Why I don’t see any Russian plot behind the Boston bombings

I’ve been struck in the past 48 hours how many journalists’ queries I’ve fielded that seemed to take seriously the idea that the Russian state (or local agents in the North Caucasus) could somehow be responsible for the terrible Boston bombing. (I’m talking 6 serious journalists: not the kind of lunatics who, for example, claimed the real bombers were Navy SEALs.) The idea would seem to be that by encouraging, facilitating or downright arranging the attack, they demonize the Chechens, legitimize their brutal security campaign in the North Caucasus, and create a new, more favorable environment for dealing with the USA, in one fell swoop. A cute idea, worthy fodder for some lurid airport thriller, but in my opinion very, very hard to believe.

I can understand why the Tsarnaevs’ family and friends might want to believe that Tamerlan and Dzhokar were framed or set up. It’s the same impulse that leads to the disbelieving and perplexed statements that “he was a lovely man” or “he kept himself to himself” every time some serial killer or child abuser is arrested. Evil thoughts and plans, alas, do not always or even usually manifest themselves through sinister manner and demented cackles.

However, if we look at these particular suggestions (some of which also come from Russians), they seem to rest of a few basic assertions:

  • The FSB had suspicions about Tamerlan Tsarnaev, so the fact that they let him into the country shows that they had some ulterior motive.
  • Putin was willing to blow up Russian apartment buildings in 1999 for political purpose, so he’d have no more compunction seeing terror in Boston.
  • The Russians want to make the world stop hassling them about their tactics in the North Caucasus: this gives them a perfect way of demonstrating that they are simply fighting evil jihadists.
  • In the most ridiculously extreme cases, it’s asserted that the Kremlin just hates the USA anyway, and likes seeing mayhem there.

Of course Moscow will seek to make political capital out of this event; that’s what countries do (I remember when offers of assistance to the USSR after Chernobyl were also accompanied by patronizing suggestions about how this wouldn’t have happened if the Soviets were less Soviet and more Western). That certainly doesn’t mean that “hardliners in Russia might want another Cold War with America, and they may even secretly rejoice at the idea of mayhem in the West.” The pragmatic art of diplomacy is often about making the best from whatever fate presents.

The Kremlin has not shown itself averse to the use of violence in domestic and international politics (I’m inclined to accept the 1999 apartment bombings were state terrorism), but this is a world apart from actually trying to instigate an attack on US soil. The risks so outweigh the potential advantages that I don’t think it would even have been seriously considered. There is one basic rule of covert operations: at some point, they become covert no longer. If Tamerlan had been an active, aware agent, what would have happened if he had been captured? Even assuming that he was instead a dupe, groomed for the purpose by Russian undercover agents posing as jihadists, what happens when the US authorities–who, we can safely assume, are turning the full weight of their massive intelligence capacity onto this case–get a sniff of this? Any political advantages are likely to be transient (think how quickly the post 9/11 amity evaporated); any political risks astronomical.

Besides which, the FSB flags up potential individuals of concern all the time. They don’t necessarily bar them from the country. One could just as easily (and foolishly) suggest that the FBI’s failure to pick up on the brothers’ jihadist sentiments in 2011, after the FSB had passed on a warning about them, showed that somehow the US authorities were involved. (And for the record, while the inevitable inquiry will say for sure, we need not assume the FBI “failed” here–Tamerlan may not have been fully radicalized by then, the FBI get many such warnings, and in any case they are often rightly skeptical of FSB tip-offs as the Russians often claim people are “terrorists” on the flimsiest grounds or just to smear political oppositionists.)

The world is usually a simpler place than people think, and covert actions less common and less attractive than the movies suggest. We’ll wait and see, but to me this is a case of an alienated young man looking for answers and sadly finding them in the ideology of global jihad, and apparently bringing his brother into the cause. In some ways this is harder to understand than deep plots and cunning stratagems, because it requires us to accept that the Western liberal democratic model does not satisfy everyone and that we cannot control the vagaries of lost souls…

(Oh, by the way: North Korea has denied being behind the bombing, too. So that’s alright, then.)

They whack him here, they whack him there… The Azeri Pimpernel

I think it fair to say that Rovshan Janiev is less dashing

I think it fair to say that Rovshan Janiev is less dashing

It is as much as anything else a sign of the pressures in the Russian underworld and the lack of clarity in what will follow the murder of Aslan Usoyan (‘Ded Khasan’) that one of the potential instigators of the attack, Rovshan Janiev (‘Rovshan Lenkoransky’) is various reported killed in Moscow, killed in Turkey, detained in Baku and, according to his brother, alive and well in Dubai

As of writing, I don’t know which of these is true, if any. Thanks to a conversation with someone in Moscow who I feel would know, I feel fairly confident that he was briefly arrested in Baku, as much as anything else as a warning to scale down his leadership campaign within the ‘mountaineer’ (Caucasus) underworld community. There seems to be a growing body of reports in the Russian press about his death in Turkey, but these could easily simply be feeding off each other. That said, he is an ambitious man, a destabilizing force, and as a result has many enemies over and above Dmitry Chanturia (‘Miron’), Usoyan’s heir. Following the murder of his lieutenants Astamur Gulia (‘Astik Sukhumski’) in Abkhazia and Rufat Nasibov (‘Rufo’) in Moscow, Janiev may well be a tempting target.

We’ll see. However, worth noting at this point is the dog that isn’t barking: the ethnic Russian and Slavic gangs who make up the majority of the Russian underworld and who are presumably happy to see their southern rivals tearing each other apart, and the Chechens, who while ‘mountaineers’ essentially keep themselves apart from the others. They could be a force for stability, preventing the mob war from escalating, or they could seek to capitalize on it by making land grabs of their own, further ratcheting up the tension…

Rovshan Janiev’s arrest in Baku: efforts to avert a mob war?

Rovshan behind bars again

Rovshan behind bars again

Dmitry Chanturia (‘Miron’ or ‘Miron Yaroslavsky’), the new head of Aslan Usoyan’s criminal network, seems to believe that the Azeri gangster Rovshan Janiev (‘Rovshan Lenkoranskiy’) is responsible for his uncle’s murderAs I’ve written elsewhere, it may be his genuine belief, or simply because Janiev is a more politically-palatable and practical target than the more likely culprit, Tariel Oniani (‘Taro’). Either way, there is likely to have been a connection to the recent murder of Janiev’s ally  Astamur Gulia (‘Astik Sukhumski’) in Abkhazia.

Many of the grandees of the Russian underworld are keenly aware of the many dangers which could follow if a new mob war erupts, from the way it would spread to the likelihood that it may force the state to crack down. They have been trying to negotiate a truce of sorts. However, the Russian state is also keen to avert any such catastrophic collapse of the present cold peace within the underworld. This was probably one of the reasons for the unusual decision to break up a gathering of bosses from the Oniani network when they sat down at a restaurant in Nikolina Gora, west of Moscow. The 23 mobsters were duly released after being detained, but the key thing was this this breach of the usual cop-godfather etiquette was likely a signal that they were being watched and their intent — to plan how they would capitalize on the murder ‘Ded Hasan’ — was one on which the authorities frowned.

I cannot help but suspect that a similar motive may be behind Janiev’s unexpected arrest in Baku on 28 January, when he flew in for a birthday celebration. Whether or not Janiev ends up being charged in Azerbaijan, let alone convicted, may to an extent be beside the point. Janiev clearly did not expect arrest and normally he would probably have been safe. However, were Moscow eager to make a point and damp down the potential embers of a criminal conflagration, persuading the Azeri authorities to give him a warning but also to take him off the streets might well be a useful step…

Sergei Shoigu: Russia’s tailor-in-chief?

They certainly look the part of the 21st century men at arms

They certainly look the part of the 21st century men at arms

Sergei Shoigu’s early initiatives as defense minister all seem to have a distinctly sartorial bent. First, he decreed that the traditional portyanki foot cloths wrapped around the foot every morning, washed and hung up to dry at night, be fully replaced by socks by the end of 2013. Then it was bruited around that the traditional — indeed, iconic — ushanka fur hat with side-flaps would be phased out and replaced with new headgear. Then we have confirmation that a new set of field uniforms including these changes would indeed be issued, with 100,000 soldiers getting them this year (earlier this year it was just 70,000), the rest in 2014.

It is easy to belittle such moves. Efficient and comfortable uniforms rank with decent housing, adequate food and proper medical care amongst the kinds of quality-of-life issues taken for granted in most Western militaries yet contributing to the terrible reputation of army service in Russia (and hence recruitment of volunteers). It is also in line with the kinds of reforms Serdyukov had been trying to introduce. After all, he had wanted to phase out the portyanki and introduce new, better uniforms.

The full array of new Russian uniforms, to be phased in from 2013

The full array of new Russian uniforms, to be phased in from 2013

However, there is much more to being defense minister than being tailor-in-chief, and the initial omens about Shoigu’s priorities are less inspiring. After Serdyukov had spent much political capital cutting down the bloated, top-heavy officer corps, it seems that the army, navy and air force command staffs will be increased fully 2-3 times. However much this is spun as a measure to improve training and coordination, it is a victory for the top brass and a step away from creating a leaner military.

Furthermore, the notion of importing better foreign-made equipment seems out of favor, with the decision to scale back purchase of Italian LMV65 light armored vehicles and new criticism of the French Mistral deal. Regardless of the qualities of these particular deals, trying for military autarky makes absolutely no sense in terms of military reform (Dmitry Gorenburg has some astute comments on this on his blog). The only people it pleases are the defense-industrial complex industrialists, who became such an enemy of Serdyukov’s.

In other words, for the moment Shoigu seems either to be playing it safe or else lacks the political muscle to take on the two conservative lobbies — the generals and the ‘metal-eaters’ — whose interests are actually antithetical to proper military reform. He may be biding his time, but for the moment he seems content to be tailor-in-chief. Maybe because he’s already window-shopping for the kind of suit fit for a prime minister. Or even a president?

A postscript: what is this massive Russian armada of which you speak?

russian navyJust as a peevish postscript to my last, reading some of the media one might be forgiven for thinking that Moscow had deployed some massive armada into the Med to shore up Assad (how does a naval force without air or meaningful artillery influence a counter-insurgency war?) or to intimidate the West. “16 Russian warships carrying thousands of marines” “a show of force“, etc

Let’s see just what is there, though:

(more…)

A Proxy War Over Syria? Hardly

Buying Russian guns does not necessarily buy you Russian support

Buying Russian guns does not necessarily buy you Russian support

What has been happening in Syria has everything to do with Syria and relatively little to do with geopolitics. The arming of the Free Syrian Army rebels is perhaps understandable, even if I suspect it will come to haunt the West (remember those nice mujahideen fighting the Soviets in 1980s Afghanistan? What could possibly go wrong with supplying them with RPGs and Stinger surface-to-air missiles?). But it seems inevitable that the conflict keeps being viewed through an anachronistic and dangerously misleading Cold War Redux lens. From this comes overheated rhetoric about how “The US Is Waging An All-Out Proxy War With Russia In Syria” and the dispatch of Russian ships becomes an effort to deter the West (how? Is Putin seriously going to put Russian troops in harm’s way?).

Let’s get serious here.

1. Russia has no great enthusiasm for Bashar Assad and his regime. To be sure, the Kremlin does not seem to have a particular problem with murderous dictators (but then again, nor often does the West), and a customer for Russian weapons is always welcome, but this has long been an alliance or rather affiliation of convenience. Russia gets arms sales and a notional naval base at Tarsus (which is of marginal real value) and a thorn in Iran’s side. Syria gets a certain degree of political cover. However, Putin is not bound to Assad, and is certainly not about to lose sleep or political capital on  his behalf. In recent weeks, after all, Moscow has carefully been easing itself away from Assad’s side.

2. Russia has legitimate security interests in the region. There are Russian nationals in-country, from military advisers to civilians (that small naval deployment makes much more sense as a potential evacuation force than some political lever, not least as it includes a couple of troop transports which are largely empty). Tarsus is not really a serious naval base, more a statement of a desire to have a toehold in the Mediterranean, but nonetheless Russia can hardly be expected not to care about its fate. Syria is also, as I note above, regarded as a counterweight to Iran, which is challenging Russia along its southern borders.

3. Russia’s biggest fear is not regime change as such but the anarchy and Islamism likely to follow. In conversations with Russian foreign ministry and security sector personnel, time and again I have heard the refrain that the West is great at destroying regimes but terrible at managing the outcome. And they have a point: I find it hard to see Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya and (although the Western role was far, far less significant there) Egypt as encouraging case studies. As I’ve written elsewhere, what Moscow fears above all is chaos and the rise of pro-Iranian Islamism in Syria. And if anything that prospect is looking more and more likely.

4. Russia is fed up. This is not so much an excuse as an observation. Moscow feels — with good reason — that it was cheated by the West (above all, the USA) over Libya, a bait and switch that saw it agree to a limited UN resolution that was then (ab)used to justify eliminating Gaddafi. Again, it’s not that the Russians were that fond of the erratic old butcher, but they are proud enough not to enjoy feeling that they were manipulated to see him ousted. Add to that the mess that has followed, and this helps explain some of their particular intransigence over Syria.

Overall, then, I do believe that Moscow feels that Assad is likely to fall and is preparing for that eventuality, even though it hopes that he will survive, whether through military success or political deals. Evacuation plans have been drafted and I hear that Syria is now having to pay up front and in full for any further shipments, whether of military materiel or anything else. The abortive invitation for talks issued to Ahmed Moaz al-Khatib, leader of the Syrian National Coalition, may have represented a ploy precisely to make him look unreasonable (as he predictably placed unrealistic preconditions on any talks) but was also a major step away from its previous position of refusing to grant any legitimacy to the opposition.

That does not mean that the Russians are happy with the way things have developed or feel any particular urge to play nice. (Relations with Turkey, which had been increasingly positive, are taking a hit.) But it does mean that it is very unlikely that they are going to put any political capital, let alone military muscle, into saving him. The best they are likely to offer is that comfy dacha in Barvikha if Assad manages to get out alive…

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