Is there a way through?

So it looks as if Putin is, I’m glad to say, not a raving and unreasoning imperialist after all. OK, so he may be a careful and calculating imperialist of sorts, but his performance at his press conference on the Ukrainian crisis, while not closing out any options, clearly indicated that Russia was not eagerly after the annexation of Crimea. I’m reassured that my early instincts, which I confess I did begin to question (not least under a heavy barrage of Russoskeptics, ably assisted by lunatic Kremlin I-hope-not-always-mouthpiece Sergei Markov) seem to have been right. Moscow’s aim is to influence Ukrainian policy, not territorial conquest (yes, I know Crimea’s parliament just voted to hold a referendum on this; I’ll take this as serious when it’s the Russian Duma saying this, instead). To be sure, I suspect that the first instinct was a combination of anger, outrage and over-reaction after Yanukovych fell, but there has been time for some consideration. And, even if Angela Merkel does believe that Putin is “in another world” (not something that unusual for leaders, especially those who have been in office long enough to surround themselves with yes-men), his Kremlin still seems able to shape this one, too.

But now that the Crimea is firmly and unquestionably under Russian control (we can safely dismiss those bizarre claims that it is “volunteer self-defence forces” who are wandering around in Russian uniforms, with Russian guns, in Russian vehicles), the conflict seems to have settled into a stalemate. Russia has actually stood down some of its forces along the Ukrainian border; it is clear there will be no imminent blitzkrieg. The West hints at sanctions, talks of consequences, suspends the kind of cooperation that has some political but no practical impact (so NATO won’t let the Russian navy help escort Syrian chemical weapons to destruction; I doubt Putin will lose any sleep over that). So how to break the stalemate?

This is not something that is going to be thrashed out by Kerry and Lavrov. Not even that world-bestriding colossus William Hague will sort this one. The terrible, unfair, difficult but inescapable answer is that it is now down to Kyiv actively to find some way to move things forward. Prime Minister Yatsenyuk has made encouraging noises about the need for a “win-win game where both Ukrainian and Russian interests are considered” and further autonomy for Crimea. However, beyond that, I feel that at the very least Kyiv needs to make certain other commitments:

1. To maintain the current status and agreement of the Black Sea Fleet Did Tymoshenka call for it to be withdrawn? I’ve only so far seen that claimed on Russian news sites and it would be a very unhelpful populist demand if so, but given provenance, I’m willing for the moment to assume the agreement isn’t being challenged.

2. Conclusively to rule out any change to the dual-language status. Trying to impose Ukrainian on the Russian-speaking areas is an obvious and unnecessary irritant.

3. To extend the autonomy status offer to other parts of Ukraine, notably the east. I can understand why Kyiv does not want to grant greater powers to areas questioning its writ and legitimacy, but it needs to take the long view. Ultimately, Ukraine’s future lies westward and eventually ethnic Russians (who even now are not in the main seeking to become part of Russia) will become reconciled to the nation’s tectonic shift. But as a measure to reassure Moscow that it will have allies and agents within the Ukrainian body politic (as well as to provide implicit protection for dirty local elites who may fear a with-hunt), this would be invaluable.

4. Formally ruling out NATO membership. Seriously, it wouldn’t happen for the foreseeable future anyway, so just explicitly take it off the table, even if only to deprive alarmists in Russia of this card.

5. Either ruling out signing the EU Trade Agreement or committing to trying to join that and Putin’s Eurasian Customs Union. OK, Ukraine would largely like the former, and combining the two might be impossible. But all things change and in any case Ukraine would not be able to join the EU any time soon. There are other ways of allowing closer EU-Ukrainian economic ties that don’t hit Putin’s sore spots and Ukraine has to trade with Russia anyway. (Edit: yes, I know you can’t actually, formally join both, I mean trying to find some way of bridging the gap rather than letting it be an either/or “who’s my bestest friend?” choice.)

Is it fair to ask Kyiv to make concessions to a country which has invaded part of its country on specious grounds? Of course not. But sadly fairness is not an especially powerful geopolitical force.

It’s a time for pragmatism, for a deal that provides enough reassurance that Putin can feel he has not “lost” Ukraine just because of Yanukovych’s ouster and can claim “peace with honour”–but without undermining the territorial and political integrity of Ukraine. This is not “letting Putin” win, not least because issues such as autonomy for the east and language rights are being pushed also by Ukrainians. Russia’s efforts to assert and maintain regional hegemony may look successful, but are ultimately doomed. History is not marching that way. It would behove Kyiv, in my opinion, to accept that long-term comfort and for the moment to do what it can to de-escalate the conflict.

Of course, that presupposes that the new government feels it can make concessions, that it does not fear the Maidan more than the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade. My greatest fear is that Moscow, the West and Kyiv alike are locked into positions from which they cannot reach far enough to find common ground.

It’s not, but if that’s where it ends up, that will be a Pyrrhic victory for VVP

OK, I will confess that my belief in Russian realpolitikal reason is beginning to be stretched. Until now, Putin has proven a very effective–in his own terms–high-stakes poker player, with a keen sense of when his opponents are bluffing. He has been able to use that to parlay a much greater geopolitical role than Russia’s actual political, economic, military, even moral resources ‘should’ command. Of course, in foreign policy chutzpah is a crucial, if intangible asset, especially when dealing with a European Union that is often disunited and uncomfortable with active interventionism (I have yet to see where the ‘Action’ in the European External Action Service comes in) and a US presidency that appears unable to take a strong line on anything that doesn’t involve drones. My assumption was that Russian moves in the Crimea were primarily a characteristically in-your-face way of bringing political pressure to bear on Kyiv to reach some kind of understanding with the Moscow-leaning elites of the East and also with the Kremlin itself, recognising that Ukraine needed to genuflect to Russian political and psychological concerns.

At the risk of sounding increasingly naive, that still may be true. We have seen this weekend a strengthening of Russian forces in the Crimea (notably with paratroopers from the 7th Guards Airborne Division from Novorossisk) and illegal pressure on the relatively few Ukrainian forces there. Further units have been mobilised on the Ukrainian border. Meanwhile, the Federation Council duly voted to grant Putin the right to send forces into Ukraine, but that’s never been a factor before, so perversely I am faintly encouraged by that, in that it smacks more of a political threat rather than a necessary prelude to war.

So conceivably, conceivably, there is still scope for a political resolution, one that will allow Putin to pull the boys back, claim victory over a cowed Kyiv and a hand-wringing West, and await the next well-meaning invitation to a “reset” of east/west relations. Let’s face it, the usual pattern is that one will be along in six months or so. After all, and this is something worth stressing amidst all the high-octane journalistic and political rhetoric, so far there has been no Russian incursion beyond Crimea, which while clearly a violation of international law, could be worked out.

And yet I wonder if Putin has over-reached himself and under-thought the implications. If Putin either is committed to taking Crimea or finds himself locked into that course of action, it will be an expensive, Pyrrhic victory. The scale and paint-scorching vitriol of Russian media and government rhetoric, the rentamob “defend the Crimea” marches, all this pushes the Kremlin into a position harder from which to withdraw. It has also radicalised Kyiv’s position–Ukraine has understandably mobilised as both political gesture and also practical precaution–and granted it sanctity in Western eyes. After all, let’s not forget that until very recently, while no one in the West mourned Yanukovych’s departure, there were also concerns about the political stability of the new regime, its links with right-wing extremists, the constitutionality of the deposition of the president, etc. Now, to acknowledge any of those would be tantamount to giving comfort to Moscow.

What, one might ask, is Moscow’s endgame? What does it want, and how likely is it to get it. The more it radicalises Kyiv, the less likely it is to get some wider political settlement. Instead, it might be forced to take Crimea if for no other reason than that it has to be seen to accomplish something, even if this is a pyrrhic victory, one which will only hurt Russia.

Here, after all, is the perverse and twisted irony of the situation. Strictly from a coldly logical position (and I am not advocating this, I should add), in many ways it is in Kyiv’s interests for Moscow to steal Crimea, and turn it into some pseudo-state or new part of the Russian Federation. Ukraine loses a sunny peninsula, but also a distinct drain on the state’s coffers (the Crimean economy is not great, and the region receives net subsidies from the centre). It sheds the most troublesome and Russophile of its regions, one which has been a turbulent locus of trouble for Kyiv for most of post-Soviet Ukraine’s history. It also gets concrete proof of the threat it faces from Russian bullying and probably accelerated and solicitous assistance from the US, EU, NATO, etc. It also validates every Ukrainian fear about Russia.

Meanwhile, Russia would face a storm of protest. Now, it has done so before and probably thinks it could weather this easily enough again, but this is not 2008 and Ukraine is not Georgia (not least as Saakashvili overplayed his hand and allowed himself to be needled into firing the first shot). Indeed, outside countries will assess Crimea 2014 in light of Georgia 2008. Of course we won’t see military action (though possibly enhanced NATO guarantees for Ukraine), but considering the example of the Magnitsky Law already present, I’d expect targeted bans and asset-freezes on officials, visa restrictions and even potentially targeted sanctions against Russian corporations. This is already being adverted by the likes as Edward Lucas and Michael Weiss, and I would imagine it would have a great deal more traction if Crimea were forcible wrested from Ukraine. There is no way round it, the most powerful weapon against the Kremlin is one targeting the elites on which it depends.

Putin is nowhere near as powerful at home, within the elite, as before. That’s not to say he has any clear rivals, or in imminent political danger, but any serious and sustained campaign to attack his elite supporters’ freedom to travel, invest, bank and shop abroad might well seriously affect this. Let’s be honest, so far the West’s track record in following through and maintaining such efforts has been questionable, but that doesn’t mean it cannot happen in the future, and Ukraine–bordering onto NATO and the EU, after all–might be the necessary cause.

So, common sense dictates that this is just an especially muscular and egregious case of Russian sabre-rattling, that ultimately they want Kyiv to cut some kind of a deal (and they’d accept something short of complete submission), and that taking Crimea would actually not be in Moscow’s interests. As the language toughens and the troops roll, though, it’s getting harder to believe that common sense is going to prevail in the Kremlin.

It’s a risky thing, making such predictions in the middle of a fast-changing and frankly confusing situation, when we have reportedly a couple of thousand troops being airlifted into the peninsula and local premier Aksenov claiming control over all forces in the area (does he mean Russian ones too? I very much doubt it, or if he thinks he controls them then I imagine it means “he controls them so long as he happens to be telling them to do what Moscow wants them to do”). Nonetheless, let me stick out my neck and say why, excitable headlines notwithstanding, I don’t think Russia is about to annex the Crimea, let alone occupy eastern Ukraine.

1. Russia already ‘has’ Crimea in the ways that matter to it. Crimea has considerable autonomy, the Black Sea Fleet presence is guaranteed by treaty until 2042 if I remember correctly, and there is massive political and economic sway over this pretty autonomous part of the country.

2. If you are going to annex, just annex. Of course, the Russians could be hoping that Kyiv will give them the same kind of excuse that Saakashvili did in Georgia (though it is very unlikely the new government is likely to be so stupid/obliging), or await a formal request, but even then I note that the proposed Crimean referendum later this year will be about greater autonomy, not independence or a return to Russia. Putin is a great fan of quickly and pre-emptively establishing the “ground truth” such that others have to accept or at least negotiate on that basis. Then why not just bite the bullet? There’s unlikely to be a better time to establish a fait accompli.

3. After all, 2,000 troops is not much of an invasion force. This figure of 2,000 is by no means a hard one, but it’s nowhere near the kind of force Russia could easily push into the Crimea (where, let’s note, it already has some 2,500 Naval Infantry). There are something like a dozen military installations across the Crimea and while I don’t believe this is purely a defensive attempt to secure them, it is well within the parameters of what one could describe in those terms. After all, 2,000 troops = around 670 troops per 8-hour duty shift, = around 56 on average per shift per installation. This to me still looks more like a muscular political gesture than anything more direct. The 7th Guards Airborne Division is based at Novorossisk, a skip and a jump away, while if you feel you need security forces, Krasnodar is home to the 2nd Independent Special Designation Interior Troops (VV) Division and the  47th Independent VV Brigade, and indeed there’s the elite 15th VV Special Designation Unit ‘Vyatich’ at nearby Armavir. In other words, it’s not as if Russia couldn’t send a much more substantial force.

4. Russia has nothing to gain, everything to lose. Russia already has what it needs in the Crimea and there has been no evidence yet that the new government in Kyiv would challenge that. Annexing Crimea means that it can no longer use the peninsula as a political and economic agent inside Ukraine, and mean that Moscow takes on responsibility for the massive subsidies that keep it afloat. And, of course, dealing with the substantial ethnic Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar minorities who would be unlikely to take kindly to this development. It also makes this much more clearly a question of Ukrainian state sovereignty and would stiffen resolve in the country and ensure greater international support for Kyiv. Russia often doesn’t mind being the bad guy, but it doesn’t court that status wilfully. This is not South Ossetia or Abkhazia where–whatever the actual rights and wrongs–there was a genuine legacy of inter communal violence and political conflict, nor a fool such as Saakashvili to give Moscow the perfect pretext to invade.

5. What is Russia’s game plan? My view, and at this stage it can be no more than a guess, is that having given up on Yanukovych (they have to look after him, to convince other kleptocrats that Russia is a reliable friend, but they clearly are treating him as an former president, not a visiting head of state), they instead are fixing on making sure that Kyiv understands that it needs to consider Russian interests and on helping the eastern regions and Crimea win even greater autonomy for themselves within Ukraine. That way, the pretty dirty, Russia-leaning local elites in these regions can be Moscow’s agents and allies inside Ukraine, spoilers if need be, but Russia still has access to Ukraine’s markets and if need be can always use trade boycotts and the energy supply as further levers.

This is hard-nosed and heavy-handed geopolitics, born of Putin’s determination to maintain Russian hegemony in post-Soviet Eurasia and his belief that Ukraine is not a “real” country, but it’s not the realm of invasions and annexations. It’s a Clausewitzian use of if not war but certainly military force as a continuation of politics.

Of course, all this said let me add one pretty fundamental caveat, of which I am indebted to Simon Schuster of TIME magazine for reminding me:

In other words, I am indeed assuming that the Russians are rational actors, even if the sources on which they are making their decisions and the operating assumptions behind them are not necessarily my own. Putin would not be the first leader who, in the heat of the moment, acted irrationally, but on the other hand his track record to date is that, especially in foreign affairs, his is a pretty cool head and he tends to be risk averse. We’ll see.

An Obvious Postscript. I was, of course, wrong. But I was wrong for precisely the reason which concerned me, in my assumption that Putin and the narrow circle he still listens to would be rational about this in the same terms outside observers recognise. What has since become clear is that Putin today is not the pragmatic Realpolitician of his first two terms, but increasingly driven by an inchoate but nonetheless powerful ideological nationalism, a sense that Russian culture is under threat, a need to legitimise himself through grand (even if ultimately Pyrrhic) victories and an eye to his legacy. In those terms, whether or not annexing Crimea made sense becomes far less important, alas, than whether it was — to Putin — historically and politically unavoidable.