Wikistrat exercise: “Winning Mexico’s Drug War”

Winning+Mexicos+Drug+War+-+front+pageFollowing my involvement in Wikistrat‘s When Putin Falls simulation, I was also fortunate enough to be asked to lead their policy-oriented Winning Mexico’s Drug War crowd-sourced exercise. Over a week, some 70 analysts brainstormed options to address the country’s present narcotics-fuelled woes, coming up with policies that ranged from the enlightened to the bloody, from the purely local to the global. (Here’s one, for example.)

Here is the introduction from the final report, which I wrote on the basis of all the hard work of the experts, analysts and contributors involved, ably marshaled by Dr Amanda Skuldt:

Mexico is burning. Over much of the last decade, Mexican drug cartels have conglomerated and made moves to challenge the central government (and each other) for control over territory and drug markets. The cartels have improved their organization and capabilities despite the massive crackdowns by the Mexican government and the flood of U.S. security assistance, which has totaled more than $1.9 billion since 2008. Drug-related violence and kidnapping remain a constant threat, even in previously “safe” areas of Mexico, with an estimate of over 40,000 people killed since 2006.

Like his predecessor, President Enrique Peña Nieto was elected on a platform of fighting organized crime. The previous Calderon administration chose directly to confront the cartels, especially by using the Mexican armed forces. Instead of calming the country, this policy caused violence within the cartels to increase and to spill over into Mexican society. In addition, the armed forces are increasingly viewed as corrupt. While Peña Nieto’s administration has claimed some successes as it moves to shift the drug war policy toward protecting civilians rather than attacking cartel leaders, these appear illusory and the death toll continues to climb with an average of 35 Mexicans killed every day. Now even Mexican politicians are being targeted with alarming regularity.

Furthermore, this struggle is taking place in the context of high unemployment, increased poverty (according to the World Bank, half of Mexico’s population of 115 million lives below the poverty line), and widespread disillusion with the government. Meanwhile, Mexican dissatisfaction with the current form of U.S. assistance is growing. It is clear that the Mexican and American governments must chart a new course of action, but what will actually restore law and order?

In April 2013, Wikistrat ran a week-long crowdsourced simulation in which 70 analysts from around the world collaboratively developed Policy Options for the Mexican government, the U.S. government and other actors to respond to the escalating drug war in Mexico. The goal was to provide a plausible range of strategies and techniques that could stem the tide of violence and could restore control of the country to the authorities.

Analysts were encouraged to tackle this not only from a geostrategic angle, but also to take a tactical “boots on the ground” approach in which they explored social, political and economic options as well as “kinetic” law enforcement/military ones. They addressed not just the intended outcome but also the actors who would be involved, the details of how the option would be implemented, and the circumstances under which it would be most likely to succeed – as well as the potential consequences of failure.

The full report has now been released, and you can read it here:  Winning+Mexico’s+Drug+War.

Georgian Organized Crime Blitz in Europe

(Some further thoughts to complement my initial, snap response, Europe-wide arrests of Georgian gangsters, with senior Kutaisi vor seized in Prague’)

squadarmobileOn 18 June, police in six European countries carried out coordinated operations, arresting 18 alleged members of the Georgian organized crime group known as the Kutaisi clan. Coordinated by the Italian National Police’s Central Operational Service and the Bari city Squadra Mobile (flying squad), these arrests netted 13 alleged vory v zakone (‘thieves in law’ or ‘thieves within the code’). Overall, there were 7 arrests in Italy, 2 in the Czech Republic, 5 in Lithuania, 2 in Portugal, one in France and one in Hungary. (Some Italian reports also cite arrests in Moscow, but I have yet to see that confirmed.)

This operation, the outcome of an 18-month investigation, was described by Europol as “one of the most significant blows against clans controlled by this high-ranking, elite of the world of Russian-speaking organised crime.”

Perhaps most interesting is that it appears—although this has not been confirmed—that the Hungarian arrest was of Merab Dzhangveladze (“Dzhango”/”Django”), the head of the Kutaisi grouping, and a major player within the Georgian underworld in both Georgia and Russia.

He is a close ally of Tariel Oniani (“Taro”), the vicious senior Georgian gang leader in Russia. He was also a sworn enemy of Aslan Usoyan (“Ded Hasan”), murdered in Moscow in January. Usoyan had formally had Dzhangveladze stripped of his vor v zakone status in 2008, as part of a tit-for-tat struggle with Taro, although this means little in today’s more diffuse and opportunistic underworld. Dzhangveladze may well have been behind the assassinations of both Usoyan and Vyacheslav Ivankov (“Yaponchik”) and has in many ways been Oniani’s right hand while he is in prison.

If Dzhangveladze has indeed been arrested, then this turns a serious blow to the Kutaisi into a devastating one. His brother Levon has in the past acted as his interim lieutenant, but lacks the stature to hold the group together for long. The Kutaisi clan, with an estimated 50 vory v zakone, is one of the most significant Georgian organized crime groups, not least amongst the so-called lavrushniki (“bay leaves”), Georgian gangsters within the Russian underworld. It certainly delivers a serious blow to the extensive Georgian—and, by extension, Eurasian—organized crime in Europe, as well as another example of the increasingly effective coordination of the struggle against them by European police forces.

However, this may also play to underworld developments in Russia. At present, the Usoyan and Oniani networks are locked in a phony war over both deep feuds and future dominance of the “mountaineer” fraction of the underworld, not so much a cold war as a tepid one that could quickly heat up further. If Dzhangveladze is taken out of the picture for long and if the Kutaisi clan are not able to bounce back quickly—two distinct “ifs”—then it does undermine Oniani. It could even embolden Chanturia, Usoyan’s successor, to strike…

Prague, Moscow, and the value of speaking firmly, clearly and with one voice

A cliché, yes, but a cool one

A cliché, yes, but a cool one

It is, of course, a hackneyed cliché to talk about the “Russian bear.” Nonetheless, it is fair to say that prodding either with a stick is equally ill-advised. However, the usual advice on encountering a bear is to give it its space, be submissive, be quiet. That doesn’t work so well with Moscow. By the same token it is a dangerous caricature to suggest (as some sadly still do) that force or assertiveness is “all Russia understands.” However, what is certainly true is that meekness and the appearance of division tend to encourage Moscow to become more confrontational. Consider, for example, the marked failure of the US government’s “re-set” policy, which has failed to deter Russia from buttressing Syrian tyranny, spying on and perhaps murdering its critics abroad, publicly outing US agents, hounding Ambassador McFaul and doing everything but kicking sand in Obama’s face.

In this context—and given that I’m in Prague for the summer, I’m especially interested in Czech-Russian relations—I was perturbed by the details of the extradition to Moscow of Russian businessman Alexei Torubarov in May, especially in the context of what seems a growing assertiveness by Russia in Central and Southern Europe.

(more…)

Moscow continues its Amerikanskaya chistka: Tom Firestone expelled

In 2010 they award him; in 2013 they expel him

In 2010 they award him; in 2013 they expel him

There seems to be an Americanskaya chistka, an American purge in Moscow. After January’s quiet expulsion of an alleged CIA agent, Benjamin Dillon, and this week’s rather less quiet PNGing of Ryan Fogle, comes news (broken in the NY Times) that Thomas Firestone, a former legal counsellor at the US Embassy who had moved into private practice in Moscow, was barred from returning to the city and sent back to the USA. Tom is, for my money, one of the sharpest–in every sense–critics of corruption in Russian business and the dark arts of reiderstvo, ‘raiding’ in particular. (The practice of stealing assets through falsified legal claims.) He spent two tours at the US Embassy as resident legal adviser, then joined the Moscow office of Baker & McKenzie as senior counsel. Not only was he given a certificate of merit in 2010 by Federal Anti-Monopoly Service chief Igor Artemyev “for his outstanding work in advancing U.S.-Russian cooperation in combating cartels and unfair competition,” he also wrote some of the seminal scholarly studies of reiderstvo, notably ‘Criminal Corporate Raiding in Russia‘ (2008).

Apparently, he was returning to Moscow on 5 May and was detained, held  for 16 hours and then put on a flight to the USA. The news only seems to have broken today (Sunday 19 May). The story–so far–is that this follows efforts by the Federal Security Service to recruit him as an agent. Tom clearly enjoyed Moscow, with all its crass energy and sharp edges, but I confess I am astonished if the FSB really thought he was likely to be open to recruitment. Honestly I’d see it as much more likely that, as a perennial thorn in the side of corrupt officials and ‘raiders’ alike, certain interests finally decided they wanted him out of their city and out of their hair. No doubt we’ll get a better sense of the picture over time.

Meanwhile, though, although this predates the Fogle case, when put together it does begin to paint a worrying picture of increasing xenophobia in Moscow. Even if there is no connection between the Firestone case and those of Dillon and Fogle, a willingness to exclude a specialist in Russian and international law and an avowed enemy of the very “legal nihilism” the government is meant to be opposing offers no encouragement. Instead, it almost begins to look as if the Kremlin’s is beginning to believe its current propaganda campaign about its encirclement by foreign foes.

A compendium of spookery: Fogle and further phantasms

President George W Bush visits CIA Headquarters, March 20, 2001.All the spookish shenanigans in Moscow this week have coincided with the end of the academic year, grading, packing to head to Prague for the summer and general chaos, hence the lack of blog posts. However, I have been writing or interviewed in a few places, so in lieu of anything substantial here, I offer a list and links (updated as and when) to these other pontifications of mine on the FSB, the CIA, Russian intrigues and more:

  • Patriot Games in Moscow News, on what the case says about Russia and the West

(And coincidentally, I’d also mention this unconnected piece on Russian organized crime at home and abroad in BNE)

‘War, Crime and the Privatization of Violence’ at the ISN website

logo_isnJust a quick cross-posted notice; this week the worthy and wonderful International Relations and Security Network (ISN) at ETH Zurich is running a five-part curated series by me on War, Crime and the Privatization of Violence (all subjects dear to my dark heart). Each part kicks off with a short essay and then assembles links to a wide range of reports and sources. To quote the introduction:

This week’s dossier explores some of the characteristics of the political-criminal nexus. The following installments consider first the world of the kleptocracy, how so many states thrive through organized plunder of their own resources and exploitation of their populations: in effect, nationalizing theft. Even if they avoid that temptation, they may find themselves conniving at or even instigating crime in the name of some greater good. Next, the focus shifts to warlords and pseudo-states, violent actors who may turn to crime to satisfy their political ambitions but also, in some case, rise as predators and later become politicians. How often do they become the builders of new polities, or are they generally the prime exponents of what one could call the “ crime-conflict nexus” instead?

However, the privatization of violence and the spread of criminalized conflicts is only part of the story, and the fourth section will consider the forces and actors facilitating this problem, from corruption at a local, national and international level to the arms dealers and other service industries of the global underworld. It is, after all, thanks to their entrepreneurial zeal that the gangsters, genocidaires and gunmen can be as effective as they so often are. Their efficiency, furthermore, ensures that they have uses to others, and so as well as the facilitators, it is vital to consider their clients, too. Nonetheless, there is always hope, and the final part of this series will instead look at solutions, from transnational programs to grassroots initiatives.

The first part, Introduction: A World of Thieves and Warriors, explores how “War and crime have forever been partners. In the modern world of often-fragile states, growing resource pressure and burgeoning transnational criminal economies, the relationship is stronger than ever” and asks “What is the difference between war and crime, between theft and looting, between corruption by an official and extortion by a gangster?”

The second, Nationalizing Villainy: Kleptocracies and State Crime, explores “what can happen if states succumb to kleptocracy and corruption, and especially how these problems induce and perpetuate war.”

Then The Crime-Conflict Nexus: Warlords and Pseudo-States starts with the view that “When a state is unable to maintain its monopoly on violence, power-vacuums inevitably arise” and considers “how organized criminals and warlords fill these vacuums in failed, weak and even pseudo-states.”

Fourth, Clients And Enablers explores the forces and actors facilitating this problem, from corruption to the arms dealers and other service industries of the global underworld,

Finally, in What Is To Be Done?, I look at possible  solutions. In particular, I note that “hope is increasingly coming not from grand transnational programs—which are often admirable, but historically often suffer from the problems of seeking consensus and settling for the lowest common denominator—but instead grassroots initiatives rooted in civil society.”

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