Tsripa,” vor v zakone
  • Razhden Shulaya
  • ?
  • ?

Portugal

  • ?
  • ?

France

  • ?

(Last update: June 27, 2013)

“A Tale of Two Cities”: Corruption in Prague and Moscow compared

“Influence-peddling, embezzlement of government funds, the (ab)use of state intelligence agents to snoop on personal rivals; the police swoop, politicians and powerful government officials are arrested and the prime minister, while personally not involved, takes responsibility for what happened on his watch and resigns. Moscow? Hardly: this is Prague.”

In my latest column for Russia! magazine, I consider what lessons the Czech’s treatment of their current–very real–corruption problem could hold for the Russian government. If it is serious about dealing with corruption systemically and from the top down. Which, sadly, I very much doubt.

Georgian Organized Crime Blitz in Europe

(Some further thoughts to complement my initial, snap response, Europe-wide arrests of Georgian gangsters, with senior Kutaisi vor seized in Prague’)

squadarmobileOn 18 June, police in six European countries carried out coordinated operations, arresting 18 alleged members of the Georgian organized crime group known as the Kutaisi clan. Coordinated by the Italian National Police’s Central Operational Service and the Bari city Squadra Mobile (flying squad), these arrests netted 13 alleged vory v zakone (‘thieves in law’ or ‘thieves within the code’). Overall, there were 7 arrests in Italy, 2 in the Czech Republic, 5 in Lithuania, 2 in Portugal, one in France and one in Hungary. (Some Italian reports also cite arrests in Moscow, but I have yet to see that confirmed.)

This operation, the outcome of an 18-month investigation, was described by Europol as “one of the most significant blows against clans controlled by this high-ranking, elite of the world of Russian-speaking organised crime.”

Perhaps most interesting is that it appears—although this has not been confirmed—that the Hungarian arrest was of Merab Dzhangveladze (“Dzhango”/”Django”), the head of the Kutaisi grouping, and a major player within the Georgian underworld in both Georgia and Russia.

He is a close ally of Tariel Oniani (“Taro”), the vicious senior Georgian gang leader in Russia. He was also a sworn enemy of Aslan Usoyan (“Ded Hasan”), murdered in Moscow in January. Usoyan had formally had Dzhangveladze stripped of his vor v zakone status in 2008, as part of a tit-for-tat struggle with Taro, although this means little in today’s more diffuse and opportunistic underworld. Dzhangveladze may well have been behind the assassinations of both Usoyan and Vyacheslav Ivankov (“Yaponchik”) and has in many ways been Oniani’s right hand while he is in prison.

If Dzhangveladze has indeed been arrested, then this turns a serious blow to the Kutaisi into a devastating one. His brother Levon has in the past acted as his interim lieutenant, but lacks the stature to hold the group together for long. The Kutaisi clan, with an estimated 50 vory v zakone, is one of the most significant Georgian organized crime groups, not least amongst the so-called lavrushniki (“bay leaves”), Georgian gangsters within the Russian underworld. It certainly delivers a serious blow to the extensive Georgian—and, by extension, Eurasian—organized crime in Europe, as well as another example of the increasingly effective coordination of the struggle against them by European police forces.

However, this may also play to underworld developments in Russia. At present, the Usoyan and Oniani networks are locked in a phony war over both deep feuds and future dominance of the “mountaineer” fraction of the underworld, not so much a cold war as a tepid one that could quickly heat up further. If Dzhangveladze is taken out of the picture for long and if the Kutaisi clan are not able to bounce back quickly—two distinct “ifs”—then it does undermine Oniani. It could even embolden Chanturia, Usoyan’s successor, to strike…

Europe-wide arrests of Georgian gangsters, with senior Kutaisi vor seized in Prague

 

uooz__vnahledI’ve noted, both on this blog and elsewhere, that “Russian organized crime” in Europe often is actually Armenian or Georgian–even if today’s Georgian godfathers are frequently based in Russia. It’s a complex and very cosmopolitan underworld, these days, that also manifests itself in the multinational networks through which these gangsters operate. This has been illustrated by the breaking news that a 46-year-old Georgian man, a senior figures within the Kutaisi criminal ‘clan’, has been arrested by ÚOOZ, the Czech organized crime police department.

According to the police, they have been working on Georgian OC since 2011, and since 2012 working especially with Italian law-enforcement because criminal enterprises were conducting crimes elsewhere and moving money into and through the Czech Republic. In particular, the Geogian Kutaisi grouping, led by Merab Dzhangveladze (“Dzhango”/”Django’), was involved in operations in Italy, which included a skhodka sit-down in Milan in December 2011 to resolve disputes with the rival Shushanashvili brothers’ Tbilisi-Rustavi clan, and the murder of a Rustavi man in the city of Bari in 2011 and the retaliatory killing of Revez Tchuradze (“Rezo”), a local Kutaisi factor, in 2012.

After the Italians, led by the Bari magistracy, issued European Arrest Warrants for several individuals on racketeering, conspiracy to commit murder and money laundering charges, 32 people were detained not just in the ČR and Italy, but also Hungary, Lithuania, France, Belgium, Poland, Germany and Portugal. In Prague, officers from ÚOOZ supported by URN anti-terrorist commandoes, seized the as-yet-unnamed Georgian criminal, apparently a member of the criminal subculture of the vory v zakone (although this means very little these days), as well as cash and documents.

There is even a link with the killing of Ded Khasan in Moscow earlier this year; Dzhangveladze is an ally of Tariel Oniani (“Taro”), Hasan’s main foe, and also possibly close to Rovshan Janiev, whom Khasan’s own people have blamed for the murder. Italian police intercepts record him ironically noting that Khasan had warned that if the Kutaisi network tried to penetrate the Moscow underworld, “the city would be spattered in blood”–and that Khasan died shortly afterwards…

UPDATE: EUROPOL PRESS RELEASE

Here’s a handy summary from Europol, although given that all the criminals in question appear to have been Georgians at first glance, maybe :”Russia-speaking” is a little questionable a headline.

HARD BLOW AGAINST RUSSIAN-SPEAKING MAFIA

The Hague, the Netherlands
19 June 2013

Early on 18 June 2013, Europol supported the arrest of 18 suspects, 13 of them ‘thieves in law’ (vor v zakone), from the Georgian Kutaisi clan. This is one of the most significant blows against clans controlled by this high-ranking, elite of the world of Russian-speaking organised crime.

The operation was developed in Italy where the Central Operational Service of the Italian National Police and the Squadra mobile of Bari led the case and arrested 7 people. Other arrests took place simultaneously in the Czech Republic (2), France (1), Hungary (1), Lithuania (5) and Portugal (2). As well as the arrests, weapons, drugs and EUR 100 000 were seized. Belgian, German and Polish law enforcement authorities also provided substantial operational support. This outcome is the result of 18 months of EU-wide intelligence exchange and evidence gathering activities in several European Union countries.

This is the first time in Europe that such a high number (13) of thieves in law have been arrested simultaneously. The arrest of the Kutaisi leader in Hungary is specifically a significant blow to Russian-speaking organised criminals. As well as the leader, the rest of the clan’s hierarchy were arrested. The operation is ongoing and further arrests are expected.

This EU-wide investigation was supported from the outset by Europol specialists who facilitated the exchange of criminal intelligence with other Member States, delivered analytical reports and supported the operation on the spot with a mobile office. Eurojust participated in several operational meetings held during the investigation and Interpol was also present yesterday in the operational centre.

In offering his congratulations to all the services involved in this operation Michel Quillé, Deputy Director (Operations) at Europol said: “In such operations the essential role in bringing separate, sensitive investigations together in a secure environment is exactly what Europol is designed to do. In this way a clear picture of the situation in the EU can be built up, intelligence exchange between Member States can be stimulated and Member States can be alerted to the need for them to launch their own investigations or support ongoing enquiries. This case is an excellent example of such cooperation working to protect EU citizens across several Member States.”

NOTES FOR EDITORS:

Vor v zakone or thieves in law are Eurasian criminals who act as leaders, controllers and regulators of Russian-speaking organised crime. For several years the power balance in this criminal landscape has been in turmoil because of an ongoing conflict between the two main Georgian clans – the Tbilissi and Kutaisi clans. The main reasons for the conflict have been the struggle for important crime investment areas and the ultimate aim of full control over all Eurasian organised crime groups.

The assassination of a Tbilissi clan leader, in January 2013 in Moscow, created a new power vacuum leading to several, violent attempts by key players to strengthen their criminal positions. This has resulted in an increased presence of thieves in law in the EU. EU countries have become a shelter for them to avoid investigation and prosecution in their home jurisdictions. Ease of movement and excellent communications in the EU are an attractive environment for them to deploy and monitor their organised crime groups, re-invest criminal proceeds and hide from possible retaliation from opposing clans in the ongoing power struggle.

Czechs and Balances: arrests in Prague may actually be good news

Ekonom_49_450Prague is, needless to say, agog with the latest and biggest corruption story: the raids this morning by some 400 police officers, led by the ÚOOZ organized crime division, which led to a series of arrests. They included several members of parliament including the former head of the parliamentary party of the Civic Democrats (ODS)—the main party in the increasingly shaky governing coalition—Petr Tluchor, former agriculture minister Ivan Fuksa (ODS), as well as Government Office director and CEZ energy utility board member Lubomir Poul, former Military Intelligence chief Ondrej Pálenik, who now heads the State Material Reserves Administration. However, perhaps the most politically-charged is the arrest of Jana Nagyová, head of Prime Minister Petr Nečas’s private office head (and, according to scurrilous, unconfirmed, but not necessarily incorrect rumor, the now-divorcing PM’s lover). The very fate of the government may hinge on Nagyová’s fate, with the prospect of a no-confidence motion being tabled or even a fragmentation of that is already a fragile and, arguably, dysfunctional government.

Parliament interrupting its session, the value of the Czech koruna dipped slightly, and president Miloš Zeman—who may relish the opportunity to throw his weight around more—has called a meeting tomorrow with Nečas, Justice Minister Pavel Blažek and the national police chief. The main opposition party, the Social Democrats, have predictably called for the “immediate resignation of the prime minister” and early elections but perhaps the most serious risk is that this forced (or allows) the junior government partner, foreign minister Karel Schwarzenberg’s TOP 09, to bring Nečas down.

In contrast with the strikingly efficient handling of the recent floods, for which both local and national government deserve full credit, this looks like a shambles. The current government has been battered by a series of corruption cases that risks making Nečas look like Silvio Berlusconi minus the bunga-bunga parties. Perhaps it is no wonder that Czechs regard corruption as one of the most serious challenges to their state and foreign observers concur.

But let me add a note of unfashionable optimism here. This is not a corruption story so much as an anticorruption one. Of course, ideally the Czech Republic would be a shining beacon of probity, Denmark with knedliky, but in all conscience, this is hardly—yet—likely. Forty-plus years of Soviet rule and all the value-distorting, economy-strangling, society-warping pressure that entailed and then a crash transition to the market take time to assimilate. As is, 54th out of 176 in the 2012 Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index, the ČR is near the mid-point of the ex-Soviet satellite states, between Estonia (32nd) and Bulgaria (75th). Lobbyists who go beyond the usual bounds, illegal wiretaps, embezzlement, sweetheart deals; they are hardly unique to the Czechs.

So a certain level of corruption within the elite is, while unconscionable, also probably inevitable. When corruption cases come to light, though, the real message is not that corruption exists, but that it comes to light. The tragic but also encouraging irony is that Nečas, who may be brought down by this investigation, was instrumental in giving prosecutors the resources and political autonomy to allow them properly to investigate corruption. All countries have at least some level of corruption—the mark of a mature, law-governed state is that even the most powerful people are not exempt from justice. While many high-level corruption cases in the ČR never seem to get anywhere and there are still certainly serious challenges, progress does seem to be being made. In short, this is a painful moment for many within the Czech political class, but these may be growing pains.

Postscript: Nečas and his apparent resignation

I write is as the news breaks that PM Nečas is apparently to resign tomorrow in response. To be sure, this might be because some unsavory facts relating to him are about to break or because of pressure within the cabinet, but in general terms, it is likewise counter-intuitively encouraging when a senior figure finds himself having to (or wanting to) take responsibility for the misdeeds of members of his team. I cannot help but contrast that with what happens in Russia, Ukraine and similar countries where democracy and the rule of law are so much more weakly rooted and where corruption is ignored, mobilized as a weapon against enemies (and a treat for friends) and nothing in and of itself to discomfort the ruling powers. The Czechs may be embarrassed by their current travails, but they should be perversely proud. Kinda. OK, better not to have a government mired in corruption in the first place, but if you are going to have that, then arrests, resignations and ample public disclosure and opprobrium are all signs of a healthy political culture…

Prague, Moscow, and the value of speaking firmly, clearly and with one voice

A cliché, yes, but a cool one

A cliché, yes, but a cool one

It is, of course, a hackneyed cliché to talk about the “Russian bear.” Nonetheless, it is fair to say that prodding either with a stick is equally ill-advised. However, the usual advice on encountering a bear is to give it its space, be submissive, be quiet. That doesn’t work so well with Moscow. By the same token it is a dangerous caricature to suggest (as some sadly still do) that force or assertiveness is “all Russia understands.” However, what is certainly true is that meekness and the appearance of division tend to encourage Moscow to become more confrontational. Consider, for example, the marked failure of the US government’s “re-set” policy, which has failed to deter Russia from buttressing Syrian tyranny, spying on and perhaps murdering its critics abroad, publicly outing US agents, hounding Ambassador McFaul and doing everything but kicking sand in Obama’s face.

In this context—and given that I’m in Prague for the summer, I’m especially interested in Czech-Russian relations—I was perturbed by the details of the extradition to Moscow of Russian businessman Alexei Torubarov in May, especially in the context of what seems a growing assertiveness by Russia in Central and Southern Europe.

(more…)

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