Putin’s Cossack rhetoric

I’ve just written in the Moscow Times about Putin’s assertion, in his latest policy statement on Russian military reform (especially well-analyzed herehere and here), that “the mission of the state now is to help the Cossacks, draw them into military service and educational activities for youths, involving a patriotic upbringing and initial military training.” I’m honestly skeptical about the value of Cossacks as fighting forces, and frankly the General Staff seems no more enthused given that the main “Cossack” units formed to date (the 108th and 247th Air Assault Regiments and the 205th Motor Rifle Brigade) really are no more Cossack than the British Coldstream Guards are affiliated with south-east Scotland: it is a matter of heavily-mythologized regimental history rather than anything else.

They may have some role in reinvigorating a largely-moribund ‘military-patriotic education’ system for pre-drafting training of young men (there is already a small cottage industry in ‘Cossack schools’ and ‘Cossack training’), but even then it will probably be the myth rather than the reality of Cossack tradition that matters: an interesting way in which the “theme parking” of an historical experience can be used for practical political purposes.

Beyond that, there is the inevitable concern that Cossacks, whether in direct state service or at arm’s length, hired through new Cossack private security firms, might become tools of social or political repression. I noted that following the passage of a particularly Neanderthal anti-gay law in St Petersburg, its author, local assembly deputy Vitaly Milonov suggested that it needed to be enforced by ‘morality police’ and that “Voluntary troops are a good idea. I think the Cossacks will help us… There is a law about Cossacks. Here you go, they are both a voluntary organization and believers.” Nonetheless, beyond possibly being used as local strong-arms, I don’t see there a particular market or need for them as contractors of vigilante violence and violent vigil.

Overall, then, it probably just reflects a new staple of nationalist rhetoric, akin to US politicians invoking the Founding Fathers at any opportunity, without any real reference to much of what they really thought or did. Nonetheless, the very choice of rhetorical flourished Putin is choosing to use says worrying things about the nationalist, conservative audience to which he is playing and his own sense of the situation in which Russia is finding itself. It will be interesting to see if he calms down a little after the elections next month and once he feels a little more secure.

2012 and the End of the World… or at least Russia… at least to some

The past 100 days have been pretty extraordinary in Russia with the rise of a protest movement and the return of something that is beginning to look like genuine politics. I have no doubt that this a very significant moment and even if it will not lead directly and immediately to substantive change, in its own two-steps-forward-one-step-back way I think it is moving the country towards meaningful democratization. Nonetheless, I have been amazed by some of the hyperbole, not so much or just the expectations of radical change now but the presentiments of doom. (more…)

Tracing the Faultlines within the Russian Security Community

This week I’m speaking on ‘The Security Services and Russia’s Perceptions of Security Challenges and Threats’ at What Future for Russia?, which promises to be a very interesting event put on by NUPI. Apart from castigating myself for the bad planning of agreeing to go to Scandinavia in what seems to be the midst of Fimbulwinter, and flying there via Iceland, at that, this also got me thinking about the very notion of lumping ‘the security services’ together into one camp.

Of course, there are some broad traits which unite them, from a commitment to Russian national security to a common interest in talking up the challenges to it, in order to guarantee continued budgetary priority and political privilege. However, especially now that more and more the prospect of a post-Putin era is being contemplated — not that he’s likely to be going any day now, but people are no longer blithely regarding another twelve years as inevitable — then a variety of internal faultlines become increasingly significant.

(more…)

Spooks and Soldiers

Just a quick catch-up: over the winter lull, Moscow News ran two columns of mine: ‘Keeping tabs on Putin’s spooks‘, which explores how the Russian intelligence community are at once the beneficiaries of Putin’s re-emergence and yet also under pressure; and ‘The very model of a modern military president‘ presented an unfashionably positive assessment of Russian military reform, and the irony that it took this least martial of presidents actually to start a genuine process (even though there is much still to be done).

New GRU chief: Igor Sergun

Despite a little confusion (RIA-Novosti and Kommersant say yes, Rossiiskaya gazeta said no at first, then yes), it seems clear that, as predicted, Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) chief Colonel General Alexander Shlyakhturov, not seen at headquarters for months (despite claims that he’s been on duty), has stepped down on grounds of age. He’s 64 – an age at which remaining in post requires a clean bill of health and also presidential approval. Shlyakhturov will presumably be given a suitable sinecure, possibly as civilian adviser to the GRU, and/or Shlyakhturov would in the near future chairman of the board of directors of the Moscow Institute of Thermal Technology (MITT).

His successor is Major General Igor Sergun. (more…)

Playing the parallels: 1905 not 1917

“Revolutions are rarely fair fights. Those in power usually have more firepower; they lose not because they are outgunned, but because they will not or cannot use it against their enemies.”

My latest column in the Moscow News , ‘Not 1917, but maybe 1905?‘ picks up where my last blogpost on Moscow’s Praetorians left off, considering the arithmetic of power and also playing the usual historian’s game of looking for parallels. There are some excitable suggestions around that Russia is currently in ‘1917’ mode, but it is important to remember that tsarist may well have been moribund, losing its last plausible opportunity for modernizing reform when Stolypin was assassinated in 1911, but what really brought it down then was the hammer-blow of the First World War. Without such a dramatic systemic shock, inertia and aristocratic self-interest may well have kept it lumbering on for a while longer, a zombie regime dead but still mobile. Russia today is, I think, in distinctly better shape. If anything, I would suggest the parallels are more with 1905, when an accidental massacre triggered a nationwide explosion of violent but incoherence anger and protest, one the state could ultimately suppress piecemeal, but a harbinger of greater troubles ahead. I certainly don’t think Putin is yet willing to abdicate…

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