A Russian National Guard? Not so fast, or so likely

Not at all clear...

According to Nezavisimaya gazeta (April 2, 2012), President-elect Putin is planning to create a new National Guard, a domestic security force uniting the MVD VV Interior Troops, the MChS Ministry of Emergency Situation forces and various other security and military elements.

This Natsionalnaya gvardiya would include not just paramilitary security forces but also light airmobile units with their own transport aircraft, specialized motorized infantry brigades, and special forces. The Guard would also assimilate the 20,000 officers in the new Military Police, making it in many ways similar to the French Gendarmerie Nationale or Italian Carabinieri: a parallel police service, parallel military and internal security force all in one. Read the full post »

Non-Lethal Guns for Russian Police

As a coda to my earlier post about the rearming of Russia’s police (and why it’s a good thing), it’s been announced that traffic and transport police, as well as precinct inspectors (essentially local community officers) and maybe some regular beat cops will receive PB-4SP ‘Osa’ pistols firing non-lethal rounds, instead of their current weapons: conventional PM pistols or the new Yarygin PYa ‘Grach’. This comes 3 years after an initial commitment to begin use of non-lethal weapons and is a further sign of encouraging, if sometimes glacially slow police reform on he ground.

The MVD has apparently earmarked 45 million rubles ($1.6 M) for 3,800 18mm PB-4SPs. These higher-power versions of an existing civilian weapon fire metal-cored rubber bullets with a muzzle energy limited by law to 91 joules — enough to stun, even break bones, but not generally lethal unless fired at the head or point blank range. Of course, a problem is that many cases in which officers use their weapons are indeed at close quarters, and the standards of marksmanship and coolness in a crisis amongst many Russian police are pretty low, so I do fear that there will still be casualties. However, given that there is less real need for such officers to be resorting to weapons anyway, this is a step in the right direction. At least these rounds are less likely to hurt an innocent bystander through ricochet or passing through the target. (According to Izvestiya, 65 people were killed and at least 500 injured by non-lethal weapons in the past few years in Russia.)

For the real tech and gun mavens, the PB-4SP Osa (a pun: it means ‘wasp’ and also stands for Oruzha Samoobronnyi or Self-Defence Weapons),  is a light, four-barrel gun firing 18.5 x 60 mm rounds using a single CR-123A high capacity lithium battery. The rounds available are the T (Trauma), the rubber bullet described above, as well as a noise and flash round (SZ), a signal flare and a solid, lethal slug.

Is Vladimir Putin Russia’s Margaret Thatcher? Or, when will the ‘men in black mercedes’ come calling?

Amidst parallels with Stolypin and Brezhnev and so forth, it may seem a touch surreal to be throwing in this additional analogue, but bear with me. In an interview in February with the (London) Times, Gorbachev raised this comparison, saying that ultimately Thatcher “stayed too long and society was tired” and that by extension the same was true of Putin. Yes, I suppose, but there is more to it than that. In her time, after the Falklands War, this unpopular and derided prime minister became unassailable. What ultimately brought her down was not that society as a whole was fed up with her, or at least not that directly. Instead, it was that she lost the support of the Conservative Party elite (even Geoffrey Howe, seemingly the meekest of figures, resigned and publicly rebuked her in the process) such that the so-called ‘men in grey suits,’ the grandees of the Conservative Party, decided she had become a liability, that their best — only — hope of political survival lay in toppling her. Thus she was confronted and induced to stand down and, indeed, there was a bump in the polls once she had gone, such that her successor John Major managed to eke out a fourth election victory for the Tories’ 18-year run in power. Read the full post »

Kazan, Dalny and the problems and prospects of police reform

I’ve just written an opinion piece for the admirable Kazan Herald on ‘Glimmers of Hope in the Kazan Police Scandal‘, trying to make some sense of the ghastly case of the apparent (well, pretty conclusive, but technically not yet proven in a court of law) death of a man after he was brutally abused in the city’s Dalny (Dal’nii) police precinct. It may seem counter-intuitive to be looking for hope in such a tragedy, but the scale and nature of the public outcry, the authorities’ quick and decisive response are encouraging and initiatives such as the decision to instal video cameras in interrogation rooms may well help more concrete the often vague precepts of the 2011 Law on the Police. After all, police reform will inevitably be a halting, two-steps-forward-one-step-back process, a cultural and institutional change far slower and more complex than just spray-painting полиция over милиция on the sides of their cars. But part of the process, unpleasant as it may be at the time, will precisely be in flushing out decades of accumulated filth from the system. That other victims of the Dalny police, and the Kazan police as a whole, are now coming forward with their stories, stories which are terrible precisely because they are not atypical, that they could be heard in every part of Russia, is a good thing. The truth shall not always set you free, but it is at least a pretty unavoidable precondition for creating a more positive relationship between police and policed in the future.

Shuffling the siloviki: who may be the winners and losers in 2012?

With Putin’s presidential election over, now the question becomes who will make it into the new government, at a time when some insiders are suggesting there may be some substantial change. On the whole, the siloviki tend not to experience particularly rapid reshuffles, but there are some who are looking more vulnerable. In a couple of columns for the Moscow News, I look first at the three key silovik ministers (Serdyukov at Defense, Nurgaliev of the MVD and Prosecutor General Chaika), and secondly at the chiefs of the main security and intelligence services (FSB, SVR, GRU, FSKN, FSO). After all, it’s not just about personalia: the decisions about who stays and goes and more to the point the nature and origins of any new hires will say a lot about what Putin plans for the future, and what he fears.

Judicial reform: the necessary flip side of police reform

The decision today to convict Alexei Kozlov on fraud charges and sentence him to 5 years in a labor camp, seemingly as retribution against his wife, the activist journalist Olga Romanova, raises a crucial issue in terms of Russian reform. I appreciate that I am unfashionable in being mildly optimistic about police reform in Russia and the prospect that — over years, not overnight — it might lead to the emergence of a force concerned less with protecting the interests of the state and the elite and more with upholding the law and providing security for all. However, that will be impossible or meaningless without a corresponding change in the nature and culture of the Russian court system. If the courts are corrupt and/or subject to undue political influence, then police reform will be largely irrelevant: the guilty can arrange for themselves to be released, even if arrested, through bribery and blat (influence, connections), while the innocent who fall foul of the state or the elite will still be at risk. As is, time and again the courts appear to be — as in Soviet times — nothing more than instruments of factional and elite interest, from denying environmentalists their rights to characterizing efforts to confront homophobia as ‘extremism.’

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