One Year On, One Year Out: a discussion in The Power Vertical and some predictions

How far is this still a 'Developing Story'?

How far is this still a ‘Developing Story’?

Towards the end of an excellent discussion on RFE/RL’s The Power Vertical podcast (and if you’re interested in Russia, you really ought to listen to it: there is literally no English-language equivalent), host Brian Whitmore asked Sean Guillory and me what trends we expected for the next year. That called for some hurried thought — Brian clearly has an unexpected streak of sadism — and you can hear what we came up with at the tail end of the most recent podcast, One Year After The Protests, which mainly concentrates on the past twelve months and the varied trajectories of government, society and opposition.

That got me thinking about the medium, though. Podcasts are a wonderful way of creating conversations, but I do wonder how long they tend to last. Do many people listen to podcasts from three months back? Six? Anyway, rather than hide behind the potential evanescence of the medium, here are the predictions I threw together, stuck on my blog so all and sundry can laugh at my naiveté or marvel at my perspicacity this time next year:

1. The regime will attempt a rebranding and a rebalancing, built around anti-corruption and perhaps a “kinder, wiser Putin” but this will not go far enough. Unwilling or unable really to tackle corruption at a systemic level, nor to abandon its dependence upon rent-seeking and those who benefit from it, this will prove an essentially cosmetic venture. In the process it could well prove thoroughly counter-productive, alienating elements of the elite, undermining the legitimacy of the regime and devaluing Putin’s own brand.

2. The opposition will begin to fragment, but in the process discover real politics. At the time this will be a painful process and lead to bickering and division, but this is actually a good thing, a part of the maturation of the political scene. The current ramshackle and insular coalition, united by little more than the catchphrase “Russia Without Putin” will be forced to devolve into movements and parties with real ideologies, that can begin to create a real political discussion and reach out, in some cases, beyond a narrow, metropolitan elite.

3. The elites will enter “survivalist” mode and prepare for the worse — and in the process further weaken the Power Vertical. As Putin and the central apparatus seem weaker or even, if the anti-corruption campaign develops, downright threatening, then the same kind of centrifugal processes we saw in the bad old Yeltsin years will emerge. Local, factional, personal and institutional groups and cabals will begin all the more aggressively looking out for their own interests, and seeing Moscow no longer as the final source of power. Such a zero-sum mindset becomes a self-fulfilling prophesy. The power of the center is, after all, as much as anything else rooted in imagination and belief; if people think Putin weak, then weak he will be…

Shoigu: saviour, scapegoat or tsar-in-waiting?

Will an army uniform suit him as well?

Will an army uniform suit him as well?

The choice of Sergei Shoigu to be the new defense minister was, in hindsight, logical and even inspired. Loyal, untarnished by suggestions of corruption, genuinely popular, he also has some twenty years experience building the Ministry of Emergency Situations (MChS) out of services that were under-resourced, often feuding and generally conservative. Shoigu has been the quintessential loyal technocrat, turning the MChS into a surprisingly efficient force, then taking on the daunting job of governor of Moscow Region before being parachuted into the defense ministry.

After his elevation, though, a favored topic amongst the wonkish Kremlin-watcher constituency (yes, including me) was considering whether or not Shoigu was now a potential future prime minister or even a president. To an extent, it is irrelevant whether he harbors any such aspirations: even if he denies them, those who want to believe will simply nod knowingly and say that, of course, he’d have to say that…

One of the features that makes Shoigu unusual, after all, is that — unlike the overwhelming majority of the current leadership generation — he has a headlining political career that predates Putin. Shoigu was building the MChS when Putin was still the mayor’s loyal bagman in St. Petersburg. It was Shoigu’s Unity party, which became part of United Russia, that then-prime minister Putin said that he’d be voting for in 1999. While Putin’s PR team scramble to find new stunts to fuel his macho myth, for almost two decades Shoigu was the reassuringly practical presence Russians saw at scenes of disaster and chaos, from forest fires to terrorist attacks. No wonder he was and still is consistently the highest-polling and most-recognizable figure within the government.

(more…)

New article: ‘Purges, Power and Purpose: Medvedev’s 2011 police reforms’

Glad to see the back of the old ‘militsiya’?

Did Medvedev’s much-vaunted police reforms account for much, and in any case will they survive Putin’s return and the swing towards a more repressive and political use of the police? Although I very much see progress as a two-steps-forward-one-back journey, I do see some grounds to praise the Medvedev reforms and express cautious optimism for their continuation under VVP in an article, ‘Purges, Power and Purpose: Medvedev’s 2011 police reforms‘, which has just appeared in the latest issue of the excellent Journal of Power Institutions in Post-Soviet Societies.

Edited by Elisabeth Sieca-Kozlowski and Anne Le Huerou, this issue (no. 13) addresses brutality and reform in the Russian police and includes a range of fascinating articles, commentaries, interviews and reviews. It’s online and free — well worth following.

Moscow’s Military Maneuvers: enter Shoigu and Gerasimov

I do hope Shoigu doesn’t take to wearing a soldier’s uniform, Ustinov-style

When the axe falls, it falls with abandon. Serdyukov’s dismissal as minister of defense has been followed by the retirement of his Chief of the General Staff, Nikolai Makarov, and a series of other dismissals, with more likely to follow. Overall, I feel Serdyukov deserves great credit for being the first Russian defense minister to go beyond just talking about reform, but Sergei Shoigu could well be a worthy successor given his great success building and developing the MChS and doing so in the teeth of both budgetary pressures and internal conservatism. However, there are grounds for caution and concern:

1. What is Shoigu’s game plan? Is Shoigu just the enthusiastic and efficient troubleshooter or might he have higher ambitions now that Putin’s position seems a little less certain and the behind-the-scenes discussions about who should be Medvedev’s successor as prime minister have undoubtedly begun. As I comment in my first column for Russia Beyond the Headlines, if Shoigu has more than just military reform in mind, he might well be tempted not to pick the fights that taking that project to the next level will demand, above all with the defense-industrial lobby. (And it it worth noting that the lobby’s current champion, Dmitry Rogozin, might also be eyeing the prime ministerial slot, muddying the waters further.)

2. What are Shoigu’s orders (and limits)? It was striking that when Putin met Shoigu and his new CoGS Gerasimov, he stressed the importance of new equipment and good relations with the defense industries. I think that Alexander Golts is right to interpret that as an injunction not to follow Serdyukov’s line — he was openly (and justly) critical of the defense industries for producing poor weapons at high prices, too late and too little reflecting what Russia’s military actually needed. Hence the decisions to buy French ships, Italian armored vehicles and Israeli drones — both to provide capabilities lacking and also to make a point. It sounds as if Shoigu is being told to make nice to the metal-bashers, who after all are a powerful, hungry political lobby. If so, then his room actually to use his budget usefully becomes much more confined.

3. What is Gerasimov going to do? One lesson of the Serdyukov era was that it was crucial that a civilian defense minister (and though Shoigu technically holds a general’s rank, he is a civilian) needs a tough and local chief of the general staff as his adviser and, if need be, enforcer. Makarov was in many ways a good choice as he had reputation and rank, but was an outsider from the ‘Arbat Military District’ circles of the Muscovite military elite, as well as a specialist on training (a key problem needing to be addressed). His successor, Valery Gerasimov, 57, comes from Kazan and was a career army officer, a tank commander, who was commander of the 58th Army in Chechnya 2001-3, but nonetheless managed to earn the praise of Anna Politkovskaya for his role in the arrest of Budanov. He was Makarov’s deputy 2010-12, but the word is they did not get along and this helps explain his appointment this year to head the Central Military District. Gerasimov is described as a “conservative” but it is sometimes hard to know what that actually means — very few generals in any armies are free-thinking hippies, after all.

As a veteran tank commander, he may well be lobbying for that arm of service, which would actually place him on the same side as the defense industries. (And, I’d suggest, the other side from logic: Russia needs good light infantry, airmobile forces, and wheeled tank destroyers/fire support vehicles.) Beyond that, it is hard at this stage to know for what he stands. However, I suspect that he is much more of an insider and a shop steward for the generals’ lobby than Makarov ever was and I don’t think he’ll be pushing for further troop reductions and other radical steps. On the other hand, he was responsible for all those parades through Moscow, so even if Russia is going to squander the opportunities Serdyukov has opened up and return to a notion of ‘reform’ that really meant little more than ‘buying shiny new stuff,’ then at least we can be assured that they will be prettily showcased rumbling through Red Square…

4. Is anything going to be done about corruption? In many ways this is more a ritual observation more than a real question, as it is hard to see any great evidence that it will. Serdyukov’s downfall had everything to do with personal (very personal) politics and little to do with allegations of embezzlement. One slight shred of optimism is that it seems Main Military Prosecutor Fridinsky — who has done more than anyone in uniform to shed light on corruption and fraud within the MoD, saying that 20% of the State Defense Order disappears through theft and kickbacks — seems to have been the main figure behind the decision not to appoint macho order-more-than-law General Surovikin to head the new military police, which may suggest he has more traction than I realized. And if the Russian arms industries are still to be paid for their junk, then the MoD might need to find the money somewhere. But overall, it is still hard to be optimistic on this point.

Putin: tactician, strategist or player of political Tetris?

Just a quick note: I have a largely-but-not-wholly serious piece on VVP and his travails in the NYU Jordan Center All The Russias blog, Putin: the man who arranges the blocks. Is this man a tactician rather than a strategist, and does he have some sense that his once-impregnable fortress might be beginning to crumble…?

History and Future: Power Vertical podcast on ‘The Ghosts of Crackdowns Past’

On a day when Russian Patriarch Kirill warned of a new Time of Troubles, when “treason” was cloaked in the rhetoric of the “modernization of the country” as a “great and holy mission” then it seemed wholly fitting that the RFE/RL Power Vertical podcast, The Ghosts of Crackdowns Past, should feature Brian Whitmore, Sean Guillory and me discussing historical parallels for the present drift towards repression and what lessons this might offer for the future. Admittedly, none of us went four centuries back (though I have paralleled Putin with Ivan the Terrible here), but still I thought it was a great discussion about what such historical episodes as the late 19th retreat from reform, Stolypin’s post-1905 crackdown, Stalinism and Brezhnev’s era may tell us about modern Russia.

This also raises questions about the use of history in politics, the way real (and more often mythologized) events are mobilized to legitimate particular narratives. Putin’s, on the whole, has rested on more recent history — beware a return to the terrible, anarchic 1990s — but as this loses its force, maybe they will try to use deeper history, instead. Of course, these appeals to historical authority are always contested, opportunities for different people and interests to put their own meaning and spin on the past. So maybe we should leave the last word to Kirill:

“So, too, today we must first and foremost make sure we prevent this ‘time of troubles’ from taking hold in our consciousness, in our minds… Today there are people, like the Boyars of Muscovy, who present unacceptable recipes for the modernization of our lives and improvement of our people’s living standards.”

After all, we wouldn’t want the modernization of Russians’ lives and the improvement of their living standards to be considered worthy ends in themselves, now, would we?

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