New head of the GOU: Lt Gen Vladimir Zarudnitsky

The Russian General Staff’s Main Operations Directorate (GOU) has a distinguished past, a rather lackluster present and an uncertain future. Sometimes rightly described as the ‘brain of the army‘ (unkind souls may regard that as a rather low bar, akin to being the ‘soul of the tax office’ or ‘heart of the Chekist’), the GOU is at once a planning body, a liaison agency with other federal power agencies such as the MVD and FSB, a kind of operational think tank and an incubator of the brightest military thinkers. Or at least that’s the plan. In recent years it has been in disarray: four chiefs in four years, a massive cut in staff from 500 to 150, and a very poor performance in the 2008 Georgian invasion, which was in a number of ways handled very badly. On the other hand, given the paucity of present military thought (something Chief of the General Staff Makarov himself admits), and the current drive to reform the military and create a meaningful operational art for the new brigade-based structure, I’d suggest that the need for the GOU has never been greater.

Anyway, on October 3 GOU chief Lt. Gen. Tretyak for formally dismissed, although he had requested to be released on medical grounds in the summer and had already physically moved out of his office. In his place comes Lt. Gen. Vladimir Zarudnitsky, a line officer with a reasonable but not especially impressive resume (more…)

Russia’s military and its ability to assert its power in the ‘Near Abroad’

Belatedly, I note my latest column in the Moscow News: ‘A true “Medvedev” doctrine,’ on Russia’s current ‘Center’ and ‘Union Shield’ military exercises and what they say about current priorities and threat evaluations. Is (was?) there a ‘Medvedev Doctrine’ that envisages interventions in Central Asia to prop up failing regimes? I hope not and think that ultimately Moscow would rather not, but my concern is that – as in Afghanistan in 1979 – the Kremlin gets sucked in believing (a) that regime change will hurt Russia, (b) that it has not alternative, but in any case (c) that any intervention can be neat, successful and brief. I’d love to be able to reassure myself that fundamental political lessons were learned from the Soviet Afghan war and also the USA’s experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan…

Russia’s new Military Police – about time, and about order

One of the (many) problems of the Russian military has been its lack of a proper military police force, and the extent to which this has encouraged or at least done little to stop rampant criminality, including the brutal hazing of dedovshchina. Instead, the Main Military Procurator’s Office (GVP) largely has to work through unit command structures (which are often more interested in concealing than revealing crimes) and the Commandant’s Service, which is largely a guard and traffic-control service and again under local commanders.

In October 2010, and after some hesitations and back-and-forths, Defence Minister Anatoly Serdyukov  and Chief of the General Staff Makarov announced that by 2012, Russia would have a proper military police force (VP: Voennaya politsiya), some 20,000 strong, and this year is seeing a rolling introduction. (more…)

‘Siloviks & Scoundrels’: my new column in the Moscow News

Time for a brief and self-indulgent excursion into self-publicity: today saw the publication of the first article in a new column I’ll be writing for the Moscow News. Entitled Siloviks & Scoundrels, it will cover issues relating to crime and policing, espionage and the military, and all the myriad other issues relating to Russian (in)security. The first article looks at prosecutor Sergei Kudeneyev’s new challenges, and future columns will look at topics including the reality of Russia’s crime statistics, how organized is Russian organized crime and the semiology of police uniforms…

Random Thoughts from Moscow (1)

Having recently returned from my first trip back to Moscow for a while, it is interesting to see how much has changed and what has not. With no particular order or claims to special wisdom, here are an initial couple of thoughts…

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The Russian Navy vs Somali pirates: a useful reminder

On May 6, Russian Naval Infantry marines from the destroyer Marshal Shaposhnikov successfully stormed the Russian tanker Moscow University, which had been hijacked by Somali pirates. After a 22-minute operation, the crew (who had barricaded themselves in the engine room) were freed unharmed, one pirate was dead and the other ten captured. The marines apparently suffered no casualties. Controversially, after talk of taking them back to Moscow for trial, the pirates were abandoned on the high seas in one of their boats, stripped of weapons and navigation equipment. They have since disappeared, presumed dead, 300 nautical miles from the shore.

On one level, this is a rare bit of good news in the ongoing struggle against the unpredictable, uncoordinated but undeniably effective pirates of the Somali coast. Given the risks and costs in arming or escorting the vast numbers of ships passing through the waters at risk, such operations at least offer the prospect of some deterrent effect. However, the operation is also noteworthy as a reminder of what it says more generally about Russian forces and approaches: (more…)

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