US takes on the Russian organized crime ‘Brothers’ Circle’. Who?

The US administration has rolled out its new Strategy to Combat Transnational Crime with an associated Executive Order on Blocking Property of Transnational Criminal Organizations. Great – it is time to put TOC higher up the threat ladder (just as the terrible Oslo events underline the dangers in focusing too much on jihadist terrorism) and while this does not represent a silver bullet solution in and of itself, it is a useful overall strategy and does unlock further resources as well as, one hopes, mark the shift of budgetary allocations towards the struggle.

The Strategy on the whole talks in broad terms, but it does make it clear that its main concern about Russian/Eurasian gangs is the threat of the penetration and destabilization of the US economy by kleptocrat criminal-businessmen:

Russia/Eurasia: Russian and Eurasian organized crime networks represent a significant threat to eco­nomic growth and democratic institutions. Russian organized crime syndicates and criminally linked oligarchs may attempt to collude with state or state-allied actors to undermine competition in strategic markets such as gas, oil, aluminum, and precious metals. At the same time, TOC networks in the region are establishing new ties to global drug trafficking networks. Nuclear material trafficking is an especially prominent concern in the former Soviet Union. The United States will continue to cooperate with Russia and the nations of the region to combat illicit drugs and TOC.

I’m a little skeptical about the whole question of dominating strategic assets (not least because the Kremlin tends to regard that as its job, and whatever you say about Russian OC, it’s outgunned by the state). Arguably a greater threat to US economic wellbeing is the extent and professionalism of Russian medicare fraud operations. Sure, rather less sexy that nuclear trafficking, less headline-grabbing than drug dealing, but a substantial drain on an already overstretched public good.

My main surprise, though, was in reading the list of specific entities targeted in the Executive Order:

1. THE BROTHERS’ CIRCLE (f.k.a. FAMILY OF ELEVEN; f.k.a. THE TWENTY)
2. CAMORRA
3. YAKUZA (a.k.a. BORYOKUDAN; a.k.a. GOKUDO)
4. LOS ZETAS

The Camorra are indeed the most violent and dynamic of the Italian-based OC groups. The Yakuza have suffered major setbacks, and are rather less overtly violent, but retain massive economic clout and social capital. Los Zetas, ex-special forces turned narcos, are among Mexico’s most dangerous groups.

But the Brothers’ Circle, aka Family of Eleven, aka The Twenty? Who are these? (more…)

‘Siloviks & Scoundrels’: my new column in the Moscow News

Time for a brief and self-indulgent excursion into self-publicity: today saw the publication of the first article in a new column I’ll be writing for the Moscow News. Entitled Siloviks & Scoundrels, it will cover issues relating to crime and policing, espionage and the military, and all the myriad other issues relating to Russian (in)security. The first article looks at prosecutor Sergei Kudeneyev’s new challenges, and future columns will look at topics including the reality of Russia’s crime statistics, how organized is Russian organized crime and the semiology of police uniforms…

A look back: ‘”Quiet Revolution” seeks to end legal nihilism’ (Oxford Analytica, 1 November 2010), on the Russian Law on the Police

In part as I reimmerse myself in the detail of this past year of change and not-so-change within the MVD, I thought I’d post (with permission), a piece I wrote for Oxford Analytica back in November of last year. This article was originally published in The Oxford Analytica Daily Brief:

Oxford_Analytica_RUSSIA_Quiet_revolution_seeks_to_end_legal_nihilism_tmp162

Two key constraints I identified were corruption and a lack of political will. It is still hard to be upbeat about the former – some definite grounds for guarded optimism, but it’s hard to know whether Russia is genuinely going to be able on current showing to address the engrained culture of corruption within the police. However, Medvedev is showing a little more political will than, to be honest, I expected eight months ago. Many of the current wave of dismissals are simply getting rid of the irredeemably incompetents and the politically out-of-favor, and many of the incomers are no cleaner, just smarter, better connected or simply luckier.

I’m writing another brief for OA now on the issue, though, and given that all too often in the past Russia has disappointed instead, it is a pleasant surprise to be marginally more optimistic than before.

Bye-Bye Bagapsh: concerns about Abkhazia’s future

The death in a Moscow hospital of Abkhaz president Sergei Bagapsh is pretty bad news. In the interim, before new presidential elections are held (they have to be, within three months), Vice President Aleksandr Ankvab will take his place, but it will be difficult to fill his shoes. I had rather more time for Bagapsh than most of the Party-apparatchik-turned-nationalist-tribunes who have colonized post-Soviet Eurasia. He was an Abkhaz nationalist but in the main managed not to let that become xenophobia. When you compare him with his fellow leader of a Georgian splinter state, South Ossetia’s Edward Kokoity, under whose administration thuggery, paramilitarism and embezzlement appear to have become the order of the day (and who is desperately trying to hold on to power), and his achievement becomes all the more striking. Kokoity clashes with Russia as often as not when Moscow asks where all the aid they send disappears to; Bagapsh tried to maintain a degree of equipoise. The irony is that although Bagapsh was criticized for his deals with Russia, he had also, before the Russo-Georgian War, been about as open as an Abkhaz leader could be to some form of negotiation with Tbilisi. (It is a further irony that his critics also disliked his efforts to allow the region’s few remaining Georgians to seek Abkhaz citizenship, as well as attempts to encourage US investment.)

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Random Thoughts from Moscow (1)

Having recently returned from my first trip back to Moscow for a while, it is interesting to see how much has changed and what has not. With no particular order or claims to special wisdom, here are an initial couple of thoughts…

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Bad news: official Russian crime data are under-reports; good news: Russian academics are digging out the real data

There is a long and inglorious tradition of under-reported crime rates in Russia. In part, this sometimes reflects the state’s unwillingness to admit the scale of the problem; in part, the police themselves choosing to ignore crimes or report them as being less serious than they really are; and in part, ‘latent crime’ resulting from public unwillingness to turn to the authorities, whether out of mistrust or simply because they don’t think there is any point. Together, these can lead to all kinds of anomalies in the apparent crime rate.

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