Non-Lethal Guns for Russian Police

As a coda to my earlier post about the rearming of Russia’s police (and why it’s a good thing), it’s been announced that traffic and transport police, as well as precinct inspectors (essentially local community officers) and maybe some regular beat cops will receive PB-4SP ‘Osa’ pistols firing non-lethal rounds, instead of their current weapons: conventional PM pistols or the new Yarygin PYa ‘Grach’. This comes 3 years after an initial commitment to begin use of non-lethal weapons and is a further sign of encouraging, if sometimes glacially slow police reform on he ground.

The MVD has apparently earmarked 45 million rubles ($1.6 M) for 3,800 18mm PB-4SPs. These higher-power versions of an existing civilian weapon fire metal-cored rubber bullets with a muzzle energy limited by law to 91 joules — enough to stun, even break bones, but not generally lethal unless fired at the head or point blank range. Of course, a problem is that many cases in which officers use their weapons are indeed at close quarters, and the standards of marksmanship and coolness in a crisis amongst many Russian police are pretty low, so I do fear that there will still be casualties. However, given that there is less real need for such officers to be resorting to weapons anyway, this is a step in the right direction. At least these rounds are less likely to hurt an innocent bystander through ricochet or passing through the target. (According to Izvestiya, 65 people were killed and at least 500 injured by non-lethal weapons in the past few years in Russia.)

For the real tech and gun mavens, the PB-4SP Osa (a pun: it means ‘wasp’ and also stands for Oruzha Samoobronnyi or Self-Defence Weapons),  is a light, four-barrel gun firing 18.5 x 60 mm rounds using a single CR-123A high capacity lithium battery. The rounds available are the T (Trauma), the rubber bullet described above, as well as a noise and flash round (SZ), a signal flare and a solid, lethal slug.

Kazan, Dalny and the problems and prospects of police reform

I’ve just written an opinion piece for the admirable Kazan Herald on ‘Glimmers of Hope in the Kazan Police Scandal‘, trying to make some sense of the ghastly case of the apparent (well, pretty conclusive, but technically not yet proven in a court of law) death of a man after he was brutally abused in the city’s Dalny (Dal’nii) police precinct. It may seem counter-intuitive to be looking for hope in such a tragedy, but the scale and nature of the public outcry, the authorities’ quick and decisive response are encouraging and initiatives such as the decision to instal video cameras in interrogation rooms may well help more concrete the often vague precepts of the 2011 Law on the Police. After all, police reform will inevitably be a halting, two-steps-forward-one-step-back process, a cultural and institutional change far slower and more complex than just spray-painting полиция over милиция on the sides of their cars. But part of the process, unpleasant as it may be at the time, will precisely be in flushing out decades of accumulated filth from the system. That other victims of the Dalny police, and the Kazan police as a whole, are now coming forward with their stories, stories which are terrible precisely because they are not atypical, that they could be heard in every part of Russia, is a good thing. The truth shall not always set you free, but it is at least a pretty unavoidable precondition for creating a more positive relationship between police and policed in the future.

The Security Forces, Moscow, March 4

"Russia. Putin. Victory."

The presidential election weekend (and the following Monday, given the decision of activists to gather at Pushkin Square) saw Moscow in the grip of a massive security operation that saw especially the heart of the city swamped with police and security forces of every kind. A reported extra 6,500 personnel were drafted in (although I suspect this is a conservative figure), over and above the extensive array of forces already present in the capital, which I have detailed elsewhere, in my post Moscow’s Praetorians. Being a rather obsessive cop-spotter, I made a point of trying to identify as many of the elements I could see. Obviously there may well have been a number I missed, but the tally I came up with included:

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The Chechens Under The Bed

As a little light relief from the presidential election and the subsequent punditry, I was contemplating the place of Chechens as a Russian folk devils. For once, this was not so much about terrorists and criminals but the recurring alarum of Chechen police being sent to Moscow for the election.

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Sukhodolsky’s ouster from the St Petersburg police: Nurgaliev’s revenge, brutal MVD politics and a suggestion of a breakdown in silovik etiquette

The outgoing Mikhail Sukhodolsky

On Friday 10 February, OMON riot police surrounded the St Petersburg police headquarters on Suvorovsky Prospekt and evicted Colonel General (Police) Mikhail Igorevich Sukhodolsky. Earlier that day, President Medvedev had signed a terse order relieving him of his duties as head of the St Petersburg and Leningrad Oblast Main Internal Affairs Directorate (GUVD) on unspecified grounds. Sukhodolsky himself subsequently held a press conference in which he enumerated the successes of his force in the time since he was appointed last year. (Interestingly enough, there’s no mention on the force’s webpage.)

Why has Russia’s second most senior field police commander, a man specially moved into this position in June 2011 from the position of first deputy interior minister, been sacked just eight months later, and so publicly at that?

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Tracing the Faultlines within the Russian Security Community

This week I’m speaking on ‘The Security Services and Russia’s Perceptions of Security Challenges and Threats’ at What Future for Russia?, which promises to be a very interesting event put on by NUPI. Apart from castigating myself for the bad planning of agreeing to go to Scandinavia in what seems to be the midst of Fimbulwinter, and flying there via Iceland, at that, this also got me thinking about the very notion of lumping ‘the security services’ together into one camp.

Of course, there are some broad traits which unite them, from a commitment to Russian national security to a common interest in talking up the challenges to it, in order to guarantee continued budgetary priority and political privilege. However, especially now that more and more the prospect of a post-Putin era is being contemplated — not that he’s likely to be going any day now, but people are no longer blithely regarding another twelve years as inevitable — then a variety of internal faultlines become increasingly significant.

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