The Navalny Case and the Final Battle between Good and Neutrality?

Yes, Navalny needs YOU!

Yes, Navalny needs YOU!

It’s been too busy a time for me of late to post, but nonetheless something that has struck me has been the relatively low-key response to Navalny’s imminent trial on what seem thoroughly spurious embezzlement charges. Of course, it’s been reported, especially since his declaration that he wanted to stand for president. However, the contrast with the massive and at times thoroughly hysterical and hyperbolic coverage of the Pussy Riot case, even before their trial, has been evident. I find this slightly surprising and distinctly alarming and a cause for what I might call some “navalny-gazing.”

No wonder, I suppose, that the subtitle on Navalny’s blog is “The final battle between good and neutrality.”

After all, while the Pussy Riot defendants were undoubtedly the victims of a kangaroo court (the very notion that they could be found guilty under the technical terms of hooliganism rather than some lesser charge was ridiculous) and comported themselves with impressive dignity in court, nonetheless they were hardly important in and of themselves. The importance, I would suggest, lay in what the trial said about the wider processes at work: the lawfare of the courts in their use against expressions of opposition thought and sentiment, the heavy-handedness of Putin’s state, the role of a conservative and assertive Russian Orthodox Church. Let’s be honest, had the authorities simply patronized them as publicity-seeking little women, slapped them with a fine, and used this as an opportunity to present the opposition as being full of blasphemers and exhibitionists, it would have been a two-day wonder.

Whether or not Navalny is the potential savior of the nation or a nationalist opportunist who has spotted a potential chance to rise is irrelevant (and for the record, while I don’t believe him to be perfect, I certainly believe him closer to the former than the latter). He is undoubtedly at present the driving force behind the opposition, however inchoate and drifting it currently may be. He has brought the issue of the corruption elite into the center of Russian politics, and has done more than anyone else to connect that with the United Russia bloc, that bastion of the cynical, the careerist and the corrupt. At present, there is no one else who can assume his mantle, no one else who has a chance–no more than a chance–of being able to turn the middle-class metropolitan opposition into a credible political force.

Which is, of course, why the Kremlin wants him out of the way, whether in prison or, much more likely, smeared and given a suspended sentence which will preclude him from standing for political office. It also explains why attack-dog Bastrykin–a man also with a clear personal animosity against Navalny–has been given such a long leash. They fear him in a way that they don’t fear socialite-seditionist Kseniya Sobchak or leftist firebrand Sergei Udaltsov.

Less comprehensible is quite why the Russian opposition is not more active and why Western democrats who want to see Russia move away from authoritarianism are nowhere near as excited as they were during the Pussy Riot case. Sure, maybe things will be different once the court case starts, but at present there seems little real enthusiasm for Navalny’s cry for protests on the streets in Russia, and far less media attention, let alone op. ed. outrage in the West.

Is it that everyone is getting tired of protest that seems to get nowhere, and Kirov is a way away rather than just a couple of streets away in Moscow? (If so, welcome to the real world: regime change is a hard slog, not a New Year’s resolution.)

Is it that people dislike or mistrust Navalny? (Sure, there are some questions to be asked, from his nationalist politics to what he’s doing on the Aeroflot board, but to be honest it’s hard to see any such antagonism towards him from any but elements of the elite.)

When it comes to the Western media and Russia-watchers, can it really be as banal as that one guy who blogs about corruption is a less exciting topic to discuss that balaclava-ed punkettes? That “People got interested in Pussy Riot on a global scale because it included so many themes – feminism, gay rights, religion” but that the bedrock issues of power and freedom aren’t as widely appealing? (Sadly, there is probably more than a little truth here.)

Whatever the reason, I cannot help but feel there is a potential opportunity here that risks being squandered. When Brian Whitmore and I were discussing the case in a Power Vertical podcast (you don’t subscribe to it? You should!) we agreed that the trial could represent a turning point for the opposition, a chance to get its act together after over a year of drift, a chance to cohere around a high-profile case, a chance to use it as a platform to seek to reach out to the disgruntled elements in the wider population (and we know they are there) and seek to build a common cause. Of course, that means they have to do it. And outsiders who want to encourage them–though ultimately this must be a domestic phenomenon, there certainly is no scope for the kind of “revolution plotted from abroad” beloved of pro-Kremlin conspiracy theorists–at the very least need to keep up the pressure and the attention, because that will help make this case significant, signal to the authorities that they cannot just pick off whomever they want with impunity.

This is unlikely to be the final battle, but it is an extremely important one. Given that “neutrality” is often a synonym in such cases for apathy or despair, perhaps this is time for action…

Sergei Shoigu: Russia’s tailor-in-chief?

They certainly look the part of the 21st century men at arms

They certainly look the part of the 21st century men at arms

Sergei Shoigu’s early initiatives as defense minister all seem to have a distinctly sartorial bent. First, he decreed that the traditional portyanki foot cloths wrapped around the foot every morning, washed and hung up to dry at night, be fully replaced by socks by the end of 2013. Then it was bruited around that the traditional — indeed, iconic — ushanka fur hat with side-flaps would be phased out and replaced with new headgear. Then we have confirmation that a new set of field uniforms including these changes would indeed be issued, with 100,000 soldiers getting them this year (earlier this year it was just 70,000), the rest in 2014.

It is easy to belittle such moves. Efficient and comfortable uniforms rank with decent housing, adequate food and proper medical care amongst the kinds of quality-of-life issues taken for granted in most Western militaries yet contributing to the terrible reputation of army service in Russia (and hence recruitment of volunteers). It is also in line with the kinds of reforms Serdyukov had been trying to introduce. After all, he had wanted to phase out the portyanki and introduce new, better uniforms.

The full array of new Russian uniforms, to be phased in from 2013

The full array of new Russian uniforms, to be phased in from 2013

However, there is much more to being defense minister than being tailor-in-chief, and the initial omens about Shoigu’s priorities are less inspiring. After Serdyukov had spent much political capital cutting down the bloated, top-heavy officer corps, it seems that the army, navy and air force command staffs will be increased fully 2-3 times. However much this is spun as a measure to improve training and coordination, it is a victory for the top brass and a step away from creating a leaner military.

Furthermore, the notion of importing better foreign-made equipment seems out of favor, with the decision to scale back purchase of Italian LMV65 light armored vehicles and new criticism of the French Mistral deal. Regardless of the qualities of these particular deals, trying for military autarky makes absolutely no sense in terms of military reform (Dmitry Gorenburg has some astute comments on this on his blog). The only people it pleases are the defense-industrial complex industrialists, who became such an enemy of Serdyukov’s.

In other words, for the moment Shoigu seems either to be playing it safe or else lacks the political muscle to take on the two conservative lobbies — the generals and the ‘metal-eaters’ — whose interests are actually antithetical to proper military reform. He may be biding his time, but for the moment he seems content to be tailor-in-chief. Maybe because he’s already window-shopping for the kind of suit fit for a prime minister. Or even a president?

A postscript: what is this massive Russian armada of which you speak?

russian navyJust as a peevish postscript to my last, reading some of the media one might be forgiven for thinking that Moscow had deployed some massive armada into the Med to shore up Assad (how does a naval force without air or meaningful artillery influence a counter-insurgency war?) or to intimidate the West. “16 Russian warships carrying thousands of marines” “a show of force“, etc

Let’s see just what is there, though:

(more…)

A Proxy War Over Syria? Hardly

Buying Russian guns does not necessarily buy you Russian support

Buying Russian guns does not necessarily buy you Russian support

What has been happening in Syria has everything to do with Syria and relatively little to do with geopolitics. The arming of the Free Syrian Army rebels is perhaps understandable, even if I suspect it will come to haunt the West (remember those nice mujahideen fighting the Soviets in 1980s Afghanistan? What could possibly go wrong with supplying them with RPGs and Stinger surface-to-air missiles?). But it seems inevitable that the conflict keeps being viewed through an anachronistic and dangerously misleading Cold War Redux lens. From this comes overheated rhetoric about how “The US Is Waging An All-Out Proxy War With Russia In Syria” and the dispatch of Russian ships becomes an effort to deter the West (how? Is Putin seriously going to put Russian troops in harm’s way?).

Let’s get serious here.

1. Russia has no great enthusiasm for Bashar Assad and his regime. To be sure, the Kremlin does not seem to have a particular problem with murderous dictators (but then again, nor often does the West), and a customer for Russian weapons is always welcome, but this has long been an alliance or rather affiliation of convenience. Russia gets arms sales and a notional naval base at Tarsus (which is of marginal real value) and a thorn in Iran’s side. Syria gets a certain degree of political cover. However, Putin is not bound to Assad, and is certainly not about to lose sleep or political capital on  his behalf. In recent weeks, after all, Moscow has carefully been easing itself away from Assad’s side.

2. Russia has legitimate security interests in the region. There are Russian nationals in-country, from military advisers to civilians (that small naval deployment makes much more sense as a potential evacuation force than some political lever, not least as it includes a couple of troop transports which are largely empty). Tarsus is not really a serious naval base, more a statement of a desire to have a toehold in the Mediterranean, but nonetheless Russia can hardly be expected not to care about its fate. Syria is also, as I note above, regarded as a counterweight to Iran, which is challenging Russia along its southern borders.

3. Russia’s biggest fear is not regime change as such but the anarchy and Islamism likely to follow. In conversations with Russian foreign ministry and security sector personnel, time and again I have heard the refrain that the West is great at destroying regimes but terrible at managing the outcome. And they have a point: I find it hard to see Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya and (although the Western role was far, far less significant there) Egypt as encouraging case studies. As I’ve written elsewhere, what Moscow fears above all is chaos and the rise of pro-Iranian Islamism in Syria. And if anything that prospect is looking more and more likely.

4. Russia is fed up. This is not so much an excuse as an observation. Moscow feels — with good reason — that it was cheated by the West (above all, the USA) over Libya, a bait and switch that saw it agree to a limited UN resolution that was then (ab)used to justify eliminating Gaddafi. Again, it’s not that the Russians were that fond of the erratic old butcher, but they are proud enough not to enjoy feeling that they were manipulated to see him ousted. Add to that the mess that has followed, and this helps explain some of their particular intransigence over Syria.

Overall, then, I do believe that Moscow feels that Assad is likely to fall and is preparing for that eventuality, even though it hopes that he will survive, whether through military success or political deals. Evacuation plans have been drafted and I hear that Syria is now having to pay up front and in full for any further shipments, whether of military materiel or anything else. The abortive invitation for talks issued to Ahmed Moaz al-Khatib, leader of the Syrian National Coalition, may have represented a ploy precisely to make him look unreasonable (as he predictably placed unrealistic preconditions on any talks) but was also a major step away from its previous position of refusing to grant any legitimacy to the opposition.

That does not mean that the Russians are happy with the way things have developed or feel any particular urge to play nice. (Relations with Turkey, which had been increasingly positive, are taking a hit.) But it does mean that it is very unlikely that they are going to put any political capital, let alone military muscle, into saving him. The best they are likely to offer is that comfy dacha in Barvikha if Assad manages to get out alive…

The ‘long 2012’: the year Russia started to move…

20130101-133324.jpg

There’s no phoenix-like firebird in Tsar Vladimir’s fairytale…

The end of the year is a traditional time for Janus-faced retrospectives and looks to the future. Trying to encapsulate Russia’s 2012 offers up an interesting contrast between what seemed at times to be a year full of drama and event, from the Presidential inauguration to Pussy Riot, and the sense that nothing much has changed. Have we just seen the emergence of the ‘New Normal‘ — a status quo that enthuses none but is tolerable to all — or did the new opposition politics start with a bang only to end with, if not a whimper, at least a yawn and some bickering?

I think that in historical perspective, 2012 will be regarded as a pivotal time, or at least the ‘long 2012’ that started with the ‘castling’ in September 2011 and dragged through to Putin’s lackluster State of the Union Address and press conference in December 2012. Why?

1. The Putin regime finally exhausted its creative potential. Tempting as it is in some quarters to paint Putinism as some terrible blight, there is no denying that not only did it do much that was worthwhile (just contrast it to the miserable 1990s) but also the regime was often shrewd, nimble, in touch with the national zeitgeist. Like it or not, Putin proved himself to be a state-builder. However, that energy and creativity seem gone now. The dearth of new and big ideas this year, the clumsy handling of challenges and opportunities alike, the renewed dependence on often-spiteful acts of repression and the apparent loss of nerve which I feel were behind both the ‘castling’ and the decision not to seek some rebranding of the regime in December all attest to this. When regimes stop evolving, they start dying…

2. The ‘Putin Vertical’ replaced the ‘Power Vertical.’ Putin’s personality (cult) has always been a crucial ingredient in his style of rule, but the essence of the ‘Power Vertical’ was that the state machine should be greater than the man behind the big desk in the Kremlin. This was given further expression by the willingness to place Medvedev in the presidency. What mattered was not just one man, it was the ‘deep state’ of an elite-wthin-an-elite that he figureheaded, united and cohered. However, that ‘deep state’ seems in disarray, and the personalization of governance is, if anything, being increased by the present anti-corruption campaign, where today’s able administrator becomes tomorrow’s interrogation subject. The ‘Putin Vertical’ is by definition much more brittle, dependent on the skills, judgement and stamina of one man, a man with many considerable abilities but also, it seems, a weakening grasp of the realities of his own country.

3. Politics are beginning to return to Russia. It’s easy to despair of the inability — indeed, sometimes I would suggest willful refusal — of the opposition movement to reach out beyond their narrow constituencies to the country as a whole. Indeed, they seem to be shrinking in stature and appeal alike, getting mired into disputes of platform, precedence and procedure. However, this is hardly surprising. The failure of the Soviet experiment tarnished much of the rhetoric and process of politics, and the Yeltsin years arguably did even more to depoliticize the country. It is, after all, an interesting question which was the greatest windfall Putin received: this or hydrocarbon revenues. It will take time for Russians to regain faith in politics, let alone a language, structures, ideologies. That will probably emerge, in part, from what will look like pointless and self-destructive rifts within the protest movement. But it will come.

So will 2013 prove to be a momentous year? Probably not; I don’t expect any dramatic collapse of the regime or, for that matter, a revitalization of Putin and his regime. Its symbol is, after all, the double-headed eagle rather than the Phoenix or Firebird. But will it be part of a momentous transition, as Russia moves inexorably, even if haltingly, towards greater democracy? That, I certainly believe.

Thoughts on today’s Putin press conference

Larger than life, but half as substantial

Larger than life, but half as substantial

At a mere 4 hours and 32 minutes, today’s press conference with 1,200 miscellaneous journalists may not have hit the record, but nonetheless it was one of those classic Putin events, in which endurance seems to matter more than content and the president almost seems to want to be able to talk away any thought of dissent or discontent. The transcript is available on the Kremlin website and a number of journalists admirably live-tweeted it with a mix of interest, surprise and bladder-clenched and back-aching despair (particular kudos to Shaun Walker, Miriam Elder and Nickolaus von Twickel). Nonetheless, here are a few initial thoughts of mine.

1. No new ideas, again. After the surprisingly anodyne state of the union address earlier this month, there was some speculation — to be fair, I indulged too — that this, Putin’s first big set-piece press conference since his return to the presidency might presage something big. Were Kudrin’s unusually vehement criticisms of the Medvedev cabinet a hint that a reshuffle was in the offing? Was the anti-corruption campaign about to kick into a higher gear? Well, no. Instead we had the usual spectacle of a tough and collected VVP fielding a handful of searching questions and a lot of fluff (Will you congratulate my child on her birthday, Mr President? Can we have a special day to celebrate the work of accountants? and so on). He gave stern answers to questions on the usual neuralgic topics such as Magnitsky and Syria and generally exalted Russia’s progress. Stability was, needless to say, his watchword, as without that there can be nothing else. So far, so usual. But I did feel that there was…

2. Something different: context. His past exercises in monarchical press conferences worked, I think, because they were not so much ways of establishing authority so much as of expressing and demonstrating it. He seemed confident, we knew, because he was confident, because he could be confident. However, after a year of drift and protest, while it is not as if the Putin regime is in danger of imminent collapse, claims that he didn’t think he had made any serious errors in the past 12 years (how about the castling, how about the Kursk, etc…?) ring hollow and, more to the point, offer nothing. I don’t think his performance was any different from in the past; I think the lens through which it is viewed certainly is.

3. Signs of life in the Russian media. Part of that change is a new mood within the media, even those in the past hardly defined by their radicalism. Amidst the embarrassing displays of fawning submission (I especially enjoyed the journalist from Magadan who felt the need to tell VVP he was so “energetic and beautiful” although the proposal to name the Kuril Islands after him also gets points), there were also sharp, pointed and serious questions on issues ranging from the adoption row to the authoritarian tendencies of the political system. I can’t say I’ve gone and trawled the old transcripts, but on a subjective level these felt much more critical and incisive than I remember in the past.

4. Personalia: messing with Medvedev. Medvedev didn’t get much of a boost here; indeed, if anything Putin was sticking pins into his little Dima voodoo doll. Serdyukov, whom DAM had praised recently, was touched on and Putin made a point of defending his dismissal, still making a mockery of any sense of innocence until being proven guilty and implicitly slapping the PM down. (For the record, it’s not that I necessarily believe Serdyukov is innocent, I just think this is something for the courts and not the Investigations Committee to decide.) Furthermore Kudrin, who had after all just laid into Medvedev and his cabinet, got a positive shout-out, with Putin reaffirming that he still listens to him.

It was interesting that the goodie bag distributed to the attendees was redolent of tsarist splendor, down to the provision of postcards of the tsars. But without divine right and the support of the elite, a tsar is just a man with a fancy chair.

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