The Pussy Riot cliches

No irony in this image. None at all.

OK, all of us who covered yesterday’s verdict were writing fast, and maybe also caught up in the moment, but many of the cliches, exaggerations and outright myths about this case are truly irritating me. Let’s just pick up on a few of the more egregious ones surfacing in the media and online comment:

“It’s like Stalinism.” As Mark Adomanis has eloquently pointed out, no it’s not, and to say it’s anything like it is dramatically to underplay just how ghastly Stalinism was.When the Pussy Riot trio, battered, bruised and brutalized, stand in the dock and haltingly read out a ‘confession’ that they were put up to it by Mike McFaul, Boris Berezovsky and an international Jewish conspiracy, if they and millions like them are sent to dig canals with their bare hands for 25 years or get a bullet in the head at the Butovo firing range, then you can call it Stalinism.

“It’s like Nazis performing in the synagogue.” No, it’s not. Pussy Riot were protesting against Putin, not calling for the extermination of Russian Orthodox believers. They may have been politically inflammatory and musically raucous, but their message is actually a distinctly humane one. Whether or not you think it legitimate protest (not least as the Russian Church is slavishly – pun intended – supportive of Putin), a childish stunt or an act of blasphemy, don’t make it more than it is.

“It was just a publicity stunt to sell records.” I doubt it. Sure, they garnered a great deal of attention, but to a large extent that was because not of their act but the trial – had the state and Church dismissed them as irrelevant and childish, or slapped on a fine or some community service, they would have been a 5-minute wonder. They could hardly have predicted what happened. Besides, if they did, if they were willing to spend a couple of years in Russia’s violent, under controlled, TB-ridden prison system just to sell records, then that’s a level of dedication we should surely applaud…

“It was whipped up by the Western media.” No, it wasn’t. Frankly, I am sure the Western media wishes it had this power, but you can ‘blame’ the clumsy handling of the case by the Russian state, the power of social media and the presence of a genuine, vocal minority who don’t like the current regime. For some reason The Guardian often seems to be regarded as the eminence grise here. I love the Grauniad dearly, but I somehow don’t see it as some combination of Bilderberg and SPECTRE. I suppose its power would explain why the UK has a liberal, leftist government, a thriving and bounteously-funded National Health Service, and Rupert Murdoch behind bars. Oh, wait, it doesn’t…

“It’s the end of Putinism.” I doubt it. Maybe we’ll look back and see it as part of the end of Putinism, to be sure, but losing Paul McCartney’s vote is something I suspect Putin can live with. If anything, I would see the trial as a symptom of the Kremlin’s increasing inability to control the national political debate and the rise of a new generation of protesters and radicals, as well as a handy rallying point, but in six months’ time I doubt we’ll be regarding it as some momentous turning point.

“They are philosopher queens/the new voice of a generation/the Vysotskys of the Putin era/etc…” Eh. The trio are clearly intelligent, committed, composed and thoughtful (more so than their music). But we can appreciate their words and poise and deprecate the trial without needing to elevate them to such a mythic status. Again, had the state not decided to make an example of them, would we really be investing them with such sanctity?

“It’s all about the Church.” Not really. Sure, the ROC has an unusual role in Russia, but it has never been truly independent of the state (well, maybe for a little while in 1917 and the very early stages of the Bolshevik era). In the tsarist era, it was firmly behind the tsar of the ‘third Rome’ while under Soviet times, the ecclesiastical hierarchy became a branch of the KGB in flowing robes. Nonetheless, it cannot demand a trial from the state, that’s not how modern Russian politics works – not even Sechin can demand anything (just ask Kudrin). Instead, it has a voice in the upper elite and it can make its case, gather supporters and hope to convince Putin the ‘decider’. In this context, Pussy Riot went on trial because the Kremlin wanted them there. They may have wanted to placate the ROC, but this should be seen as a piece of the government’s wider campaign against the opposition.

“The same would have happened in the West.” No, it wouldn’t. The “whatabouters” who tend to plug this line tend to point to cases of people trying to distribute anti-Semitic tracts or the like, in countries where that it explicitly illegal. (If you want an example of this kind of offensive nonsense, see here.) Let’s take UK law as an example. I’m not a lawyer, but it seems to me that at most they could be charged under section 5, Part I of the Public Order Act 1986, which would be punishable by no more than a fine

There is much excellent reportage about the case, and it is an important case that does have a real significance for Russia today. But there is also far too much hyperbole, spleen (on both sides of the debate) and wishful thinking. It will be interesting to see how the case is viewed in six or twelve months from now.

On Pussy Riot and the politics of example

The Pussy Riot trial police dog. No doubt soon to be the Presidential Plenipotentiary to the Northwestern Federal District…

So, two years for each of the three Pussy Riot defenders — conveniently enough less than the three demanded by the prosecution (so this counts as the “leniency” for which Putin called), and meaning that, with time off for good behavior, they can be out before the 2014 Sochi Winter Olympics. Vast amounts of attention will be given this in the media and the blogosphere, so let me confine myself to wondering just why the Kremlin went ahead with this trial and — because I have no belief that this case was not wholly politically-staged — decided on such a penalty.

I may not often agree with the Kremlin’s calculations and solutions, but I certainly don’t believe Putin and his cohorts are fools or unthinking autocrats. They do what they do for reasons. The only plausible reason for this case is that it is meant to be an example.

Read the full post »

Magic, Myth and Vladislav Surkov

A belief in magic depends heavily on an acceptance of certain terms of reference. The sun rises again because we chant the sacred prayers. You get pregnant because you drank my potion. If you hadn’t prayed so hard, that wouldn’t have been a winning lottery ticket. Causation is asserted and believed, not proven. Of course, any evidence that appears to support the belief system is eagerly pounced on, as we all like to believe we are right. I cannot but help wonder if this is part of the powerful and probably growing myth of Surkov, Kremlin political technologist and spinmeister.

Read the full post »

Room for Chechens in the global jihad?

Three news items last week raised again the thorny question of how far the current insurgencies in the North Caucasus may be linked with a global Islamic extremist jihad. Read the full post »

Crime, Corruption and Chatham House

For those of you who might be anticipating some scandalous allegations about the Royal Institute of International Affairs, then prepare to be disappointed as I have nothing but good words to say about this institution, the biggest name in UK foreign policy think tanks. This post is, rather, an explanation for my recent absence from the blog and also a pointer towards a few recent appearances.

In June, I was delighted to take part in a panel discussion with the splendid title Russia’s Rotten Core: money, politics, and the rule of law, alongside Russian billionaire Alexander Lebedev and Vladimir Ashurkov, executive director of the Russian Foundation for Fighting Corruption. I’m sure it will surprise no one who has seen Lebedev senior in action to hear that he very much used it as a platform for his own personal anti-corruption campaign, but overall this led to an interesting discussion chaired by John Lloyd, contributing editor of the Financial Times, which considered the scale and implications of the problem and steps which could be taken to address it on a national and international level. A transcript and recordings of the initial presentations and the subsequent discussion are available on the Chatham House website here.

Then in July, I was back there for a solo gig, an experts’ roundtable on Transnational Aspects of Russian Organized Crime. I can’t speak for the audience, but I found this a wonderfully stimulating event. The great virtue of a place like Chatham House is that by virtue of its pivotal status (and, let’s be honest, the less eclectic and extensive range of thinktanks compared with Washington), it attracts people with the most impressive and interesting expertise and experience and this was certainly the case here. I discussed the rise of organized crime and corruption within Russia and its spread abroad, the various forms it takes and possible measures to combat the problem. A summary of the event is also available here.

‘Il Principe’ or ‘Prezident v zakone’? Putin, power and being the pivot

The Decider

The most recent podcast from the ever-excellent RFE/RL Power Vertical series dwelt on Putin as the ‘indispensable man’ in Russian politics, and the nature of power. An interesting difference of nuance between Brian Whitmore and his co-host Kirill Kobrin came over what was more central to the present system. Brian seemed to suggest that it was political power, an asset which could then be converted into economic power; Kirill, by contrast, stressed the importance of economic power, and the extent to which the system was built on control of the economy. Obviously political and economic power can be converted into each other, but I confess I am minded of Machiavelli’s dictum from his Discourses: “gold alone will not procure good soldiers, but good soldiers will always procure gold.”

Economic and political power are fungible, but the exchange rate between the two will vary from system to system, from time to time. I am probably closer to Brian, in that I feel that in modern Russia, political power can make you obscenely rich (if that’s what you want — there are also many within the upper elite who clearly lead very privileged lives but are less interesting in swelling their bank accounts than others), but economic power does not automatically make you that powerful. It certainly does not make you secure: today’s oligarch can too easily become tomorrow’s zek if he falls foul of the political elite. The super-rich are super-rich because they also know how to operate within the political environment; but the politically powerful need not also be personally wealthy or economically savvy.

That leads me to the issue of Putin’s role within the elite and the nature of the ‘power vertical.’ Read the full post »

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