A Quick and Provisional GRU Update

Update: the afternoon I wrote this, it was announced that Lt Gen Igor Korobov has been appointed. Needless to say, I take full credit for forcing the Kremlin’s hand ;). Meanwhile Dyumin, perhaps as a consolation prize, perhaps because his position at the defence ministry had thus become untenable, moves across to become acting governor of Tula. So the military win this round – but apparently not easily.

 

GRU logoA month ago tomorrow, military intelligence chief Igor Sergun died of heart failure in the suburbs of Moscow (not in Lebanon, not anything exciting…). That the announcement of his successor would be delayed because of the long Christmas-to-Orthodox-New-Year holidays was expected. But despite a couple of times hearing suggestions that a name was about to be announced, no one yet.

It’s bad enough that we don’t even know what the agency should be called — it’s traditional form, the GRU, that even Putin uses, or the more anonymous GU (“the Main Directorate”) in official parlance? I talk a little about this in War On The Rocks here. But as the leadership vacuum continues to resist being filled, it is hard not to assume this is because the appointment is proving contentious. As near as I can tell–and all this needless ought to be taken with caution, as the people who really know aren’t going to tell–there is a three-cornered, asymmetric fight:

Steady As She Goes. The obvious stakeholders want the obvious choice: defence minister Shoigu, CoGS Gerasimov (probably) and the bulk of the GRU itself want one of Sergun’s deputies to succeed: Vyacheslav Kondrashev, Sergei Gizunov, Igor Lelin, or most likely, Igor Korobov. Obviously the new director’s interests and personality would have an impact, but essentially this is the continuity choice.

A Fork in the Road. Seemingly the least-likely option, being floated by a few senior figures within the regular Ground Forces, is one of their number. This is really to push forward their own agenda, which is to split the GRU, with one portion sticking to the “spy” stuff, and the other–taking with it the Spetsnaz commandoes–engaging in tactical reconnaissance, special ops and that kid of thing. I don’t at present see any wider constituency for this, although in such circumstances it is always possible the main candidates cancel each other out and open the way for the mutually-least-objectionable one.

Praetorians to the Fore. There has been something of a trend of late to see security apparatus insiders known to Putin, especially from the Presidential Security Service (SBP) and its parent, the Federal Guard Service (FSO) parachuted into key positions across the security sector. It could be that Putin will want to make sure a personal client is heading the GRU, in which case the obvious candidate would be Lt. Gen. Alexander Dyumin, whose strangely meteoric rise from presidential bullet-catcher to deputy defence minister in less than a year I have sketched here.

What I have to confess I don’t see any signs of, is a land-grab by any of the other intel agencies, notably SVR and FSB. The military is still not a bloc to mess with, and any such move would unite them more than anything else.

The Unexpected Death of Russia’s military intelligence (GRU) chief, Igor Sergun

SergunToday, news broke about the death yesterday (3 January) of 58-year-old Colonel General Igor Sergun, head of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff, better known as the GRU.

No cause of death has yet been announced, but there has been no suggestion of anything shady or strange about his demise, even at this relatively young age (especially by the standards of Russian military gerontocracy!). No doubt more details will follow tomorrow; today it’s just the hurried eulogies. Putin issued a statement that said “Colleagues and subordinates knew him as a real military officer, an experienced and competent commander, a man of great courage, a true patriot. He was respected for his professionalism, strength of character, honesty and integrity.” Defence Minister Shoigu and the Collegium of the ministry extolled “the bright memory of a wonderful man, a true son of Russian patriots of the Motherland […who…] forever remain in our hearts.”

Sergun was an extremely important figure in the revival of the fortunes of the GRU, an agency that was pretty much at rock bottom when he took it over at the end of 2011. Since then, it has regained control over the Spetsnaz special forces, been crucial in the seizure of Crimea and operations in the Donbas, emerged as the lead agency for dealing with violent non-state actors and generally consolidated its position as a crucial instrument of today’s “non-linear war.” Indeed, it was a perverse accolade to this effect that he was included in the EU’s post-Crimea Western sanctions list.

It will be interesting to see who replaces Sergun and whether they are able to consolidate and maintain this turnaround. Reportedly — and thanks for Michael Kofman for bringing this to my attention — one of Sergun’s deputies is recently-promoted Lt. Gen. Alexei Dyumin, formerly of the Presidential Security Service (SBP) and close to Putin not just from that role but also as a dacha neighbour and ice hockey team player. If Dyumin gets the job, he’ll have a solid krysha, political cover, and it will also represent one more example of the colonisation of the security structures by veterans of the SBP and its parent organisation, the FSO. But on the other hand, Dyumin — unlike Sergun — is not a career military intelligence officer but essentially a security guard. Whether or not he will be anywhere near as successful operationally, and whether he is willing to bring unwelcome news to the president may well be another matter.

In any case, we await details. I’ll follow up as they emerge.

If US Intelligence on Russia is Broken (A Bit), What Can Be Done To Help Fix It?

How can we know what he's thinking?

How can we know what he’s thinking?

General Philip Breedlove, Supreme Allied Commander Europe, recently gently but unmistakably reprimanded the US intelligence community for its “lack of ability to see into Russia, especially at the operational and tactical level.” While he acknowledged change was under way, even then he made it clear that this was very, very much a work in progress: “We’re gently turning the nose of this ship to get back to what we need to be looking at.” Is Russia befuddling US intelligence, and if so what should be done about it?

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First Thoughts on Arrest of Russian Spy in New York

SVRSo today the FBI charged three Russians with being spies, agents of the SVR (Foreign Intelligence Service). Two are already out of the country and were in diplomatic cover anyway, so the worse the US government could have done would have been to “PNG” them (persona non grata — in other words, kick them out). The third, though, Evgeni Buryakov, was in “non-official cover”, apparently* working undercover at Vneshekonombank, the Russian Bank for Development and Foreign Economic Affairs. More will emerge about the case and I’ll have more time later to ponder it, not least thanks to tomorrow’s snow day, but here are some first thoughts:

This underscores my view that Russian espionage in the West is not only intensive and extensive, it is geared for the long haul. Many of the recruitment targets the SVR were after were not especially valuable now, they were being cultivated for years in the future or for potential future tasking.

This is proper espionage, by which I don’t necessarily mean especially skilled (it’s hard to tell so far whether it was or was not), but the methodical collection of information, leads and assets that truly establishes intel resources rather than the showy and expensive nonsense of the deep undercover illegals of the “Anna Chapman Ring” (not that she was their leading light).

Russia is still heavily using every state-affiliated agency available for its illegals. Vnesheconombank is a state agency rather than a real bank, by the way, and if you’re wondering why I assume this is where he worked, well, it’s because someone of the same name is listed on their webpage as a deputy rep:

Unless there are two Russians of the same name working in NYC in a Russian bank, I can assume this is a "gotcha"

Unless there are two Russians of the same name working in NYC in a Russian bank, I can assume this is a “gotcha”

Russians are very heavily invested in gathering economic and econ-political intelligence, as well as the usual political/military stuff. In part this is part of general assessment of Western capacities, but also to support Russian economic interests and, these days, to identify not only potential scope for sanctions but also ways of undermining the Western economy. One danger, after all, of the sanctions regime over Ukraine is that it has further strengthened Moscow’s awareness of the potential in the weaponization of finance…

More anon.

Russia’s Intelligence System – a presentation

Screen Shot 2015-01-24 at 12.03.10I was delighted to be invited to speak to the 2015 Annual Symposium of CASIS, the Canadian Association for Security and Intelligence Studies, in Ottawa. I was discussing Russia’s Intelligence System and to try and say something meaningful in just half an hour, I concentrated not just on the ‘who’–which agencies there were within the Russian intelligence and security community–so much as what was distinctive about how they operate in real life. My final conclusions were that the Kremlin ought to beware what it wished for, that it had agencies which were functional in appearance, but politically often counter-productive:

  • They are technically highly capable, even if sometimes badly tasked
  • They now reinforce Putin’s assumptions, not inform his world view
  • They reinforce the world’s view of Putinism
  • They are cynical opportunists at home, loyal to themselves

(To this end, I still suspect they may be key elements of what I have called the “Seventh Column,” the insiders who may ultimately turn on Putin.)

The slides for my talk (© Mark Galeotti 2015) are at: 150123-Galeotti-CASIS-RussiasIntelSystem

Blowback’s a bitch: MH17 and the east Ukraine campaign’s long-term costs for Russia

MH17Policy makers, especially policy makers who have never seen action, are often seduced by covert operations. They see them as the perfect policy instrument: cheap, deniable, effective. Yes, there can be tremendously effective covert or at least non-conventional operations and campaigns, but just as all intelligence operations must come to terms with the fundamental truth that nothing is guaranteed to stay secret for ever, so too these sneaky campaigns can very easily either fail or, even more likely, have unexpected consequences that may overshadow the intended outcome. After all, while Al-Qaeda and the rise of Osama Bin Laden cannot entirely be charted back to the US campaign to support Islamist rebels fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan–had the social, political and intellectual climate not been ready for the message of jihad then they would have remained on the fringes–nonetheless there is a strong connection.

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