As the terrible events in Kiev unfold, I’m getting increasing media queries about Berkut (‘Golden Eagle’), the Ukrainian riot police busily out on their skull-cracking work, so I thought it might be useful to post a quick summary here. In short, they are the descendants of the Soviet OMON and thus very similar to their Russian OMON counterparts (the acronym now stands for Special Purpose Mobile Units, even since the militsiya was renamed politsiya and no one much liked OPON as a new name). They even wear the same blue urban camouflage or black uniforms (although just to show that they are their own men, they wear maroon berets instead of their Russians’ black ones). In other words, Berkut (click here for a gung-ho recruitment video) fulfills a range of roles, from armed support to the regular police (such as in raids on gang headquarters), through additional patrollers on the streets. However, their prime and backstop role, as here, is in public order duties. Members either apply directly or are recruited from regular police and disproportionately served in the paratroopers or Naval Infantry (marines). Whatever one may feel about what they do, in fairness they are pretty good at it: they know how to pick the right kinds of recruits, train them well and keep them at a good level of physical and moral conditioning. As I say, this is a technical observation about their skills, not a moral judgement…
Berkut: Yanukovich’s stormtroopers?
Posted by Mark Galeotti on December 1, 2013
https://inmoscowsshadows.wordpress.com/2013/12/01/berkut-yanukovichs-stormtroopers/
Coming Up For Air
I’ve been pretty absent on this blog for a while: a combination of a time-consuming side-project and an equally time-consuming completion of a book manuscript as well as generally life getting in the way, Still, the project is essentially over and the book — Russia’s Chechen Wars, 1994-2009, for Osprey’s Essential Histories series — has been submitted, maps and all (though it is only scheduled to see the light of day in December 2014), so I am contemplating the prospect of not having to be working pretty much every hour available. Any day now, once I’ve caught up on the backlog of everything which didn’t get done before…
Posted by Mark Galeotti on November 25, 2013
https://inmoscowsshadows.wordpress.com/2013/11/25/coming-up-for-air/
Latest on Treasury’s Campaign against Russian/Eurasian Organized Crime
Under the terms of Executive Order 13581, the US Treasury has been seeking to locate and freeze assets associated with key organized crime kingpins, a range of Japanese, Latin American, Italian and Russian/Eurasian ne’er-do-wells. On 30 October, a new set of targets was announced, including six people and four businesses “linked to the Brothers’ Circle, a Eurasian crime syndicate.” I’ve written elsewhere (here and here) that I still do not believe that the Brothers’ Circle, as a specific crime group or “coordinating body”, actually exists and instead that it is a—perfectly reasonable—fiction-of-convenience to allow this Order to be applied against criminals operating within the very loose and often mutable networks of Russian/Eurasian crime.
Posted by Mark Galeotti on October 31, 2013
https://inmoscowsshadows.wordpress.com/2013/10/31/latest-on-treasurys-campaign-against-russianeurasian-organized-crime/
Is the MVD getting into the macroeconomics game, or hinting at criticism of the Kremlin?
My eye was caught by a RIA Novosti news item today. For the sake of completeness, here’s the original and a hasty and rough translation:
МВД ожидает стабилизации общественно-политической ситуации в России
Posted by Mark Galeotti on October 28, 2013
https://inmoscowsshadows.wordpress.com/2013/10/28/is-the-mvd-getting-into-the-macroeconomics-game-or-hinting-at-criticism-of-the-kremlin/
The FSO: praetorians, protectors, political force
Last week, I used my column in the Moscow News to ruminate about the Federal Protection Service (FSO), and the paradox raised by the sight of an officer hurriedly relighting the Olympic torch with his cigarette lighter, that this is at once one of the most visible yet secretive agencies within the Russian security apparatus. I wanted to use my blog—where I don’t have to worry about word limits!—to revisit that text and develop some of the thoughts within it.
On the one hand the FSO has a high profile, from the blue-jacketed security officers outside Lenin’s tomb and the goose-stepping Kremlin Guards at the Eternal Flame, to the inevitable sunglasses-and-earpieces coterie of bodyguards around President Putin. And it even gets a cameo role in the Call of Duty video game series.
Posted by Mark Galeotti on October 24, 2013
https://inmoscowsshadows.wordpress.com/2013/10/24/the-fso-praetorians-protectors-political-force/
Updated after Biryulevo: Is Navalny a Revolutionary? If So, Which One?
A few days back, I wrote this note: Is he a reformer, a radical, a revolutionary? Indeed, what do these kinds of distinctions mean? A reformer wants to change and ameliorate the existing system, a revolutionary wants to change it. In that context, it seems hard–at least, if we believe his rhetoric–not to see Navalny as a revolutionary. Following this thought, and in the hope of being able to say something about the man that hasn’t already been said in the umpteen articles, profiles and posts about him, I ruminated in a trilogy of articles for Russia! magazine, about the contrasts and similarities one might be able to see between Navalny and three icons (or devils) of the ‘official’ Russian Revolution: Lenin, Trotsky and Bukharin. Times change, but the underlying realities of power and the human condition do not. The key issue, ultimately, will be whether his focus will be of tearing down the old order or working with elements within it to change it. After all, a revolution need not be built on an uncompromising campaign of destruction, it can be negotiated–and likewise what may seem like a revolution in its sound and fury may, as the USSR discovered, actually replace one autocracy with another…
Since, then, the events of Biryulevo, in which the murder of a Russian man by a man presumed to be from the Caucasus sparked rolling race riots in Moscow, have also given Navalny the chance to speak out on race issues. It’s long been known that under the cheery liberal demeanor there lurk some attitudes which, to be honest, are much more traditionally and recognizably Russian. Certainly his initial responses, both through re-tweets of racist messages and then tweets of his own did not bode well. On his blog,he then proceeded to blame the riots on the Kremlin above all for encouraging and allowing the influx of workers and migrants from abroad and also from the North Caucasus (and let’s remember that these are Russian citizens; it would be like a mayoral candidate for New York wanting to bar African-Americans from southern states). He then went on to advocate a popular vote on tougher visa regimes for Central Asians, admitting graciously that “not every Central Asian is trafficking heroin” (no, they are more likely to be doing the miserable jobs no one else wants), but still blaming them for drug addition, crime and disorder.
Navalny is a politician. He is also a Russian and prey to many of the same unpleasant prejudices that even otherwise enlightened and humane Russians often do. (The irony is that Putin, while undoubtedly a Russian state nationalist, actually appears–as near as we can tell–to be less of a racist than Navalny. Go figure.) I can see the potential political merits of positioning yourself as the tribune of the angry and disenfranchised Russian lumpenproletariat (and judging by the images, those mobs don’t get much more lumpen). I can also accept that there are issues of crime, alienation and even intimidation connected with living near particular concentrations of migrants. Navalny is not one to encourage pogroms, to be sure, but at the same time, by sympathizing with the rioters, by presenting the paroxysm of violence that ripped southern Moscow as the desperate cry for help by victims, then he is at the very least giving violent racists aid and comfort.
I wonder if, returning to my revolutionary comparisons, this may prove to be Navalny’s equivalent of Lenin’s decision to seize power in 1917; a moment when political opportunism begets its own original sin. By seizing power in a country so unready for a proletarian movement, Lenin virtually ensured that a Stalin (or at least some kind of authoritarian modernizer) would arise, despite Bukharin’s hopes for NEP. In other words, the political compromises he made then–and to win the Civil War–actually doomed what positive potential there may have been in the Bolshevik movement. If Navalny becomes similarly seduced by the idea that he can rise to power, and do reformist good, by harnessing this embittered, angry racism, then he may well find that he cannot so easily tame these energies. Instead, they may possess him: the hungry ghosts of the Black Hundreds, of General Skobelev (the butcher of Geok-Tepe), of Pamyat, all await the summons…
Posted by Mark Galeotti on October 14, 2013
https://inmoscowsshadows.wordpress.com/2013/10/14/updated-after-biryulevo-is-navalny-a-revolutionary-if-so-which-one/





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