Spooks and Soldiers

Just a quick catch-up: over the winter lull, Moscow News ran two columns of mine: ‘Keeping tabs on Putin’s spooks‘, which explores how the Russian intelligence community are at once the beneficiaries of Putin’s re-emergence and yet also under pressure; and ‘The very model of a modern military president‘ presented an unfashionably positive assessment of Russian military reform, and the irony that it took this least martial of presidents actually to start a genuine process (even though there is much still to be done).

Putin, Kudrin and the real Stolypin

There has been a lot of discussion lately about history, historical parallels and the historicization of the contemporary Russian ferment. I’ve played with parallels to 1905 and more recently Fiona Hill and Clifford Gaddy have written thoughtfully in the National Interest about Putin’s ‘historical turn’ and his self-identification with repressor-modernizer prime minister Pëtr Stolypin. In a conversation yesterday with RFE/RL’s excellent Brian Whitmore, we touched on the historical parallels (I suggested that in some ways he might be a Nicholas I figure – intellectually able to understand the need for reform, viscerally unable to sanction anything he felt weakened the state or brought the risk of instability).

Combined with the – in my opinion – likely accession of Kudrin as prime minister in the new Putin presidency, it got me wondering whether Putin really understood the historical parallel he likes to draw. Kudrin is personally close to Putin, but a technocrat rather than a silovik, more interested in modernization that statism. Unlike Medvedev, Kudrin has the stature, personal leeway and character to go nose-to-nose with Putin and demand a degree of control over policy. Furthermore, although I think Putin will will March’s presidential election, it will probably be in a second-round run-off and leave him weaker than he has been at any point since 1999. In short, he will need Kudrin and through him the technocrat wing of the political elite and in turn through them, some relationship with the aspirant middle class who represent the base of the current protests.

Kudrin will want to modernize by economic liberalization, which will have powerful socio-economic and thus political implications. It will lead to a drift of power away from the modern chinovniki, the bureaucrats of the state and security apparatuses, and towards the middle class. This is in some ways akin to Stolypin’s “wager on the strong” in the countryside, seeking to privilege a rural yeoman classes a new social backbone of tsarism, while modernizing the urban economy.

Perhaps the real Stolypin would actually be Kudrin. So who does that leave Putin? Possibly Nicholas II, turning to his self-confident (even arrogant) and able prime minister in desperation, despite having little personal sympathy for or understanding of his strategy. The real Stolypin failed to save autocracy from itself. Nicholas was unable or unwilling to support him against increasingly disgruntled aristocratic elites and ultimately may have turned a blind eye to the plot to assassinate him. It remains to be seen whether history offers any repetitions, but I can’t help but wonder how far Putin – no historian – is kidding himself about his own place in history.

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Here’s an excerpt:

The concert hall at the Syndey Opera House holds 2,700 people. This blog was viewed about 47,000 times in 2011. If it were a concert at Sydney Opera House, it would take about 17 sold-out performances for that many people to see it.

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New GRU chief: Igor Sergun

Despite a little confusion (RIA-Novosti and Kommersant say yes, Rossiiskaya gazeta said no at first, then yes), it seems clear that, as predicted, Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) chief Colonel General Alexander Shlyakhturov, not seen at headquarters for months (despite claims that he’s been on duty), has stepped down on grounds of age. He’s 64 – an age at which remaining in post requires a clean bill of health and also presidential approval. Shlyakhturov will presumably be given a suitable sinecure, possibly as civilian adviser to the GRU, and/or Shlyakhturov would in the near future chairman of the board of directors of the Moscow Institute of Thermal Technology (MITT).

His successor is Major General Igor Sergun. Read the full post »

The “death porn” of Russian mafiya reporting

I just wanted briefly to note a nice piece on Russian organised crime in the latest Financial Times Magazine. Moscow bureau chief Charles Clover writes about the role of gangsters in modern Russia and tries, but regrettably (if perhaps predictably) doesn’t get to dig deep into the case of Aslan Usoyan, ‘Ded Khasan.’ However, he does have some very acute observations about the “death porn” (his words) around Russian reporting of mob hits, part of an interestingly ambiguous and “oddly reverential attitude” they have for their gangsters:

In what has become almost a ritual, a high level razborka, or execution, will invariably lead the evening news. Announcers dwell lovingly on the details of the murder weapon, the getaway route, the model of Mercedes or Maybach that the victim was driving. Then comes the grainy CCTV footage or mobile phone photos of the deceased slumped over his steering wheel or prone outside the entrance to a lap-dancing club.

Within 24 hours, television stations will have produced computer simulations of the attack, complete with CGI-style graphics. Ballistics experts will be discussing the properties of the weapons used and any cool gadgets involved in the operation. Footage will follow of balaclava-clad police commandoes kicking in doors and cuffing men with abnormally thick necks and lots of tattoos and scars; mugshots of the enemies of the victim, their mob aliases (“Tomato”, “Pussycat”, “Little Japanese”) and their possible motives.

Of course, I am unashamedly a consumer and sometimes purveyor of such salacious stuff, so I am hardly passing any moral judgement. But Clover has the “the drama, gore, technological geekery, secret service acronyms and luxury branding, which accompany the typical Russian mafia hit” exactly right.

 

Playing the parallels: 1905 not 1917

“Revolutions are rarely fair fights. Those in power usually have more firepower; they lose not because they are outgunned, but because they will not or cannot use it against their enemies.”

My latest column in the Moscow News , ‘Not 1917, but maybe 1905?‘ picks up where my last blogpost on Moscow’s Praetorians left off, considering the arithmetic of power and also playing the usual historian’s game of looking for parallels. There are some excitable suggestions around that Russia is currently in ‘1917’ mode, but it is important to remember that tsarist may well have been moribund, losing its last plausible opportunity for modernizing reform when Stolypin was assassinated in 1911, but what really brought it down then was the hammer-blow of the First World War. Without such a dramatic systemic shock, inertia and aristocratic self-interest may well have kept it lumbering on for a while longer, a zombie regime dead but still mobile. Russia today is, I think, in distinctly better shape. If anything, I would suggest the parallels are more with 1905, when an accidental massacre triggered a nationwide explosion of violent but incoherence anger and protest, one the state could ultimately suppress piecemeal, but a harbinger of greater troubles ahead. I certainly don’t think Putin is yet willing to abdicate…

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