Korabelnikov leaves Russian military intelligence

On 24 April 2009, General Valentin Korabelnikov was replaced by his deputy, Lt. General Alexander Shlyakhturov, as head of the GRU, Russian military intelligence (technically, the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff).

Initial reports conflicted as to whether the 63-year-old was sacked or stood down, but given that his name has surfaced as one of the senior military leaders reportedly willing to resign over proposed military reforms at the end of 2008, arguably his card had been marked for some time. While his spokesman subsequently branded the suggestion he would resign as “brazen lies”, his discomfort with civilian defence minister Serdyukov was an open secret. It is hardly subtle that while President Medvedev awarded the outgoing intelligence chief the customary medial, this was only ‘For Services to the Fatherland’ third class. The honest answer seems to be that he chose to retire – because the alternative was to be sacked.

Korabelnikov became director of the GRU in 1997, and his 12-year tenure has seen mixed results. The GRU arguably recovered its aggressive edge more quickly that its larger ‘civilian’ espionage counterpart, the SVR, not least in assassinating Chechen rebel president-in-exile Zelimkhan Yandarbiev in Qatar in 2004 and, reportedly, involvement in other murders of Chechens abroad. The main focus of its tactical intelligence and armed operations, though – after all, the GRU controls the main Spetsnaz, or military special forces elements – were in Chechnya, where it supported warlord-turned-president Ramzan Kadyrov and played a key role in the conflict. Meanwhile, as well as its intelligence operations in the West, the GRU sought to penetrate the post-Soviet states of the ‘Near Abroad’, both covertly and also through developing relations with local security agencies.

The campaign of murders may have been operationally successful but were arguably politically problematic, not least as they helped cement a growing notion that Russia was dangerous, untrustworthy and unconcerned about international law. Such attitudes certainly helped sharpen British assumptions about the Livtinenko murder and leave London far more willing to see the Kremlin’s hand at work. Elevating Kadyrov may also prove a pyrrhic victory, in that he has all but created an autonomous and autocratic Chechnya under his personal control, fully aware of how far Moscow needs him and is thus forced to put up with his antics.

Perhaps more to the point, last year’s Georgian campaign did not show the GRU in especially good light. The war was won and Tbilisi was induced to start it, but this reflected both the disparity in the two sides’ forces and the planning of the Main Operational Directorate. However, the GRU’s tactical intelligence proved flawed and although Spetsnaz of the 45^th Detached Reconnaissance Regiment were relatively effective in their work, this too has proved counter-productive. Delays in passing reconnaissance data to the frontline military units have been used by critics of the GRU within the military and the SVR. The former suggest that Spetsnaz ought to be transferred from the GRU’s control and integrated within the regular military. The latter argue that the GRU would be better able to manage its tactical reconnaissance role if it concentrated on it, abandoning strategic intelligence to the SVR. Both of these are pretty naked ‘land grabs’ and are unlikely to get anywhere, but the very fact that such arguments are being made underlines the present weakness of the GRU.

Beyond the internal wrangling of military-bureaucratic politics, though, is this a big deal? In terms of the GRU, Shlyakhturov was Korabelnikov’s First Deputy and himself a GRU careerist. There is no suggestion yet that he stands for anything different although after years in the shadow of a powerful and uncompromising master, we might not have expected to see anything beyond obedience. Time will show whether he is anything beyond a ‘mini-Korabelnikov’. Perhaps more significant will be what this dismissal shows about military and Kremlin politics. President Medvedev and Prime Minister Putin must have been in agreement about this, given the implicit veto power the latter retains on security-related personnel changes, so suggestions of a widening breach between the two may be premature. Within the General Staff, the replacement of Korabelnikov with a more junior and still-unknown figure also helps ease the pressure on Chief of the General Staff Nikolai Makarov, whose relationship with the senior commanders has been tense. Combined with the formal announcement of the end to the ‘counter-terrorist operation’ in Chechnya, this could potentially help open a window to substantive military reform. But then again, outside observers have wistfully looked for such opportunities time and again, without there being subsequent and sustained reform, so we’ll just have to keep watching…

Financial crisis puts new pressure on Russian police, but means boom time for security forces

Although Putin made a great play of his commitment to law and order, the emphasis always seemed to be on order more than law. Resources were devoted more to defence and public order, but nonetheless the bonanza of oil and gas revenues did mean that spending on the police picked up, making good some of the deficits created in the 1990s, when successive budget crises left them in a disastrous state. At the same time, a trickle-down of prosperity did help control (if not really reverse) the rise in street crime, while organized crime matured, with real power in the underworld moving from ‘street mafiya’ to ‘suit mafiya’, the age of the overt gangsters known as ‘bandits’ giving way to the behind-the-scenes ‘authorities’ who blended crime, business and politics. This did not mean that organized crime disappeared, but at least it did mean an end to the more violent, indiscriminate days of the 1990s turf wars.

However, the global financial crisis is making its mark in Russia, too. Street crime appears again to be on the rise (although comprehensive and reliable figures have not yet been released) and organized crime is also under pressure. The old underworld status quo is being put in question as cash-strapped gangs seek to make good their deficits by muscling in on others’ territories and businesses. (The drug trade within and more to the point through Russia is a particularly attractive bone of contention.) Meanwhile, the ‘authorities’ are finding that their incomes from white-collar crime are falling, and may well drift back into their bad old ‘bandit’ ways.

Sadly, Medvedev does not seem to take organized crime seriously as a threat and even at this time appears to be following in Putin’s footsteps in prioritizing public order over law enforcement. The Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) still maintains its own army, the Interior Troops (VV). While sometimes deployed for patrol and similar duties, essentially this is a military force trained and equipped for public order and internal security duties, with army uniforms, combat weapons and even armored vehicles.

The VV are currently number  just over 200,000 effectives, but this year they were to begin to be reduced as part of a plan promulgated in 2006, down to 140,000 by 2011. However, according to the VV commander Army General Nikolai Rogozhkin, this draw-down has been placed on hold – presumably because of the Kremlin’s fear of mounting public unrest caused by the global economic slow-down. Indeed, if anything more resources are being diverted to public order forces, also including the OMON riot police who most recently were deployed in force in Vladivostok against protesters. Rogozhkin himself has been promoted to the rank of Deputy Interior Minister, a position also held by his predecessors but originally withheld from him since his appointment in 2004 precisely because of the planned diminution of the VV’s role. Meanwhile the VV themselves are gaining three Special Designation Centers (TsSNs), essentially special force detachments, to add to their existing Spetsnaz elements, including Vityaz. There is also a massive re-equipment program under way, equipping the VV with everything from new weapons (they look, for example, set to replace their ageing AK-74 assault rifles with the new AK-104 even quicker than the regular military) to unmanned aerial vehicles (airborne drones).

The MVD’s 2009 budget was predicated on a reduction in the VV of some 15,000-20,000 men, largely by not taking new recruits and thus saving not only on their salaries and maintenance costs but also training. Instead, not only are the VV maintaining their current strength, the introduction of new kit costs money and brings with it new training needs. Although the new MV budget has not been released, the hints and omens suggest no substantive increases given the government’s overall drive to cut expenditure. Even if the MVD budget remains stable, though, instead of being able to divert savings from the VV to regular policing it will actually have to increase its spending on its paramilitaries. This money will have to be scrounged from the expenditures on regular policing which – as in Soviet and even tsarist times – always seems to be the poor relation.

(Temporarily) Lost in Transition!

Apologies for the lack of activity on this blog. I am currently in the process of my move from the UK to the USA, winding up my affairs here and generally busy with logistics of every kind. Normal service will resume in the New Year, once I am settled.

Who is Yunus-Bek Yevkurov?

No one is likely to mourn the departure of Murat Zyazikov from the position of president of the volatile North Caucasus republic of Ingushetia. But the Kremlin’s choice of a successor has come as something of a surprise: Colonel Yunus-Bek Yevkurov, a gung-ho paratroop officer with no political experience or profile, no power base in the republic and – seemingly – no great enthusiasm for the job.

New guns for Russia’s cops – so what?

A piece of news which might seem of interest only to the gun-nut and the real obsessive actually has rather greater significance: the Russian police are phasing out their old Makarov pistols and Kalashnikov rifles with new weapons.

So what?

‘Contract killing is a continuation of business by other means’

It goes against the grain, but sometimes – rarely – I feel Putin and the Russian security apparatus deserve to be given the benefit of the doubt. On 6 October, the interesting but often-sensationalist Russian newspaper Novaya gazeta ran an article ‘Registered Speciality – the Killer’ which claimed that the Russian spetsluzhby, the security agencies, now routinely murder enemies of the Kremlin. The author, Novaya gazeta’s military affairs editor Vyacheslav Izmailov, pulls together a varied collection of killings and kidnappings and asserts that the same sinister hand is behind them all.

Russia Ready For Meaningful Military Reform. Again. Really.

On Friday 26 September, President Medvedev used a meeting in Orenburg with military district commanders during the Centre-2008 exercises to make his latest statements about defence modernisation. The headlines were made by his pledge to revamp Russia’s strategic arsenal: “A guaranteed nuclear deterrent system for various military and political circumstances must be provided by 2020.” However, he promised modernisation across the board: “We must ensure air superiority, precision strikes on land and sea targets, the timely deployment of troops. We are planning to launch large-scale production of warships, primarily, nuclear submarines with cruise missiles and multi-purpose attack submarines… We will also build an air and space defence network.”

On the face of it, this all sounds like news.

New appointment to MVD command structure

On 8 September, President Medvedev filled one of two gaps in the Ministry of Internal Affairs command structure, elevating Lt. Gen. Alexander Smirny from command of the MVD Organisation and Inspection Department (OID) to become a deputy interior minister. The current leadership structure (including the main operational departments) as of 14 September 2008 is thus:

Medvedev’s first police reform: MVD loses specialised organised crime department

Under Yeltsin, under Putin, and now it seems under Medvedev, reorganising law-enforcement agencies and overlaying new bodies on top of the existing ones has been the usual response to dealing with serious and organised crime. Cynic though I may be, this was my first thought on looking at Medvedev’s latest decree of 6 September 2008. The Interior Ministry (MVD) is to lose its specialised department for fighting organised crime and terrorism (DBOPT, but still widely known by its old acronym, UBOP) and its local branches. Investigating organised crime will simply be rolled into the work of the existing Main Directorate for Criminal Investigation (GUUR) and local CIDs, while UBOP staff will be transferred to a new body with a rather incongruous combination of roles: fighting ‘extremism’ and protecting judicial officials and witnesses.

Blood Brotherhood: Chechen organised crime

I have just had published in Jane’s Intelligence Review a piece on Chechen organised crime (http://jir.janes.com/public/jir/index.shtml, 28 August 2008), and while it wouldn’t be appropriate for me to reproduce the whole article here, I thought it might be useful if I summarised some of the main findings.

Chechen organised crime is not a specific gang so much as a distinctive criminal subculture. Often known as the bratva, ‘brotherhood’ – although sometimes it is described as the ‘Chechenskaya obshchina’ or ‘Chechen commune’ – it is a characteristic mix of modern efficiency and a bandit tradition.