Shuffling the siloviki: who may be the winners and losers in 2012?

With Putin’s presidential election over, now the question becomes who will make it into the new government, at a time when some insiders are suggesting there may be some substantial change. On the whole, the siloviki tend not to experience particularly rapid reshuffles, but there are some who are looking more vulnerable. In a couple of columns for the Moscow News, I look first at the three key silovik ministers (Serdyukov at Defense, Nurgaliev of the MVD and Prosecutor General Chaika), and secondly at the chiefs of the main security and intelligence services (FSB, SVR, GRU, FSKN, FSO). After all, it’s not just about personalia: the decisions about who stays and goes and more to the point the nature and origins of any new hires will say a lot about what Putin plans for the future, and what he fears.

Tracing the Faultlines within the Russian Security Community

This week I’m speaking on ‘The Security Services and Russia’s Perceptions of Security Challenges and Threats’ at What Future for Russia?, which promises to be a very interesting event put on by NUPI. Apart from castigating myself for the bad planning of agreeing to go to Scandinavia in what seems to be the midst of Fimbulwinter, and flying there via Iceland, at that, this also got me thinking about the very notion of lumping ‘the security services’ together into one camp.

Of course, there are some broad traits which unite them, from a commitment to Russian national security to a common interest in talking up the challenges to it, in order to guarantee continued budgetary priority and political privilege. However, especially now that more and more the prospect of a post-Putin era is being contemplated — not that he’s likely to be going any day now, but people are no longer blithely regarding another twelve years as inevitable — then a variety of internal faultlines become increasingly significant.

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New GRU chief: Igor Sergun

Despite a little confusion (RIA-Novosti and Kommersant say yes, Rossiiskaya gazeta said no at first, then yes), it seems clear that, as predicted, Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) chief Colonel General Alexander Shlyakhturov, not seen at headquarters for months (despite claims that he’s been on duty), has stepped down on grounds of age. He’s 64 – an age at which remaining in post requires a clean bill of health and also presidential approval. Shlyakhturov will presumably be given a suitable sinecure, possibly as civilian adviser to the GRU, and/or Shlyakhturov would in the near future chairman of the board of directors of the Moscow Institute of Thermal Technology (MITT).

His successor is Major General Igor Sergun. (more…)

Moscow’s Praetorians: the Kremlin’s security forces

Given the protests in Moscow and the deployment of riot police and security troops, I thought this was a good time to provide a quick update as to the security forces available in the capital, not least as a counter to some of the more fanciful suggestions about the imminent victory of people power. (more…)

Viktor Bout’s conviction: first thoughts

So, arms dealer and get-anything-anywhere shipper Viktor Bout was today found guilt on all four counts of his indictment, that is:

  • conspiracy to kill US nationals;
  • conspiracy to kill US government officers;
  • conspiracy to acquire and use anti-aircraft missiles; and
  • conspiracy to provide material support to a foreign terrorist organization.

Of course Bout and his lawyers will appeal, and they are likely to have the continued support of the Russian government and ‘party of power.’ Voice of Russia has already flatly said that “The evidence against the businessman was quite ridiculous” and no doubt a chorus of similar disapproval will come from Russia, with the LDPR’s Leonid Slutsky dismissing the verdict as “a typical American propaganda ploy.” OK, he’s in the LDPR, but it is worth remembering that he is also first deputy chairman of the Duma’s Foreign Affairs Committee. Indeed, a collection of deputies in the Russian State Duma sent a letter to Presiding Judge of The Southern District of the Federal Court of New York Shira Scheindlin on October 7 inter alia stating that:

V. Bout’s case, according to his lawyers, is based mostly on non proven facts, speculation, dubious allegations, doubtful evidence and unpersuasive accusations, that have been proclaimed in the media for almost 10 years as the truth. Therefore, the formation of a negative international public opinion about V. Bout has started years before the provocative DEA operation [Relentless], which resulted in his arrest.

They claimed, needless to say, that Bout’s arrest was part of a shadowy plot to abort the ‘reset’ in Russo-American relations.

What is the big picture, though? I doubt it will have a major impact on US-Russian relations, even thought the ‘reset’ hasn’t really taken that much hold. Given that I suspect that Bout had a relationship with the GRU, military intelligence, I wonder if this will be another nail in the coffin of that organization, or at least dead-duck chief Shlyakhturov. If Bout was indeed a sometimes-agent or at least contact for the GRU, then it may also put a crimp in some of their operations.

But what about the global arms market, is that likely to feel the absence of Viktor? He’s certainly a character, but more than that was extremely good at what he did. I doubt his network can survive much more of an absence. There will, of course, be arms dealers – there always will. But they are unlikely to have the same range of connections, organizational capacities, attention to detail and ability to draw on Russian arms stocks as Viktor. So the capacities and efficiency of the global illegal arms market is degraded, if only slightly. But every little helps.

More on the GRU and its hard times

I return to the question of why the GRU is having a hard time of it at the moment (and is likely to continue to do so for a while) in my latest Moscow News column, Spooks Under Fire. They are suffering in part for being too obstreperous (and CoGS Makarov is looking to assert his authority) and also because Putin is becoming less tolerant of overlaps and turf wars within the intelligence community. Brian Whitmore makes some interesting additional observations in his latest Power Vertical blog post. We still await to hear whether military intelligence chief General Shlyakhturov will return to his post from his lengthy ‘medical leave’ – I suspect not.

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