Turkey shoots down a Russian jet and we return to the 19th century

 

Su24shootdownIs the shooting down of a Russian Su-24 ‘Fencer’ bomber by a Turkish fighter – the first direct NATO vs Russia combat incident – a big deal or not? My first thoughts are that the answer is probably not, at least not in the long term, but we can expect a fair amount of overt sound and fury on the one hand, and probably some covert retribution from Moscow, too. WW3 is not, however, on the cards.

The Russians are saying it was on the Syrian side of the border, the Turks say the plane was on theirs. I have no idea at this stage which is true, although it certainly wouldn’t surprise me if the Russian jet had intruded. Putting aside the (remote) possibility of pilot error, Moscow has been willing to cross into NATO airspace in the past and may even had an operational reason for doing so, perhaps trying to set up an attack run on a rebel convoy or facility on the Turkish border. After all, let’s not forget that Ankara is playing an active role in the Syrian civil war, and in its eagerness to hammer Kurds, wherever they may be, arguably supporting some pretty toxic elements.

Moscow may well have been assuming the Turks would be as restrained as other NATO members, which was an undoubted mistake. Putting aside any cultural stereotypes, Ankara is not only embarked in a campaign to assert itself as a regional power, it also sees Moscow as a sometimes partner-of-convenience, but also local rival. Russian intelligence officers have assassinated Chechen fundraisers in Turkey, and generally the Kremlin has shown little signs of seeing in Ankara a serious ally, partner or player, even in the days when Putin and Erdogan were getting along. Only this Friday, Russia’s ambassador had been given a dressing down about the bombing of Turkish-backed rebels. It may well be that Ankara leapt at the opportunity to teach Russia a lesson and also show that it was a serious player.

Putin’s immediate response has been mordant and tough, accusing Turkey of stabbing Russia in the back, of in effect protecting ISIS, and running to its NATO powers as if it has been one of its own aircraft that had been shot down. We can expect some kind of retaliation on the political-economic front (maybe stopping Turkish airliners coming to Russian airports?) and maybe also some unloading of additional serious ordnance on Turkish-backed elements in Syria. However, I suspect neither Moscow nor, at the very least, the other European NATO powers will want to let this go too far. Russia cannot fight hot diplomatic wars on too many fronts, and Europe clearly wants Moscow to be part of the solution in Syria and maybe Ukraine, too. And, frankly, there is in many capitals concern about Turkey, its agenda and its role in the region. Much will depend on where Washington falls, of course, but if Moscow can get even a crumb of contrition from Ankara or sympathy from Europe, then we can expect this to be splashed on Russian TV and allow the Kremlin to let this slide a little.

But even in this best-case scenario, I don’t imagine that will be the end to it. Moscow has already been willing to operate inside Turkey covertly, and is engaged in political tussles over influence in the South Caucasus as well as Middle East. I would expect some uptick in ‘mischief’ – perhaps some support for the Kurds or other violent extreme movements, for example – as well as a more assiduous campaign to push back and stymie Turkish regional ambitions.

It’s often said, with good reason, that Putin really wants a return to 19th century geopolitics, when might made right and realpolitik was all. Let’s not forget that one of the defining 19th century conflicts was that between Russia and the Ottoman Empire, which were sometimes openly at war, sometimes ostensibly at peace, but never anything than enemies. Here we go again.

A Tale of Two Cities and their security conferences

 This has been definitely the week of Central European security, with both the Warsaw Security Forum and the Riga Conference. I was delighted and honored to be invited to attend and speak at both, a chance to do the usual networking, hear a variety of interesting perspectives, pontificate, and also to see Warsaw for (to my shame) the first time and renew my acquaintanceship with Riga (always a pleasure). At the WSF, I participated in the opening panel on ‘The Rise of the West in a post-Western World’ alongside two former presidents (Saakashvili of Georgia and Landsbergis of Lithuania) and a former foreign minister (Jeremič of Serbia) ably chaired by Katarzyna Pisarska.  Am not sure whether or not the session will be made available on line (I’ll update this blog with a link, if so), but the event also provided an opportunity for Brian Whitnore of RFE/RL and me to record an episode of The Power Vertical podcast face to face, for a change. Read the full post »

If US Intelligence on Russia is Broken (A Bit), What Can Be Done To Help Fix It?

How can we know what he's thinking?

How can we know what he’s thinking?

General Philip Breedlove, Supreme Allied Commander Europe, recently gently but unmistakably reprimanded the US intelligence community for its “lack of ability to see into Russia, especially at the operational and tactical level.” While he acknowledged change was under way, even then he made it clear that this was very, very much a work in progress: “We’re gently turning the nose of this ship to get back to what we need to be looking at.” Is Russia befuddling US intelligence, and if so what should be done about it?

Read the full post »

The Early Autumn Publications Roundup

For the next instalment of my kinda-regular roundups, here are (to the best of my knowledge) all my publications from mid-August to the end of October 2015, linked where possible.

Russian bear should be more cuddly, less snarly,’ Moscow Times, 12 August

Why Russia is not an existential threat for the West,’ Russia! magazine, 18 August

Museums show Russia’s big security problem,’ Moscow Times, 25 August

Boozing through the Soviet Afghan war was more horrifying than you can imagine,’ War On The Rocks, 5 September

Kremlin’s “shadow power” tarnishes its image,’ Moscow Times, 6 September

STOLYPIN: Can Putin really be syrious?‘, Business New Europe, 7 September

Yakunin and the Systemic Virtues of a Generous Retirement‘, Russia! magazine, 16 September

Book Review: Global gangs: street violence across the world. Edited by Jennifer Hazen and Dennis Rodgers‘, International Affairs, 16 September

Putin and Trump have a lot in common,’ Moscow Times, 22 September

Russia to defend core Syrian government areas,’ Jane’s Intelligence Review, 22 September (with Jonathan Spyrer: he wrote the stuff from Damascus’s perspective, I wrote the Russian material)

Zaslon — Russia’s ultra-secretive special ops in Syria,’ War Is Boring, 5 October (not technically by me, but essentially recycling my findings)

Russia in Syria: Putin’s hard sell of quick victory against Isis could come back to haunt him,‘ International Business Times, 6 October

West must play it cool with Putin,’ Moscow Times, 6 October

Wikistrat Report: Russia in Syria — tactical masterstroke, strategic risk,’ Wikistrat, 7 October

STOLYPIN: The limits of Russia’s “patriotic mobilization”‘Business New Europe, 12 October

Crime, Kleptocracy, and Politics: Developments in Modern Russia‘, videocast talk at the Hudson Institute’s Kleptocracy Initiative, 13 October

West has lost the right to lecture Putin,’ Moscow Times, 20 October

Most of Russia’s military still “rubbish” despite Ukraine, Syria deployments‘, Reuters, 20 October — connects to podcast I recorded for the War College series, playable through this page or available on iTunes.

‘Russia: Economics may dent Russian police reform,’ Oxford Analytica, 26 October

‘Putin’s Spies and Security Men: His Strongest Allies, His Greatest Weakness’, Russian Analytical Digest No. 173: Russia and Regime Security, October

Crime, Kleptocracy, and Politics: Developments in Modern Russia

20151013_imageI was delighted to be able to discuss Russia, crime, corruption, politics, geopolitics and kleptocracy — all subjects close to my heart — yesterday at the Hudson Institute under the auspices of its Kleptocracy Initiative. The event was livestreamed and is now available through the Hudson’s YouTube channel here. The central point? That Russia is a kleptocracy in many ways but certainly not just a kleptocracy. There is also a rational state and people who want to do their jobs on one side, and a state-building project on the other, and what is distinctive about Russia today is:

  • the way that kleptocracy has been harnessed by the state as an instrument for both domestic and international purposes; and
  • the interconnected, post-ideological world in which Russia operates.

Is Ukraine being thrown off the bus? Not really, but France and Germany are right

Hollande-Merkel-PoroshenkoPoroshenko was in bullish form at the UN General Assembly but was apparently very worried about the Putin-Obama handshake, worrying that Washington would make some deal over Syria at Ukraine’s expense. Perhaps he should have been looking at Europe, instead. The ever-perceptive Leonid Bershidsky has an interesting piece in Bloomberg where he suggests that France and Germany have in effect told Ukrainian President Poroshenko that he has to make peace with the separatists, through pushing through a new election law for the Donbas and an amnesty for separatist leaders to allow them to contest the vote:

The way Merkel and Hollande see it, Poroshenko should be interested in working to reintegrate the rebel-held areas into Ukraine, which would mean contesting the election and, in case of an almost certain defeat, working with the winners. That’s the European way of doing things; trying to enlist outside support to defeat the separatists is not, especially when Europe has plenty of problems of its own.

Inevitably, Kiev’s partisans will see this as a betrayal and playing into Putin’s hands, as the new plan puts the onus on Poroshenko to get the law through his recalcitrant legislature. In the process, what seemed almost certain – that at year’s end, while Kiev comes into for some criticism, Moscow and the Donbas rebels get the lion’s share of the blame for the (inevitable) failure of Minsk-2 – now looks much less clear. After all, the burden is on Poroshenko and Minsk-2 implicitly just history.

Read the full post »

Follow

Get every new post delivered to your Inbox.

Join 3,760 other followers

%d bloggers like this: