This is a summary of the discussion at the last of the current series of online Strategic Competition Seminar Series (SCSS) webinars held on 19 December 2023 by the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies (GCMC) in Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany. The summary reflects the overall tenor of the discussion, and no specific element necessarily should be presumed to be the view of either of the participants. 

Introduction

Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Gen. Valeriy Zaluzhnyy published an article entitled “Modern positional warfare and how to win it” (The Economist, 1 November 2023).  Gen. Zaluzhnyy used the phrase “positional stalemate”, noting that fighting Russia has turned into positional, trench/artillery warfare due to defense in depth secured by minefields akin to WWI-style attrition. On 4 November President Volodymyr Zelensky stated: “This situation is not a stalemate” and “We don’t have the right to give up. What’s the alternative? What, we need to give away a third of our country? That would only be the beginning. We know what a frozen conflict is, we’ve already drawn our conclusions. We need to work more with our air defense partners, unblock the skies, and give our fighters the possibility to carry out offensive operations.” (Meduza, 4 November 2024) Speculation regarding disunity in Ukrainian strategic decision-making elite – a theme exacerbated by Russian media propaganda and fake videos designed to demoralize Ukrainian society – focused on apparent strained relationships within Ukraine’s executive authorities and the erosion of political willingness in the US and Europe to continue to provide military and economic support to Ukraine.

This all combines to generate a pervasive sense amongst the western commentariat (e.g. Rachman, Financial Times, 18 December 2023) of increased risk that Ukraine exhausts its human and materiel resources needed to defend itself against Russian aggression and then faces collapse. Over the next 1-2 years, time is on Russia’s side. Attritional warfare harms Ukraine more than Russia as Russia’s economy is ten times and its population 4 times that of Ukraine. As Ukraine has more limited manpower resources than seemingly Russia, a ceasefire/armistice on Russian terms is the best realistic outcome for Ukraine and so western partners should steer Ukraine in this direction. As such, the $61 billion requested by the Biden Administration would only slow the inevitable. Better, they argue, for Ukraine to negotiate an armistice (which may lead to a peace settlement) now when Ukraine could get better terms than wait and lose more in the future.

In this third FY24 monthly virtual seminar we place Gen. Zaluzhnyy’s article in context, explore the meaning of “positional stalemate”, and stress test its implications. Neither Russia nor Ukraine has the strategic initiative, but Russia has not yet been able to realize its advantage in manpower. Determining Russia’s balance of capabilities and forces for a long attritional war is a necessary part of the puzzle, as is thegap between what Ukraine determines that it needs to effect breakthroughs and what the West can provide at this point, as well as Ukraine’s indigenous capacity to defend itself and regenerate its forces. 

Ukraine, “Modern positional warfare and how to win it”

Gen. Zaluzhnyy offered a military assessment of a high intensity and dynamic stalemate as it unfolded over 2023 and, as the article’s title suggests, it identifies what Ukraine needs move from “positional stalemate” back to a war of maneuver: “The simple fact is that we see everything the enemy is doing and they see everything we are doing. In order for us to break this deadlock we need something new, like the gunpowder which the Chinese invented and which we are still using to kill each other.” Stalemates get broken and characterize only certain points in time. To move beyond “positional stalemate” to breach and then breakthrough, Gen. Zaluzhnyy identified five systems to “win the war”: air superiority through aviation, advanced electronic warfare [EW], enhanced counter-battery capabilities, modern mine-breaching technologies and building up reserves. Ultimately, Ukraine needs to develop its indigenous home-grown arms production, increase its capacity to train reserves on its territory and, almost two years into full-scale war, improve troop rotation. Gen. Zaluzhnyy’s recognition of “positional stalemate” was not a roadmap from the battlefield to the negotiating table and a ceasefire on Russian terms.

“Positional stalemate” is in fact a “dynamic stalemate” in several respects. First, although neither Russia nor Ukraine currently have the forces capable of exploiting and sustaining only local rather than major offensive operations, even though these will continue to be a feature of the war in 2024. Second, although Gen. Zaluzhnyy’s article focuses on land warfare, arguably Russian land warfare is designed to secure Russian naval supremacy in the Black Sea. In 2014 Russia annexed Crimea, in 2018 it built the Kerch Strait bridge and the 2022 invasion established the “land corridor” to Crimea. Ukraine has been able to degrade Russian naval capabilities, both in terms of quantity (19 ships destroyed) and symbolic strikes against the Donskoi nuclear submarine in dry dock and the HQ of the Russian Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol.  In addition, numerous Russian “red-lines” breached with no response, thus undermining Russia’s deterrence capability. Ukraine is able to secure a grain deal that decrease pressure on global grain prices. In addition, the balance of power in the Black Sea has shifted from Russia to Ukraine and NATO member (Bulgaria, Romania and Türkiye) maritime forces. Third, both sides suffer from the lack of resources. The rate at which Ukraine can “metabolize” additional weapons systems, such as the F-16’s and ATACMS, shapes its operational art, as does Russia’s ability to replenish its forces with domestic and important (Iranian and North Korean) systems and ammunition.  Ukraine will increase its drone warfare in Crimea over the winter, targeting Russian logistics, but while drone attacks are easier to conduct they are less impactful than missile attacks. Both Russia and Ukraine are able to intercept most drone attacks, but for infrastructure to continue to operate, especially indigenous and joint military production facilities Ukraine needs improved air defense capabilities (see forthcoming CNA report). Fourth, in the context of a longer war, both sides face risks at the “front” and Russia, for example, compensates by escalating operations designed to limit the ability of Ukraine to fight, including cyber-attacks, assassinations, disinformation operations designed to undermine Western support for Ukraine and bring psychological pressure to bear.   

Russia’s Balance of Capabilities and Forces for a Long War?

In order to secure Western support, it is in Ukraine’s interest to exaggerate Russian strengths as part of that request. But to what degree is the Russian Federation able to win a long-term war of attrition with Ukraine? If/when EU and US aid packages to Ukraine are approved in January 2024, might this change our appreciation of Russia’s staying power? President Vladimir Putin radiates optimism but to what extent does such confidence reflect reality?  We can note negative trends in Russia’s ability to sustain high intensity combat operations.

First, in terms of the production of military equipment, over the last seven months Russia’s Defense Industrial Complex (DIC) has been operating at maximum capacity. Through 2024 production will start to decrease as equipment becomes exhausted, Soviet stock will be not be replenished and sanctions will degrade efforts further. Through 2024 the tensions and trade-offs between the labor supply needed for the DIC and attempts to expand the Russian police force and able-bodied troops for the “front line” will increase. Second, manpower shortages matter in land warfare.  In 1914 Romanov Russia could in the space of several months mobilize 5 million troops from a population equivalent of today. The Soviet Union achieved something similar in 1941. This number is unimaginable today due to a combination of changes in society and less developed systems for planning and carrying out military mobilization. Manpower deficits make themselves felt in terms of training cadres and battlefield troops and in this respect, Russia will likely be in late 2024 in a weaker position than it was in 2023. Russia likely currently “expends” more troops on the battlefield than it is able to replenish, not least due to the high losses the Russian Armed Forces experience in its attempts to capture Kupyansk and Avdiivka and prevent Ukrainian advances on Tokmak.  In addition, the need to place police cordons around mosques after Friday prayers to dragoon troops suggests that Russia’s autumn draft does not go well.  Volunteers are contracted for 6 months as are prisoners and leave service when their time is served. Those mobilized in September/October 2022 appear to have indefinite contracts or until the “Special Military Operation” (SVO) ends, a situation that is just starting to cause protests among family members of those mobilized. Desertion rates among serving soldiers and avoidance of mobilization are also factors that must be accounted for.

Russian manpower deficits are a vulnerability that could conceivably be exploited by Ukraine. Russians abroad represent a potential recruitment pool for Ukraine’s Foreign Legion and to fight for “Free Russia”, particularly those that left Russia in February/March 2022 as they opposed the war, rather than the September 2022 wave leaving for Armenia, Kazakhstan, Georgia and Türkiye, for example, to avoid mobilization. Such recruits would need a common binding ideological program (a “post-Putin Russian Parliamentary Republic”?) and identifiable political leadership in exile willing to attract such support.  However, both are not readily apparent and would be difficult to attain, though numbers and fighting ability would matter less than their destructive symbolic effects they would have on mobilization within Russia.

Third, Russia’s Defense Ministry Collegium held on 19 December 2022 outlined an increase in the size of the Russian military from its current 900,000 to 1.5 million, with conscription time doubling from one to two years and 695,000 contracted soldiers.  It is highly unlikely that Russia can train, restructure (from brigades to divisions) and expand its military while its field army is tied down in Ukraine. On 14 December 2023 at the “Results of the Year with Vladimir Putin”, Putin reiterated Russia’s SVO goals as “demilitarization” and “denazification” – the former goal (equated with Ukrainian attrition rates) has been a constant since February 2022, the latter has now made a comeback. Although both are broad and unquantifiable goals, which themselves suggest that Putin is reserving for himself the ability to declare “mission accomplished”, at the very least Russia will seek to take full control over the territories it has declared are formally and constitutionally Russian: certainly, Donetsk, Luhansk and Crimea and perhaps Zaporizhzhya, Kherson and parts of Kharkiv region. If this is so, any attempt to reformat and expand the Russian military is a mid-term prospect (8-10 years?), particularly as Ukraine is firm set on degrading and destroying Russian forces.

Conclusions

Some western appreciation of the “glaring mismatch between ends and the available means” (Haass and Kupchan, Foreign Affairs, 17 November 2023) leads to the conclusion that a ceasefire would save lives and allow for economic reconstruction. Russia’s resources are assumed to be constant and infinite whereas Ukraine’s are not. The fact is that Russia would use a ceasefire to rearm, that most proponents of a ceasefire do not envisage NATO trip-wire troops in Ukraine but rather suggest that the OSCE or UN “monitors” would be sufficient. In terms of tangible issues such as manpower, a population in Ukraine of 33-34 million and in Russia of 140 million does not translate into battlefield numbers and effects. Intangibles, such as morale, training and leadership also matter. As Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba noted: “If the war were only about numbers, we would have already lost. Russia may try to outnumber us, but the right strategy, advanced planning, and adequate support will allow us to effectively strike back.” (Foreign Affairs, 14 December 2023)  

In late 2023 a misreading of the Zaluzhnyy article has generated a false dilemma: the West either keeps Ukraine in a fight that it cannot win or pushes it to forge a ceasefire with Russia.  However, Ukraine can sustain its position through 2024 by focusing on defense and regeneration while allowing Russia to waste its forces through attacks that are likely to fail. At his end of year press conference on 19 December 2023, President Zelensky pledged to produce a million drones in 2024, rejected NATO membership for only part of Ukraine, and stated that Ukraine sought to mobilize an additional 450,000 to 500,000 individuals. Ukraine can then potentially return to the offensive in 2025 because it will have built up its forces while Russia will be less strong due to the previously discussed deterioration of arms production and manpower shortages.  

As Ukraine’s willingness to resist Russian aggression in its war of national survival is the golden constant, the end game in Ukraine becomes a function of the West’s understanding of the first and second order effects of Ukraine’s defeat (the West’s global survival?) and its political will to take the necessary steps to avoid it. In this respect, the EU (EUR 50 bn) and US ($61 bn) military and other aid packages for Ukraine expected in January 2024 are litmus tests of western commitment.

Disclaimer

This summary reflects the views of the authors (Dr. Pavel Baev, Dr. Yevgeniya Gaber, Dr. Mark Galeotti, Dr. Dmitry Gorenburg and Dr Graeme P. Herd) and are not necessarily the official policy of the United States, Germany, or any other governments.

GCMC, Garmisch-Partenkirchen, 19 December 2023.

Lawrence Freedman, the doyen of British war studies scholars, recently published a thoughtful piece on his ‘Comment is Freed’ substack taking issue with something I had previously written in the Sunday Times, encapsulated by my line ‘real strategy is to attempt to outlast the West’s interest in Ukraine’ such that ‘not losing is tantamount to a win in his book.’ (‘Why “Not losing” is not tantamount to winning,’ 23 November 2023) It is a lengthy and admirably comprehensive piece, so I thought it was worth a response, to highlight some of the difference in our perspectives – which are found across the commentariat – as well as the common ground.

End State vs Process

First of all, when Freedman and I disagree on Putin ‘winning by not losing,’ he is talking, I think, about an end state while I am talking about a process: one can be ‘winning’ for a long time before actually achieving a win – and, indeed, win and win and eventually lose. Just ask Napoleon or Hitler.

Of course, I agree that the current situation, a hard-fought battle to hold on to portions of south-eastern Ukraine, is not what Putin wants. His goal – and more on that later – is to have achieved some kind of victory, or at least something that he can spin as victory, which will allow him not to be spending a third of his federal budget on the military and which has some kind of legitimacy and stability. So my take is that at present, while Putin would be delighted with actual progress in the war (hence the meatgrinder offensive at Avdiivka, for example), he is at least satisfied with the status quo. High hopes for Kyiv’s counter-offensive have been dashed; ‘Ukraine fatigue’ is a real thing; there are renewed suggestions that the USA and some other European countries may be pressing Zelensky to open negotiations; and sanctions have not had the kind of quick and devastating impact on his economy that some of their boosters hoped.

That does not in any way preclude a shift to a more offensive strategy in the future. It is hard to see quite what that would mean, admittedly, given that the current smaller-scale operations seem to be consuming whatever capabilities Russia may have. Yet who knows what 2024 will offer, especially if Putin takes the politically-costly step of a further mobilisation. Maybe he will be encouraged to be more ambitious, maybe more conservative.

Plausible Victories

This is, after all, another key issue. Putin does not have one single, immutable goal or strategy. To be sure, his initial intent was to impose a compliant proxy regime on Kyiv, but he seems quickly to have realised that this looked impossible. I’m sure he’d still love to see such a regime, but it does not appear to be an active objective. Indeed, even in the ultimately-abortive Istanbul negotiations in March 2022, Moscow was looking for guarantees of Ukrainian neutrality and clear claim to the pre-February occupied territories, rather than anything more expansive.

In other words, Putin will take what he feels he can get, when he feels the time is right (or that he has no alternative). He has already demonstrated a degree of pragmatism, abandoning his initial drive on Kyiv and focusing instead on the south-east. Indeed, in other conflicts and crises he has shown a capacity to accept the best-achievable over the ideal. In the South Caucasus, given that he is busy in Ukraine, he accepted Turkey intruding into the region through its alliance with Azerbaijan, even though for years he had been trying to resist it. In the case of Ukraine, we should not under-estimate the scope he has to define the outcomes, at least to the Russian population. It is not just a question of his control over the domestic media apparatus, but also the way he has developed this new narrative, that this is not really a war with Ukraine as such, but with the whole West. In that context, even small wins can be presented as actually impressive David-versus-Goliath successes.

Why am I talking so much about spin? Because ultimately, ending a war is as much a political calculation as starting one. Neither side looks set to ‘lose’ this war in the sense of a cataclysmic defeat that leaves the other in control of its capital and territory. Instead, the end is likely to be the result of a painful cost-benefit assessment that balances the dangers faced and damage taken against the prospects for a better outcome. Realistically speaking, I feel that Moscow’s maximum-plausible ‘win’ would mean not just occupying the annexed regions and forcing Ukraine explicitly or implicitly to accept that, but also imposing neutrality on its neighbour. Indeed, this is the kind of deal various Kremlin-adjacent mouthpieces are still trying to sell. Conversely, Kyiv’s best hopes would presumably be the expulsion of all Russian troops from all occupied territory (including Crimea) and likewise some explicit or implicit acknowledgement of both defeat (which will mean reparations of some kind, although I don’t expect to see Putin in a war crimes tribunal) and also Ukraine’s true sovereignty, expressed and guaranteed by NATO membership or the like.

I can’t help suspecting that, although ultimately I think the shooting will someday stop and Ukraine become part of both NATO and the EU, neither side will get even these more constrained notions of a ‘full’ victory. In that context, much will depend on what both Ukraine and the Kremlin feel they can accept, and whether they think another six months, year or whatever of war is both bearable and likely to lead to a better outcome.

However much Putin cares about Ukraine – and his historically-skewed notions that it is really no more than a part of Russia’s historical and cultural patrimony appear genuine – I suspect he cares about survival more. We have already seen political concerns limit military decisions, from the delay in abandoning Kherson to the hesitance about further mobilisation. In characteristic style, Putin continues to try and hedge his bets, to have both guns and butter, something which cannot be sustained for ever. Indeed, the assumptions behind the 2024 budget, with its massive defence spend, are precisely that this will not be repeated in 2025.

Now vs Then

Hence the importance of what may otherwise be seen as semantic quibbling over ‘winning’ and ‘losing.’ Clearly Putin is at present not satisfied with what he has now, although in a year’s time, with Western ammunition production finally scaling up and another hundred thousand plus dead Russians and a budget under pressure, it might look more appealing. He may well be tempted into more offensive operations next year, although on present showing there seems little reason to expect any dramatic advances. To hope that Ukraine (which is suffering greater losses proportionate to its smaller population) may not be able to sustain the war long-term may seem like a reach, but perhaps seems more viable if you believe what the Kremlin apparently does about the scope for dissent within Kyiv and the wider population. Likewise, with populists winning elections in Europe and the orange arch-populist still making the running in the USA, the thought of a collapse or at least constriction of aid to Ukraine is not wholly implausible.

I certainly do not subscribe to the view that ‘a cease-fire could easily be achieved with a bit of imaginative Western diplomacy and some pressure on Kyiv to make the best of a bad job.’ At present, Putin has no reason to accept that, and for that matter nor do the Ukrainians. Again, though, what is off the table today might seem sensible in a year’s time. The ebb and flow of the battlefield, the supply of men and materiel, the international environment will all shape a constantly-evolving sense of both side’s objectives.

In the final analysis, Freedman’s and my views are closer than all this might suggest. He recognises that Putin ‘may be prepared for the war to go on for years to get to a win but there is no reasons to suppose that he relishes years of gruelling positional battles without a major breakthrough any more than Zelensky.’ Indeed, we agree that Putin is unlikely to regard any outcome short of ‘a submissive government in Kyiv’ to be ‘satisfactory and durable’. The question is whether he can ever get his head round it regardless, finding the alternatives even less ‘satisfactory.’ I think we have to presume that in extremis, he can – both because of past examples of his reluctant pragmatism, and also because otherwise we are essentially imagining no outcome bar a war that cannot end, at least not while Putin is in the Kremlin. And, of course, the limits of our imagination are often the limits of our policies.

This is a summary of the discussion at the last of the current series of online Strategic Competition Seminar Series (SCSS) webinars held on 21 November 2023 by the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies (GCMC) in Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany. The summary reflects the overall tenor of the discussion, and no specific element necessarily should be presumed to be the view of either of the participants. 

Introduction

Prior to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the Russia-China “no-limits friendship” (4 February 2022) and strategic partnership was understood to as respectful, pragmatic and non-ideological, translating into being “not always for but never against, with both determined to uphold their own strategic autonomy in decision-making and military operations, political and economic realms. China has committed itself to transitioning from ‘a’ to ‘the’ global power after 2049. China encourages all developing nations to initiate their own paths to modernization, contrasting this to Western endeavors, and implicitly, Russia’s (Russia lacks its own compelling vision of the future, a developmental or modernization paradigm).

After Russia’s full-scale multi-axis attack on Ukraine, the invasion of 24 February 2022, this formula allowed for expanded economic and political cooperation but not military alliance. Russia’s invasion raised concerns in China alignment with Russia could trigger secondary sanctions with the West. Russia’s poor military conduct and threats of horizontal and vertical escalation also are of concern to China, particularly the potential use of non-strategic nuclear weapons by Russia (China’s “red line”). Russia that is economically and militarily weaker and more politically isolated, we might suppose, becomes a more dependent China partner. But a collapsed Russia constitutes a critical liability for China: a “second DPRK” emerges – nuclear, nationalist and unpredictable; the West is better able to unite against Chinese near peer competitor malign strategic behavior.

In this second FY24 monthly virtual seminar we explore Russia in a global context, focusing on three issues: first, Russia’s relationship with China in the context of the recent Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) meeting in San Francisco, November 2023; second, ongoing Chinese military aid and assistance to Russia; and, third, Russia’s foreign policy thinking towards the Global South and the potential implications of these positions for its relationship with China. 

APEC: US and China without Russia?

Since 1993 in Seattle APEC states have met annually and the meeting provide a neutral space for leaders to conduct adjacent bilateral meetings.  In San Francisco, where Russia was absent, Presidents Joe Biden and Xi Jinping took the opportunity in a bilateral to prevent a competitive relationship from spiraling into a more contentious confrontation. That the meeting itself took place was the message – the US and China are still in strategic economic dialogue – and that it took place without Russia underscored Russia’s diminished middle range economic status.  The APEC meeting highlighted two important dimensions of the Russia-China relationship that are coming into sharper focus. 

First, the extent of US-Chinese economic interdependence, the volume and density of trade and investment and how his impacts Chinese strategic decision-making, does not register in Russia. The scale, scope and implications of this US-China bilateral interdependence dwarf that of Sino-Russian trade.  In addition, as Russia has sacrificed economic modernization and development for a “forever war” and restorationist not future narrative (“the future as history”), Russia fails to understand the importance of this economic dynamic (slowdown and debt overload) in Beijing, and the impact of this change on foreign policy-making in Beijing.  Xi Jinping is the key determinant as to whether China confronts, competes or cooperates and Russia struggles to understand why Xi has changed many key figures in China’s economic team, including his finance minister, is beyond the Kremlin’s understanding, as is the firing of China’s s defense, and foreign ministers (the interlocutors of Shoigu and Lavrov).  The ostensible reason – corruption – is not believed and Russia suspects a new dynamic in Chinse foreign policy.  This in turn suggest that Russian assumptions regarding a gradually escalation of tension in US-Chinese relations may not be correct.  Russia’s long-serving Beijing ambassador (Denisov) has been replaced and with it his insights into Chinese decision-making centers and connections to Chinese elites.

Second, China and the US are more aligned regarding Gaza and the need to avoid “horizontal escalation” and a wider regional conflict, while Russia and China more divergent.  Wider escalation aligns with Russian interests in that it increases the price of oil (it is almost axiomatic in Russian foreign policy that crisis in the Middle East means greater hydrocarbon revenues) and would also stress Western decision-making centers and distract from support for Ukraine. The Gaza crisis highlights the degree to which Chinese and Russian interests in the Middle East lack harmony and belies the boast of “no-limits friendship”.  

Chinese Military Assistance to Russia

There no evidence that China is sending direct military aid to Russia.  This may be the result of US warnings to Beijing that such aid would result in high political and economic (sanctions) costs for China or that such assistance was not deemed necessary by China or that China did consider the option but that publicity given to bilateral Russian-Chinese discussions on this issue dissuaded China.

While direct military assistance is not a feature of the relationship, Chinese companies do engage in direct dual (civilian and military) use transfers of equipment and indirect military transfers (e.g. trucks, navigation equipment, fighter jet parts and jamming components) through parallel imports using intermediaries and third countries.  Russia receives 70% of its high technology imports from China, with semi-conductor chip imports doubling since the start of the invasion in 2022 (though with up to 40% failure rate suggesting poor quality assurance procedures).  Both Ukraine and Russia receive commercial DJI drones (China’s preeminent manufacturer) indirectly through parallel channels and China supplies the engines for Iran’s Shahed drones.

There is neither evidence to suggest that China is becoming more supportive of Russia over time nor evidence arguing that western pressure is causing China to pull back from existing levels of support.  CSTO states are not sending their equipment to Russia, with China backfilling and so extending its influence. China remains neutral regarding DPRK transfers of conventional military artillery shells to Russia – DPRK does not require Chinese “political consent”. (China’s influence over DPRK foreign policy, such that it is, is strongest in the sphere of DPRK nuclear testing).  China has well-established military links with Belarus, and does develop a military answer to HIMARS (the multiple rocket launch system – Polonez-M) but in limited numbers and Belarus does not function as an entrepot for Chinese arms transfers destined for Russia. China may in future play a larger role in reconstituting Russia’s conventional combat capability but is unlikely to be a mediator in any Russian-Ukrainian ceasefire or peace negotiations.  It has no desire to be one, lacks the expertise and is not perceived to be a neutral arbiter.

Russian foreign policy thinking, the Global South and China 

We can examineRussia’s foreign policy thinking towards the Global South at two levels.  The first pragmatic and transactional level is evidenced by remarkable trends.  First, the shift in Russia’s external trade from Europe to Asia and financial flows from London and Frankfurt to Dubai and Hong Kong.  Second, and in parallel, the gradual formation of a new semi-bloc of sanctioned countries from Venezuela to North Korea.  Hanna Notte characterises this grouping as “Russia’s Axis of the Sanctioned” and Jahangir Arasli  use the acronym “BRINKS” (Belarus, Russia, Iran and North Korea).  This is shift in the international system is being forged by new supply chains and a new geography of financial flows, and consolidated by an expanded BRICS, the Belt and Road Initiative and the SCO. These shifts are potentially sustainable and will gradually institutionalise Russia’s new position in the global political economy. The second more abstract, cognitive and discursive level centers on Russian foreign policy thinkers and their thinking – their attempts to try to make sense of these institutional changes. Here we see that the war in Ukraine, Russia’s relations with China and Russia’s policy towards the Global South are all interlinked.  We can identify three – or perhaps three and a half – positions.  

Classical Liberal: The first is a classic liberal position, which builds on two premises: (i) that multipolarity is exaggerated and US hegemony is impregnable, and (ii) that as Russian civilisationism is a myth Russia should align with the West as much as possible – not least to avoid subordination to China.  This position was advanced in the now (in)famous article of the director of ISKRAN Valery Garbuzov (he was subsequently dismissed). Garbuzov argued that Russia was undergoing a “delayed post-imperial syndrome” but “still has a strong expansionist charge and an as yet unrevealed ambition for global geopolitical influence”. Garbuzov is critical of Russia’s geopolitical activity in the Global South, including the creation of the SCO or the BRICS – or its attempts “to rally around itself on an anti-Western platform the former colonial and oppressed peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America” or to act as “the leader of the ‘global majority’’”. He views this activity as essentially instrumental. He writes that “The purpose of all this is quite obvious – plunging one’s own society into a world of illusions and accompanied by great-power and patriotic rhetoric, the undisguised and deliberate indefinite retention of power at any cost, the preservation of property and the political regime by the current ruling elite and the oligarchy integrated with it.” As a result, he argues, Russia has become “frozen in the past”, trying “to regain its former greatness, lost possessions and global influence.” This is a view that calls for a Russian retreat from globalist thinking, a realignment with the West and Russia acting as a counterpoint to China. Ultimately, if Russia must choose, it should be aligned with Europe and not China. Russia is not ultimately a separate civilisation – nor should the world be constructed around civilisations.  This article has prompted a flurry of responses that represent two further positions. 

Defensive civilisationism: This position can be characterised as one that is a kind of semi-isolationist camp that views Russia’s relations with the Global South as helpful but not vital. We can call this ‘defensive civilisationism’.  Here the views of Boris Mezhuev, an advocate of what he calls “conservative enlightenment”, are interesting. He has set out what he calls five principles of Russian paleo-conservatism.

• First, the global world is broken and is dividing into competing military-economic blocs.  
• Second, the bloc that we call the collective West will not include Russia in any version that is acceptable to us. At the same time, Russia is not interested in the disintegration of the West. 
• Third, the most important task is to mark a boundary between ‘the Russian World’ and ‘the Collective West including a ceasefire line in Ukraine.  
• Fourth, Russia would like to see a deeper conflict between China and the West that would enable Russia to retain its position as a third force.  
• But, fifth, Russia needs an informal ideology, such as conservative enlightenment, to distinguish it from China and the West.  

The overall goal is the protection of Russian civilisation from the West and in this sense, it represents a kind of defensive civilisationism. In this worldview, the Global South is primarily a way for Russia to survive – not primarily an arena for global struggle against the West. Here there is no great interest in Russian activities in Africa or supporting Hamas in Gaza, except as a tactic to limit Western efforts against Russia.

Offensive civilisationism: The third position is more radical and revolutionary. It views Russia as the vanguard of an anti-Western camp. It borrows heavily from Soviet terminology and anti-colonial discourse and calls for Russia to lead an anti-colonial axis, with the goal of deconstructing US and Western hegemony. The basic premise is simple. One cannot have a world order based on civilisations unless Western hegemony is first undermined. This camp includes diverse voices that normally disagree, from people who have always argued this way such as Alexander Dugin, to include more recent converts such as Sergei Karaganov, who argues that Russia needs to “force the West to retreat in a fundamental way, to agree a new status quo”. In recent speeches, Putin has increasingly adopted this position. In his 30 September 2022 speech marking the annexation of four Ukrainian regions, he railed against US hegemony and claimed Russia’s role as leading an anti-colonial platform uniting country in the Global South. In his 5 October 2023 speech at Valdai, Putin claimed that “the world is on its way to a synergy of civilisation-states, large spaces, communities identifying as such”. This is a radical vision for a post-liberal world order that has become increasingly mainstream in Russian foreign policy.  There are more and less radical positions within this view. A more radical view sees China as Russia’s ideological ally, making any concerns about a junior partnership unnecessary. In this view, China does not threaten Russia’s civilisational uniqueness – unlike the West. Instead, the two countries are driving changes “the likes of which we haven’t seen for 100 years”, as Xi put it in a meeting in Moscow in March 2023. 

Each of these views has serious problems.

1. The classical liberalview lacks any understanding of serious structural shifts in the global economy. It banks on a 1990s style unipolarity, an unlikely rapprochment between Russia and the West and an equally unlikely distancing between China and Russia. The lack of clear foreign policy thinking – including on future relations with China – among Russia’s political opposition (including its diaspora), poses a challenge for the future.
2. Defensive civilisationalism is more likely to grow in influence. Potentially it could coalesce with former advocates of realpolitik for a more restrained foreign policy, but one still driven by civilisational values and a hostile relationship with the West. Former advocates of realpolitik such as Dmitry Trenin, also praise “a sea change in Moscow’s worldview and international positioning toward the world’s rising non-Western majority”.
3. The sharp anti-Americanism in Russia’s offensive civilisationism mobilizes some supporters, but even its rhetoric appeals to a relatively limited constituency – even in China. The economic ties between China and the US are underestimated in Moscow, as noted above. The “Axis of the Sanctioned” (basket-case economies) is important but hardly ground-breaking.

Conclusions

Nevertheless, for now, while Russia’s foreign policy may be based on post-imperial illusions, it is also riding on some genuine shifts in international relations, whether the war in Gaza or the tensions between the US and China. We should not underestimate the significant traction for Russia on some key international issues in the Global South. Gaza is the most obvious challenge – and will come back time and time again in Russia’s narrative. US support for Ukraine is equated with unipolarity whereas a Russian victory over the West and the march to multipolarity occurs when Russian-Ukrainian “reunification” complete.  While many countries want a reduced US role in their regions, few want to see the kind of world envisaged by Russia, divided into macro-blocs around great powers.  In addition, and most importantly, President Xi needs breathing space to address the consequences of China’s economic problems and seeks to reduce confrontation with the US and create a more stable IR environment, one that also favors BRI transactions. Russia’s spoiler foreign policy thrives on and fosters instability and crisis, contexts that give Russia strategic relevance.  Russia faces the constant of Chinese disapproval when it seeks to deepen relations with India and Vietnam, for example, and enable horizonal escalation in the Middle East.

Disclaimer

This summary reflects the views of the authors (Dr. Pavel Baev, Dr. Dmitry Gorenburg, Dr. David Lewis and Dr Graeme P. Herd) and are not necessarily the official policy of the United States, Germany, or any other governments.

GCMC, Garmisch-Partenkirchen, 21 November 2023.

This is a summary of the discussion at the last of the current series of online Strategic Competition Seminar Series (SCSS) webinars held on 24 October 2023 by the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies (GCMC) in Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany. The summary reflects the overall tenor of the discussion, and no specific element necessarily should be presumed to be the view of either of the participants. 

Introduction

This first monthly virtual seminar for FY24 aims to provide a series of claims about the role of structure and agency in Russia, explore the rhetoric and reality of Russian foreign policy, and offer a typology that characterizes alternative power transition/succession future scenarios (highlighting their embedded assumptions) based on current trends and possible future dynamics. This set of ideas and arguments can act as a benchmark and then be challenged, amended, replaced with a clearer understanding, or supported and strengthened by further empirical evidence as the year progresses. What is clear is that there is little consensus among subject matter experts on many of the issues. We will have the opportunity for more acute analysis over eleven other virtual monthly seminars (with the possibility of up to six drop-ins to respond to fast changing events) and two SCSS Workshops to explore these ideas further.   

Structure, Regime and Agency

How Russian elites have historically viewed the importance and function of geography, technology, the economy in creating and addressing threats and vulnerabilities.  (See chart above: “Russian Structural Factors, Current Regime and Putin’s Operational Code”). Russian elites shared a broad sense of legitimate and necessary responses to threats (strategic culture) and different regimes were able to create and propagate broad national interest based on their particular reading of the past. Structure, then, mediated by regime narratives, creates a broad consensus as to enduring national interest and broad foreign policy and security goals.

Regimes in Russia-controlled state institutions, including the media, education system, and Russian Orthodox Church, propagate nationalist-imperialist narratives. These narratives revolve around themes of ‘encirclement’ and Russia as a ‘besieged fortress,’ depicting external enemies as coveting Russia’s resources and fearing its military might. An imperial political culture views Russians as the system forming people and Russia itself as a “civilizational-state” (“Fundamentals of State Policy for the Preservation and Strengthening of Traditional Russian Spiritual and Moral Values”, November 2022, updated 2023). The regime promotes the sacralization of a strong, stable state and celebrates Russia’s unified “millennial historical path of Russia” narrative, but regime stability is upheld by a set of authoritarian practices (e.g. clientelism, electoral ballot stuffing, opposition persecution).

Tsarist, Soviet and post-Soviet regime leaderships had some agency – they could exercise risk calculus, weigh different courses of action, and select different means to achieve such goals. The operational codes of different sets of decision-makers, that is, their philosophical (how they see the world) and instrumental beliefs (on that basis, what is the best response) explains why different leaderships exercise different choices.  For example, all want influence in Ukraine: Yeltsin recognizes its independence in 1991; Putin orders full scale multi-axis attack on 24 February 2022. Different leaders can choose different means to achieve the same ends. 

Putin’s regime (leadership) can be viewed in terms of a “limited access order”, that is, as an enclosed prerogative state elite that understand and uphold the “rules of the club” and benefit from access to revenue flows and Sistema. Putinism at home is ultimately defined by its lack of clarity.  Its most visible characteristic is the blurring – of past and present, war and peace, internal and external threats, military and non-military tools, the merging of Putin-regime-state, and perception and reality.  Putin deliberately does not offer a policy map or blueprint for the future.  Putin avoids ideological certainty in order to maintain his room for maneuver and strategic autonomy as a leader. Ambiguity, blurring, and balancing allow for unpredictability and strategic surprise. 

In foreign policy, though, Russia’s narrative is structured around problem, blame and solution – the core components of every ideology.  Putin defines his full-scale invasion of Ukraine as a “Special Military Operation” not a real “war”.  In fact, according to this understanding, Russia fights the West in Ukraine, and as such Ukraine is the first battle in a wider global struggle.  As Putin stated at the Valdai Club meeting on 5 October 2023: the “Ukrainian crisis is not a territorial conflict. The issue is broader and more fundamental — we are talking about the principles the new world order will be based upon.”  The militantly liberal totalitarian West (“Anglo–Saxons”) seek to unjustly uphold unipolarity through colonial unequal practices. This current order, Russia asserts, poses an existential threat to Russia’s identity and sovereignty.  The solution, or victory in this global struggle, is the “inevitable” emergence of “fair multipolarity”, an “unstoppable process”, according to Lavrov, and one that Russia supports. Russia targets its “lets fight Western imperialism” and oppose US hegemony narratives towards the” hedging middle” in the Global South.

In reality, Russia’s vision for a global order appears to be the “Vienna” European Great Power system projected onto the world stage.  This suggests that “fair multipolarity” norms will include “super-sovereignty”(“some states [Great Powers] are more sovereign than others”), which allows Russia to act as a rule shaper and rule breaker. Russia as a “state-civilization” – an undoubted euphemism for “empire”, seeks to “make the international system safe for emerging empires”. For Russia, as the US is a superpower and breaks the rules, it follows” to break the rules is a hallmark of a superpower, not to break the rules is to become “Greater Kazakhstan with nuclear weapons”, that is, strategically irrelevant. Russia’s foreign policy is value-free, bilateral and interest-based, highly pragmatic, transactional and situational. In Ukraine, Russia sees itself as both fighting for a new World Order and control over a reconstituted buffer zone on Russia’s periphery.

Alternative Russian Future Scenarios

In viewing the future alternative possible Russian trajectories, we can focus in on a broad set of scenarios which are differentiated by degrees of change/continuity in terms of political system, regime, and leadership operational code.  Each scenario can have different pathways.  Time is not neutral: depending on governing assumptions, the longer the war the more stable or unstable Russia becomes.  We can list here the scenarios, broad characteristics and assumptions embedded within them.  Going forward, SCSS seminars can look to identify possible external game changers that would reshape possibilities.  For example, if China understands prolonged war weakens Russia, and so threatens system-collapse, Beijing may use its strategic influence to press Russia to negotiate.  As FY 2023’s SCSS#12 noted, if organized opposition strengthens and Lukashenka’s regime weakens, a Western-orientated Belarus becomes the best security guarantee for Ukraine and Europe.

• “No Putin; no Russia”:

This is not an alternative scenario but rather one that extrapolates forward from the present into the future: Putin remains in power.  It represents a steady-state continuity model suggests that “war Putinism” is an effective management model, that the longer war continues, the more elites, sub-institutional actors and society adjust and adapt around incentives for upholding the status quo in war time and the necessity of circumventing sanctions.  Russia’s missile production increases, allowing stand-off attacks and so “Special Military Operation” continuity. Putin’s inner-circle become “true-believers.” Putin’s responses to short-term symptoms of dysfunctionality (most notably, Prigozhin’s uprising on 24 June 2024), strengthen the regime over the longer-term. More cynically, those willing to remove Putin are unable and those able are unwilling: Putin’s calibrated coercion and coup-proofing is effective and the regime sustainable. Military “volunteers”, at least according to Russian propaganda, are on the increase.  Putin’s management is understood to be critical to the functioning of the limited access order, as it ensures stability, predictability (“rules of game”) and allows for dynasticism (the transmission of power and property to the next inter-married generation).  At the same time, Putin is able to “refresh” the “limited access order”, with second tier “war oligarchs” enjoying upward lift.  This scenario validates the understanding that the “limited access order” is a durable structure capable of self-reproduction.  In this scenario, regime personnel gradually evolve but its policies and Putin’s operational code remains constant. Indeed, since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Putin’s philosophical beliefs only appear to have been reinforced.

• “Putinism with Paramount Putin”:

This alternative scenario suggests that Putin is able to step-back from the presidency and still exercise a strategic decision-making role from behind the scenes, in the tradition of Deng Xiaoping and Nursultan Nazarbayev.  It remains unclear exactly which position in Russia would allow Putin to guarantee his own personal security, mobility, consumption habits and still shape events in Russia. However, it is clear that although “Putinism with Paramount Putin” appears a de facto continuity scenario, dual power centers will inevitably entail competition between the two.  Competition has second order effects: a weakening of the authority and legitimacy of the sitting incumbent, strategic decision-making paralysis, and potential destabilization two reward and punishment centers encourages factionalism.  Putin’s current apparent ability to manage “mission” with “money” elites, status quo with renewal, and the risks of military defeat in Ukraine with those of political revolt in Russia, will become much harder.  Russian reversals in Ukraine might challenge Putin’s regime, but even if Ukraine restores its 1991 statehood, it does not follow that Russia will admit defeat and it can continue attacks on Ukrainian critical national infrastructure.  This scenario suggests that the ‘Collective Putin’ cannot agree a successor but there are no popular or consensus alternatives that can step up and realize that a “successors race” is too destabilizing. Regime stability is maintained but while Putin’s philosophical beliefs would continue, his instrumental beliefs would need to consider the dual power center conundrum.  In addition, the new sitting president may share the world view, but may have a competing set of instrumental beliefs. 

• “Putinism without Putin”:

This alternative scenario suggests that Putin is no longer in power, but the transfer was peaceful.  In other words, either Putin steps down voluntarily and is able to manage his own succession (“operation successor”) or is made an offer he cannot refuse, steps down and remains a silent powerless shadow, or has died.  “Putinism”, though, continues as the ruling “ideology” (paradoxically, its greatest strength is its ability to be all things to all regimes) – Putin’s regime is self-sustaining and can operate without Putin. A combination of belief, convenience, inertia, and a desire for continuity suggests that Russia’s new leadership will rule in name of “Putinism”.  Whatever the trigger/pathway that follows Putin’s removal from power, this scenario is predicated on the assumption that the “Collective Putin” leadership can negotiate and bargain, reach a consensus, and that a ‘transition alliance’ would then reflect evenly balanced factional interests. To put it another way, ‘chiefs inside-the-system’, regional heads, key Federation Assembly senators, and parastatal leaders (e.g. Sechin, Chemezov) can identify a lowest common denominator acceptable technocratic-manager that is not obviously a protégé of any one interest group (e.g. Mishutsin and Sobyanin?).  Russian history (February 1917, 1953, 1964) suggests elites remove or attempt to remove a leader in the case of August 1991 when his strategic decision-making threatens individual and collective elite interests or perception changes and risks of removal appear less than costs of continuity.  In this scenario, the regime certainly changes in terms of leadership composition, and also operational code. 

• “Neither Putin nor Putinism”:

This alternative scenario represents the most radical rupture with the present.  As such, this scenario has the most divergent possible pathways and to illustrate this point we can identify three. First, an intra-elite catastrophic breakdown occurs. This could be triggered by an “emergency scenario” (Putin dies or is incapacitated) and the inability of the elite to find a consensus successor.  As a result, a “war of protégés” and/or an intra-siloviki war of “all against all” unfolds – think a combination of August 1991 and October 1993 squared. Under succession stress, alliances that look solid can be situational – transitional psychology reshapes transactional calculus (June 24 2023).  Second, it is possible that one powerful faction within the elite emerges and places a strong-man as president, prepared to draw a line, scapegoat Putin, Shoigu, Kadyrov, Prigozhin for the war, unwind tensions with the West to enable forced modernization/reform under conditions of internal repression.  This “Liberal Dictatorship” pathway is paradoxical. Lastly, a “Populist People Power” pathway cannot be discounted, suggesting a new counter-elite/opposition leader emerges, constitutional changes create a more regulated decentralized federation with greater power invested in the regions, the Duma and less in the presidency. This constrict is then capable of building coalitions for structural economic reform. The new leadership realize that the Putinist system is in fact structured for Sistema not prolonged conflict with the West and that fundamental reform/modernization necessary.  In this broad scenario, “People Power” alone suggests political system change, whereas all others identified here “just” regime and leadership operational code all change.    

Disclaimer

This summary reflects the views of the authors (Graeme P. Herd and Dmitry Gorenburg) and are not necessarily the official policy of the United States, Germany, or any other governments.

GCMC, Garmisch-Partenkirchen, 27 October 2023

This is a summary of the discussion at the last of the current series of online Strategic Competition Seminar Series (SCSS) webinars held on 19 September 2023 by the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies (GCMC) in Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany. The summary reflects the overall tenor of the discussion, and no specific element necessarily should be presumed to be the view of either of the participants. 

Introduction

SCSS Workshop II (6-7 September 2023) identified and stress-tested the assumptions underlying a sustainment theory of Ukrainian victory and so a theory of managing a Russia in defeat. Our final virtual seminar of the year 2022-23 (SCSS#12) brought together some members of the SCSS “Core Group” to reflect on insights generated in all three Workshops and the eleven other monthly virtual seminars and add analytical value by viewing all previous discussions in the round.  In particular, we focused on the relationship between Ukrainian force structure, capabilities mix and security assurances//guarantees and the sustainability of victory.  We also addressed stability in Russia and the impact of a prolonged war on the nature of regime stability and possible evolution.

Sustainable Ukraine – Victory and Security

Ukraine’s desired end state is “victory” over Russia. A sustainable “Ukrainian Victory” scenario assumes a combination of military and diplomatic efforts. This can involve either the culmination of the Russian military presence in Ukraine or diplomatic negotiations. Alternatively, it can involve a combination of both approaches, allowing Ukraine’s military, law enforcement and security services to liberate some occupied territory, while the Ukrainian political leadership negotiate the rest with the West for military-political security guarantees.  This forms the basis of negotiation with Russia.  Cornerstone issues in any negotiation with Russia include restoration of territory, justice and punishment of war crimes perpetrators, and Russian compensatory reparations for war damage. 

A post-conflict Ukraine emerges with restored statehood along 1991 borders and Ukraine builds a force structure, acquires a capability mix and negotiates “security guarantees” that can defend its territory and deter a defeated nuclear Russia. For the victory to be sustainable, in the process of “victory”, NATO cohesion is maintained, allowing for future support to deter Russia.  Moreover, it also assumes Putin cannot politically survive a very visible defeat and that this triggers a post-Putin elite-managed/curated stable transition.  Ukrainian victory does not occur with Ukrainian tanks in Moscow, Moscow Tribunals (akin to Nuremberg or Tokyo) or the disintegration of the Russian Federation but rather an intra-elite manged power succession that allows Russia to unwind from its Ukrainian debacle.

In envisaging possible “Ukraine victory” end states in military-security terms, it is prudent for Ukraine to consider a sovereign “just in case” force structure size and capabilities mix that could defend Ukraine and deter Russia from future attack in the scenario where no meaningful external security guarantees are forthcoming.  This perspective also accepts that all commitments and guarantees are, in reality, subject to political choice, however “legally binding” they appear. In this “worst case victory” scenario, at war termination Ukraine looks to maintain a powerful standing military of 500,000 (60 plus brigades), maintain martial law and turn Crimea into a militarized Ukrainian fortress.

Is this financially sustainable?  Ukraine‘s draft 2024 budget shows a $42 billion deficit (20% of GDP), with 50% of GDP spent on defense. At best Ukraine’s economy in 2023-34 is expected to stabilize rather than grow.  To  give another sense of the scale of the challenge: Poland aspires to build an army of 300,000 and this places great demands on the state in terms of manpower and finance, even though Poland’s GDP was three times that of Ukraine in 2021 and its population 40 million, as opposed to 36 million in Ukraine.  This then suggests either a transatlantic division of labor – the US continues military support and the EU financial – or political will is found to confiscate the some $350 billion of frozen Russian state assets in the West which could become reparations and reconstruction support for Ukraine.  In a very tangible way Russia is directly held to account for the damage it has caused. 

What are, as always, provisional conclusions?

• Ukraine needs a “theory of victory” that at its heart beats a war-fighting linear military strategy of liberation to expel Russian military forces from its territory and end direct conflict with Russia. With no magic “silver bullet” apparent, this then is achieved by prolonged gradual and slow attrition and the exhausting of Russian forces rather than Kherson-type breakthrough offensives.   
• A non—linear diplomatic strategy to address some of the cornerstone negotiation issues now and build towards security commitments, arrangements, assurances and guarantees for the future.  Western security commitments will determine the necessary Ukrainian force structure, size, and capabilities mix and set the balance between the need for self-sufficiency and the need for partners and allies.
• For victory to be sustainable Ukraine needs a “theory of security” to win a lasting peace after the war.  To win the peace Ukraine needs to prioritize economic development and reconstruction but must also be able to defend Ukraine and deter Russia.  The need for both creates pressures for trade-offs (peace and justice) that will manifest themselves in negotiations, both with Western partners and with the Russian adversary.
• “The loser decides when it has lost” and Putin has every incentive not to admit defeat and negotiate.  It is much harder for Russia to find its way out of Ukraine than the Soviet-Afghanistan war and post-Soviet Russia does not have a track-record of ending conflicts rather of freezing them.
• Negotiations with their necessary trade-offs and compromises may reward Russia for its invasion and so encourage Russia to continue the conflict.  Nonetheless, Ukraine needs to have a conversation about the parameters of an acceptable settlement. 

Evolving Russian Regime Dynamics

The flip-side of a Ukrainian “theory of victory” and then a viable “theory of security”, is “Russian defeat.” Defeat may be experienced in two-stages: first, the culmination of Russian military power in Ukraine and then, second, managed power transition to a post-Putin Russia. The sooner Russia is defeated, the lower the costs of reconstruction in Ukraine and less the suffering. In addition, does Russia’s current war strategy generate pressures for controlled or “soft-landing” post-Putin power transition in Russia? 

Ukraine aside, there are two other external factors that will impact the strategic calculus of decision-makers in Russia, and so likely place constraints and limits on Russian strategic behavior.  The first is Belarus, the second is China. If Belarus’ organized opposition strengthens and Lukashenka’s regime weakens, a Western-orientated Belarus becomes the best security guarantee for Ukraine and Europe. Continued Chinese support for Russia’s military machine is essential for Russia’s ability to continue fighting and this means China will be critical in any negotiations.  It may also mean that if China understands a prolonged war weakens Russia to the point of system-collapse, Beijing will use its strategic influence to push Russia to negotiate to allow it to stabilize: better a weakened partner than no partner at all?

When turning to domestic drivers, we can look to the structure of political order. Putin has crafted a “limited access order” regime in which an enclosed elite profits from rent-seeking activity. This elite seeks to remain “insiders” to this power circle and this need to avoid expulsion drives loyalty to Putin and so ensures regime stability.  The “rules of the club” are understood and upheld by all members. Russian history (February 1917, 1953, 1964, and 1991) demonstrates that status quo elites seek to manage power transition by removing a leader when the leader’s strategic decision-making threatens individual and collective elite interests – individuals within the elite calculate that they lose more than gain with the current leader and that, perhaps, the system itself is in danger, threatening much more pervasive instability.  At this point elites move to replace the existing leader. How has the war impacted the “rules and membership of the club”?  What of regime stability?  

Russia is both strong and brittle.  The basis of regime strength rests on three pillars and all three are threatened. First, Putin’s legitimacy which shapes his capacity to manage the elite. Inside Russia this war is understood as “Putin’s war” and the International Criminal Court (ICC) inditement curtails Putin’s global mobility.  Externally, “Putin’s war” translates into a “Putin’s defeat” narrative, rather than necessarily Russia’s. Second, the presence of sufficient funds to address short-term crises, but funds are under increasing pressure as the war demands ever greater military outlays. Third, Putin’s continued ability to control the security apparatus. This pillar was stress-tested by the 24 June Prigozhin rebellion, not because of mass defections to Prigozhin, but because of the silence of support for Putin. Bortnikov and Zolotov as the leaders of the FSB and Rosgvardiya respectively are considered die-hard Putin loyalists, but it is unclear the extent to which they control the structures beneath them. There are also evident tensions within the Russian military, which war exacerbates, between “fighting generals” (many of whom are exiled in Syria) and “parade generals” in the General Staff and MoD who occupy the so-called “Arbat Military District” in Moscow. The net effect is that the system goes into each crisis with a leader whose legitimacy is weaker, with fewer resources and decreased coercive capability.

Currently Putin manages these tensions by seeking balance, though as the war continues Putin gives way a little.  For example, different impulses animate individuals in the elite.  For some “money” (greed) and the tangible logic of consequences are key, for others “mission” (a set of ideas/ideology) and the intangible logic of “appropriateness”.  Rational-acting Russian economic elites prioritize sanctions relief efforts in Russian foreign policy, whereas discursive elites, who have some traction with society, prioritize imperial “mission”, vaguely defined as “fighting evil in the world” and reject a “civilizational U-turn”.  Putin pays more attention to nationalist influencers who support a maximalist state ideology, total war with new mobilization, purges against the elite, with a focus on revisiting the history of privatizations since 1991 and so targeting oligarchs.  Second-tier ideological elites and “wear oligarchs” seek social lift and a place in the “limited access order” highlighting the inherent tensions between the status quo, the need to self-reproduce and a stability-above-all mindset.  

In late 2023, it is fair to assume that the Special Military Operation (SVO) is re-designated as “war”, martial law and full mobilization would occur. This outcome in turn suggests that the siloviki are able to persuade the Presidential Administration that the military risks in Ukraine (defeat) outweigh the domestic risks of backlash against escalation in Russia (revolt). As Putin himself defines “Russian victory” as his remaining in power, for now it appears political risks in Russia take precedence over military ones in Ukraine. The crunch will come when Crimea itself is at risk as this is as much political as it is military. 

What can we conclude?

• First, Putin’s toolbox makes greater use of heavier “sticks” as there are fewer carrots “available” but calibrated coercion is still a feature: internal opposition figures are “encouraged” to leave Russia in order to reduce pressure on the regime. 
• Second, currently, for the elite the risks of moving against Putin outweigh the benefits. Russia’s economy is robust enough that the fear of economic collapse is not widespread. Elite’s do not want to move against Putiin prematurely as Putin appears still in control and the fear of losing control and facilitating anarchy are powerful elements in elite psychology. Clear alternatives to Putin do not emerge as this would be suicidal – or at least made to look that way. But if an invisible threshold between order and disorder was crossed, a threshold that only appears after it is crossed, and the regime begins to unravel, an intra-elite managed transition may be harder.  
• Third, the Russian system/regime is not interested in or structured for war, let alone prolonged conflict, it is made for enrichment and corruption according to the logic of sistema. Only Putin and his small aging inner circle truly support this agenda, and Russia’s ability to reconstitute its conventional combat capability (with critical Chinese aid) allows for its continuation. Russia will likely continue its campaign of missile attacks through the winter to destroy Ukrainian infrastructure, its strategy of ruin and spoliation, to make Ukraine fail as a viable state. Russian missile production increases and this approach is militarily sustainable.  
• Fourth, this suggests that the most liokely scenario is that Putin remains in power, Russia continues the war but within limits that reflect the tolerance levels of the elite majority, Chinese attitudes towards the use of tactical nuclear weapons, societal support for mobilization, and potential tensions in Belarus. Imperial aggression in Ukraine undercuts any notion of a modernized Russia in the future. Russia faces amuddle-through and long-goodbye scenario. 

Disclaimer

This summary reflects the views of the authors (Pavel Baev, Mark Galeotti, Dmitry Gorenburg, David Lewis and Graeme P. Herd) and are not necessarily the official policy of the United States, Germany, or any other governments.

GCMC, Garmisch-Partenkirchen, 20 September 2023.

This is a summary of the discussion at the latest of the current series of online Strategic Competition Seminar Series (SCSS) webinars held on 18 July 2023 by the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies (GCMC) in Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany. The summary reflects the overall tenor of the discussion, and no specific element necessarily should be presumed to be the view of either of the participants. 

Introduction

Dmytro Kuleba, Ukraine’s Foreign Minister, penned an article in Foreign Affairs in April 2023 entitled: “Why NATO Must Admit Ukraine”. He argued that the Vilnius NATO Summit should offer a “clear written statement” and “timetable” “laying out a path to accession” which could lead to decision at the Alliance’s 75th anniversary summit in Washington DC in 2024.  In June 2023, Andriy Zagorodnyuk, a former Ukrainian Defense Minister, also published a piece – “To Protect Europe, Let Ukraine Join NATO” – which highlighted the security benefits of Ukraine in NATO. It noted that given its land warfare capabilities and real-time experience, Ukraine is best placed to stabilize NATO’s eastern flanks: “If Moscow tried to seize control of territory in Estonia, Latvia, or Lithuania, American troops might not arrive until it is too late. Ukrainian units, by contrast, are nearby. They could make it to the battlefield fast and then do what they’ve done with great success for the last 15 months—stave off Russia.”

The final 11-12 July NATO summit communiqué reaffirmed the 2008 Bucharest decision to admit Ukraine as a member“when Allies agree and conditions are met”.  The “conditions” themselves were not fully elaborated, leaving open the possibility that Allies could disagree over whether all “conditions” had been met, just as Hungary and Türkiye had over Sweden’s fast track membership, so prolonging Ukraine’s non-NATO status, and bringing into question accession itself. President Zelenskyy expressed anger at the ambiguity: “It’s unprecedented and absurd when a time frame is set neither for the invitation nor for Ukraine’s membership.  While at the same time, vague wording about ‘conditions’ is added even for inviting Ukraine.”  

This was an immediate response, expressing understandable frustration.  A week later, how might we assess the significance of the Summit in the round and, in particular, its implications for alternative future Ukrainian trajectories, including security guarantees? 

NATO Vilnius Summit

The Summit communiqué noted anormalization of NATO defense and deterrence efforts, including discussing its high readiness forces, and addressing budgetary and preparedness challenges. As NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg noted, the unblocking of Swedish NATO accession (to be the 32^nd member), became a “game-changer for European security and will provide an uninterrupted shield from the Baltic to the Black Sea.”  The U.S. now intends to move forward with the long-promised $20 billion sale of F-16 jet fighters to Türkiye. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has likely concluded that the benefits of leaning into NATO and the West now outweigh costs of veto (although this ought not to be taken to mean he will not return to his familiar role of spoiler in the future, should it appear to be in his interests).

The communiqué also addressed China, but not as an adversary: “We must continue to engage with Beijing to tackle today’s global challenges, including nuclear proliferation and climate change. At the same time, China should use its considerable influence over Russia to end its illegal war in Ukraine. So far, however, Beijing has not condemned Moscow’s aggression and is instead increasing its economic, diplomatic, and military cooperation with Russia.” NATO’s Indo-Pacific partners–Australia, New Zealand, the Republic of Korea, and Japan-were also Summit participants: “The Indo-Pacific is important for NATO, given that developments in that region can directly affect Euro-Atlantic security.” 

NATO-Ukraine relations were addressed not just through a commitment to NATO’s “open door” policy but also by the removal of the alliance’s formal membership action plan (MAP) requirement, representing fast-track accession once “conditions” related to good governance and anti-corruption policies have been met.  The NATO-Russia Commission was upgraded to a new NATO-Ukraine Council, constituted as a consultation mechanism and forum where both NATO and Ukraine “meet as equals” to discuss strategic objectives.  It does not appear to be a body that will assess the conditions that Ukraine would have to fulfil to become a member.

Ukraine also began a negotiation process to formalize and secure “bilateral long-term security commitments and arrangements” with G7 members as it “defends its sovereignty and territorial integrity, rebuilds its economy, protects its citizens, and pursues integration into the Euro-Atlantic community.”  In this respect, strategic policy goals have been identified. Ukraine needs to determine the capabilities mix, industrial base, training, intelligence sharing and cyber and other initiatives that would allow it to deter future Russian aggression. Additionally, Ukraine’s economic stability should be resilient, creating conditions that promote its economic and energy prosperity and security. Ukraine should also be provided technical and financial support to meet its immediate needs and drive effective reform and good governance-building that facilitates its Euro-Atlantic integration.

Assessment

In offering an assessment, we can point to four core takeaways.  First, although Ukrainian expectations of a timetabled fast-track NATO membership may have constututed its “Holy Grail”, politics is the art of the possible and in reality this fell outside the bounds of what was achievable:  there is no current consensus among the 31 allies for admitting Ukraine into NATO.  Given this caveat, the Summit results exceeded expectations.  Turkish consent on Swedish NATO membership was an unexpected NATO “win” and must have come as a shock for Russia. President Zelenskyy’s expressed frustration can also be understood as performative, as he is able to “mobilize victimhood” to best effect.  His disappointment was undoubtedly also a genuine emotion but it may also be a strategy according to the principle of ‘asking more than you hope to get in order to get what you want’: Zelenskyy forces the West to use its “no’s” so that he can optimize outcomes on other fronts, not least securing G7 security “commitments and arrangements”.

Second, perception within NATO over the probable course of the war shifted from a belief that the war would be prolonged to a realization that the war could be shortened: “support Ukraine for as long as it takes” mutated into the need to “support Ukraine with whatever it takes”. This perception shift in NATO is driven by visible fragmentation of Russia’s strategic and operational level chain-of-command and control, exacerbated by the Wagner rebellion on 24 June and subsequent arrests and dismissals of flag officers in Russia, Kremlin uncertainty and erratic and unpredictable behavior.  The fragility of Putin’s regime is much more visible as the cumulative effects of 15 months of war make their presence felt.  The ongoing dismantling of the Wagner enterprise (military, media, business components), its obvious utility in Africa for Russian foreign policy, the demands it still makes on the Russian MoD to facilitate its lift and the bizarre meeting with Putin, Prigozhin and 35 Wagner commanders on the 29 June, all attest to a sense of drift and growing chaos.

In addition, in Russia itself we see a clash of perception between its “fighting generals”, who recognize reserve shortfalls, lack of rotation, deficits in supplies, and the results of artillery duels on the one hand and their frustration with Russian civilian elites and society “business as usual approach” on the others hand. The latter expects “breakthrough”, the former fears “breakdown”.  The assumptions underpinning the notion of an armistice (cease-fire) agreement look less stable: it overestimates Russia’s fighting ability and political durability and underestimates Ukraine’s will and determination to win. Putin is deterred from further mobilization by fear that the gubernatorial elections in September 2023 trigger a color revolution: Putin’s deep-seated predictive paranoia and phobias around future instability undercut his ability to stabilize the present.

Third, NATO commits to mid-term and long-term strategic planning based on 2% GDP growth but as set against a Russian military in decline in terms of scale and scope of threat potential in Arctic, Nordic and Baltic regions. Russia’s unprovoked invasion of Ukraine and its conduct during its war of choice has managed to strategically and permanently destroy its image in the west, as well as the reputation and combat effectiveness of its conventional military capability declines, as does Russia’s residual threat to NATO itself.  As a result, NATO member states can deliver more and newer military aid to Ukraine, allowing Ukraine to pursue battlefield victory.

Nonetheless, perception shifts aside, the current reality is that the war will be protracted and that even eventual NATO membership does not guarantee Ukraine’s total security, as Russia has carried out hybrid attacks on existing NATO member states.  Ukraine then needs to make itself resilient against such attacks but if taken too far a “porcupine strategy” risks facilitating the emergence of a “garrison state” in which martial law, emergency legislation and increased censorship all undermine Ukraine’s EU aspirations. In addition, the provision to Ukraine of long-range weapons are key to its future deterrence ability but risk calculus between Ukraine and Western donors may differ when it comes to deterrence by punishment using such weapons. 

Fourth, in terms of risks associated with Ukraine’s NATO membership, the calculus attempts to address two competing sets of assumptions and implications which are constantly challenged in real time.  On the one hand, the decision not to offer near-automatic NATO membership for Ukraine is animated by a fear that it could give Russia an incentive to both escalate and prolong its war against Ukraine or widen hostilities by initiating a NATO-Russia war, with the threat of nuclear escalation.  Dmitry Medvedev, the deputy chair of Russia’s Security Council, after all, states that even increased military assistance to Ukraine by the NATO alliance brings World War Three closer, never mind membership.  The assumption here is that as long as Russia is at war with Ukraine, offering Ukraine NATO membership means that NATO automatically enters a state of war with Russia.

However, and on the other hand, such fears are misguided.  Article 5 stipulates that each NATO member must take “action as it deems necessary” to help an attacked party. As Andriy Zagorodynyuk notes: “By this standard, Ukraine may as well already be a NATO state. It receives tens of billions of dollars in help from partner nations in the form of sophisticated armaments. It has been the beneficiary of extensive Western military training. It receives detailed U.S. intelligence. And it has never asked for NATO to deploy troops on the ground.” More importantly, U.S. Amb. Kurt Volker argues that a failure to map a clearer pathway to membership as part of a deterrence strategy means that the Russian Federation has no incentive for war to end and every incentive to protract and prolong it. But unless we envisage NATO membership to be offered while the fighting is going on – which even Kyiv did not expect – then this applies anyway.  A more pertinent argument: given current fragility in Russia, with the Wagner rebellion a symptom of wider dysfunction, might greater risks lie with non-membership and greater stability with NATO membership? Lastly, as Ukraine was attacked by Russia when it was non-aligned, and non-aligned Finland has not subsequently been attacked when it joined NATO, the case that NATO membership deters Russian military invasion and non-alignment invites them can be made. 

To achieve as rapid an integration as possible, given the dangers of prolongation, we might assume that “all-in” NATO support for Ukraine should replace “calibrated escalation”. However, it is difficult to predict that “all-in” support could lead to transformative change on the battlefield. Cluster munitions, for example, compensate for current shortages of ammunition experienced by Ukraine. This potentially relieves time pressure and reduces the possibility of Ukraine having to accept greater risk, but are not transformative. But an “all-in” approach would not be risk free: depleted western arsenals may undercut contingencies against China, and if “all-in” Plan B replaces “calibrated escalation” Plan A, what then will be Plan C?

In the week following the NATO Summit, Russia did not extend a grain agreement concluded on July 22, 2022 in Istanbul for 120 days and extended several times thereafter.  President Zelenskyy noted that two agreements were in existence.  The first between Ukraine, Türkiye, and the UN, and the second between Russia, Türkiye, and the UN. He suggested that Ukraine, the UN and Türkiye continue the grain initiative using the Black Sea corridor, with Türkiye taking responsibility with Ukraine and potentially other littoral states, such as Bulgaria and Romania, to ensure safe passage of Ukrainian grain. This would create de facto security guarantees for Ukraine, albeit ones that are sectoral and sub-regional specific (NW Black Sea). President Erdoğan and Putin have a competitive relationship and Erdoğan has invited Putin to visit.  In return, Putin needs a face-saving gesture.  If no meeting occurs then Türkiye, having returned Azov brigade soldiers and commanders to Ukraine and called for Ukraine’s NATO membership, may well press forward with decisions over safe-passage, though actual guarantees are high risk and remain a reserve option for Erdoğan “the peace-bringer”.

Conclusions

The NATO Vilnius Summit occurred at a moment in which perceptions were shifting on a number of fronts.  First, NATO’s role consolidated around one primarily centered on collective defense.  This was reflected in NATO’s force generation model that plans to have 100,000 forces deployable across the eastern flank in the first 10 days (200,000 in 10-30 days and 500,000 within 30-80 days) and the 2% GDP expenditure on defense becoming the floor not ceiling. Second, with the removal of political blocks to Swedish accession, the alliance appears more unified and larger than ever, with greater consensus around what was acceptable, affordable and strategically appropriate. Third, the understanding of Ukraine’s trajectory and necessary support, and Russia’s actual power, dysfunction and future, are shifting. 

The Summit did not offer fast-track membership but it did advance the conditions that allow for that membership – military and economic support for Ukraine that increase its chances to restore statehood. Russia seeks to downplay the Summit’s importance, arguing Kyiv’s failure to achieve membership signifies abandonment and highlights Russia’s ability to deter. Yet, if Ukraine restores its 1991 statehood, then it is highly improbable that Russia’s refusal to concede war termination will be allowed to veto Ukraine’s NATO membership. A weakened and damaged President Putin will need to run for his “first term” presidency if he is to stay in control of Russia.  The politics of this dynamic will likely further impede Russia’s ability to prosecute its war of imperial aggression.  NATO’s next Summit is in Washington DC, July 2024, before the U.S. elections. We can expect a transformed strategic environment by then.

Disclaimer

This summary reflects the views of the authors (Pavel Baev, Mark Galeotti and Graeme P. Herd) and are not necessarily the official policy of the United States, Germany, or any other governments.

GCMC, Garmisch-Partenkirchen, 19 July 2023.