My latest Moscow News column, Retooling Russia’s Riot Police, is out today. I riff off the responses to the recent UK riots (and in particular to the perceived weakness of the initial police response) to talk a little about Russian public order forces, and why – as usual before elections – they are being strengthened. The OMON, by the way, are not becoming OPON now that the militsiya are the politsiya, but KON: Komanda osobennogo naznacheniya (‘Special Designation Commands’). I plan to discuss the reforms to the public order and security forces here in a few days.
All posts in category Police Reform
Good Bye OMON, Hello KON
Posted by Mark Galeotti on August 22, 2011
https://inmoscowsshadows.wordpress.com/2011/08/22/462/
Russia’s new Military Police – about time, and about order
One of the (many) problems of the Russian military has been its lack of a proper military police force, and the extent to which this has encouraged or at least done little to stop rampant criminality, including the brutal hazing of dedovshchina. Instead, the Main Military Procurator’s Office (GVP) largely has to work through unit command structures (which are often more interested in concealing than revealing crimes) and the Commandant’s Service, which is largely a guard and traffic-control service and again under local commanders.
In October 2010, and after some hesitations and back-and-forths, Defence Minister Anatoly Serdyukov and Chief of the General Staff Makarov announced that by 2012, Russia would have a proper military police force (VP: Voennaya politsiya), some 20,000 strong, and this year is seeing a rolling introduction. (more…)
Posted by Mark Galeotti on August 19, 2011
https://inmoscowsshadows.wordpress.com/2011/08/19/russia%e2%80%99s-new-military-police-about-time-and-about-order/
Medvedev’s Police Purge (1): the Ministers
It certainly looks as if Medvedev’s cull of the police is moving apace. The plan under the new Law on the Police was to cut the MVD’s force by 22% and bring it down to a strength of of 1,106,472. As of 1 August, he was able to announce that 183,000 officers had been dismissed and 48,000 more were soon to be cut, for a total reduction of 231,000 or around 17%.
Not bad, but these figures pale into insignificance in comparison with the losses at the top of the command structure. (more…)
Posted by Mark Galeotti on August 3, 2011
https://inmoscowsshadows.wordpress.com/2011/08/03/medvedev%e2%80%99s-police-purge-1-the-ministers/
A look back: ‘”Quiet Revolution” seeks to end legal nihilism’ (Oxford Analytica, 1 November 2010), on the Russian Law on the Police
In part as I reimmerse myself in the detail of this past year of change and not-so-change within the MVD, I thought I’d post (with permission), a piece I wrote for Oxford Analytica back in November of last year. This article was originally published in The Oxford Analytica Daily Brief:
Oxford_Analytica_RUSSIA_Quiet_revolution_seeks_to_end_legal_nihilism_tmp162
Two key constraints I identified were corruption and a lack of political will. It is still hard to be upbeat about the former – some definite grounds for guarded optimism, but it’s hard to know whether Russia is genuinely going to be able on current showing to address the engrained culture of corruption within the police. However, Medvedev is showing a little more political will than, to be honest, I expected eight months ago. Many of the current wave of dismissals are simply getting rid of the irredeemably incompetents and the politically out-of-favor, and many of the incomers are no cleaner, just smarter, better connected or simply luckier.
I’m writing another brief for OA now on the issue, though, and given that all too often in the past Russia has disappointed instead, it is a pleasant surprise to be marginally more optimistic than before.
Posted by Mark Galeotti on July 9, 2011
https://inmoscowsshadows.wordpress.com/2011/07/09/a-look-back-quiet-revolution-seeks-to-end-legal-nihilism-oxford-analytica-1-november-2010-on-the-russian-law-on-the-police/
Russian Prison Reform: a B+ with promise but some concerns
Russia needs to incarcerate fewer of its citizens, and this is something acknowledged by the Kremlin and Justice Ministry on down. In March, Justice Minister Konovalov admitted that “people ending up in prison is not the answer” to crime. After all, prisons are expensive and unless run and resourced well – and frankly, Russia’s generally are neither – tend to do little to prevent recidivism, instead creating a marginalized, traumatized underclass that has only learnt how to do crime better. (It is no accident that one Russian prison slang term for prison is akademiya.) In Russia’s case they are also incubators for HIV and drug-resistant TB, which are then released into mainstream society with ex-prisoners. They are also incubators for violence, between inmates and by guards and suicides: in 2009, for example, 4150 prisoners died in Russia’s prisons from various causes, about 0.5% of the total (almost exactly double the USA’s figure, based on deaths in state prisons 2001-7).
In fairness, work has been done to address some of these issues. For much of the 1990s, the prison system received no more than 60% of the resources it needed just to survive, and while estimates vary, the figure is now closer to 90%, with some areas actually receiving enough of an excess to manage to build more modern facilities or upgrade existing ones. New medical treatment regimes have at least begun to slow the spread of TB according to the WHO. The culture of impunity for prison guards involved in extralegal violence has also been restricted, although while there have been prosecutions (especially if you beat a former FSB officer to death), there is still a long way to go. After all, given the overstretch facing the GUIN (Glavnoe upravlenie ispolneniya nakazaniya, Main Directorate of Administering Sentencing, but in effect Main Directorate of Corrections), prison officers often feel exposed and vulnerable, and resort to violence in part to assert their authority, a morally-reprehensible but frankly inevitable consequence. The same is true of the way that in some prisons, gangs of convicts are effectively handed de facto control of parts of prisons who then use violence and intimidation to maintain a form of order. Sometimes known as SPDs (Discipline and Enforcement Sections), this practice was formally banned at the end of 2009, but still persists in many cases. That even GUFSIN (the Federal Penitentiary Control Directorate) officers are now also sometimes being held to account, though, does suggest that change is on the way.
Posted by Mark Galeotti on June 25, 2011
https://inmoscowsshadows.wordpress.com/2011/06/25/russian-prison-reform-a-b-with-promise-but-some-concerns/
Random Thoughts from Moscow (1)
Having recently returned from my first trip back to Moscow for a while, it is interesting to see how much has changed and what has not. With no particular order or claims to special wisdom, here are an initial couple of thoughts…
Posted by Mark Galeotti on May 21, 2011
https://inmoscowsshadows.wordpress.com/2011/05/21/random-thoughts-from-moscow-1/
