Why I don’t see any Russian plot behind the Boston bombings

I’ve been struck in the past 48 hours how many journalists’ queries I’ve fielded that seemed to take seriously the idea that the Russian state (or local agents in the North Caucasus) could somehow be responsible for the terrible Boston bombing. (I’m talking 6 serious journalists: not the kind of lunatics who, for example, claimed the real bombers were Navy SEALs.) The idea would seem to be that by encouraging, facilitating or downright arranging the attack, they demonize the Chechens, legitimize their brutal security campaign in the North Caucasus, and create a new, more favorable environment for dealing with the USA, in one fell swoop. A cute idea, worthy fodder for some lurid airport thriller, but in my opinion very, very hard to believe.

I can understand why the Tsarnaevs’ family and friends might want to believe that Tamerlan and Dzhokar were framed or set up. It’s the same impulse that leads to the disbelieving and perplexed statements that “he was a lovely man” or “he kept himself to himself” every time some serial killer or child abuser is arrested. Evil thoughts and plans, alas, do not always or even usually manifest themselves through sinister manner and demented cackles.

However, if we look at these particular suggestions (some of which also come from Russians), they seem to rest of a few basic assertions:

  • The FSB had suspicions about Tamerlan Tsarnaev, so the fact that they let him into the country shows that they had some ulterior motive.
  • Putin was willing to blow up Russian apartment buildings in 1999 for political purpose, so he’d have no more compunction seeing terror in Boston.
  • The Russians want to make the world stop hassling them about their tactics in the North Caucasus: this gives them a perfect way of demonstrating that they are simply fighting evil jihadists.
  • In the most ridiculously extreme cases, it’s asserted that the Kremlin just hates the USA anyway, and likes seeing mayhem there.

Of course Moscow will seek to make political capital out of this event; that’s what countries do (I remember when offers of assistance to the USSR after Chernobyl were also accompanied by patronizing suggestions about how this wouldn’t have happened if the Soviets were less Soviet and more Western). That certainly doesn’t mean that “hardliners in Russia might want another Cold War with America, and they may even secretly rejoice at the idea of mayhem in the West.” The pragmatic art of diplomacy is often about making the best from whatever fate presents.

The Kremlin has not shown itself averse to the use of violence in domestic and international politics (I’m inclined to accept the 1999 apartment bombings were state terrorism), but this is a world apart from actually trying to instigate an attack on US soil. The risks so outweigh the potential advantages that I don’t think it would even have been seriously considered. There is one basic rule of covert operations: at some point, they become covert no longer. If Tamerlan had been an active, aware agent, what would have happened if he had been captured? Even assuming that he was instead a dupe, groomed for the purpose by Russian undercover agents posing as jihadists, what happens when the US authorities–who, we can safely assume, are turning the full weight of their massive intelligence capacity onto this case–get a sniff of this? Any political advantages are likely to be transient (think how quickly the post 9/11 amity evaporated); any political risks astronomical.

Besides which, the FSB flags up potential individuals of concern all the time. They don’t necessarily bar them from the country. One could just as easily (and foolishly) suggest that the FBI’s failure to pick up on the brothers’ jihadist sentiments in 2011, after the FSB had passed on a warning about them, showed that somehow the US authorities were involved. (And for the record, while the inevitable inquiry will say for sure, we need not assume the FBI “failed” here–Tamerlan may not have been fully radicalized by then, the FBI get many such warnings, and in any case they are often rightly skeptical of FSB tip-offs as the Russians often claim people are “terrorists” on the flimsiest grounds or just to smear political oppositionists.)

The world is usually a simpler place than people think, and covert actions less common and less attractive than the movies suggest. We’ll wait and see, but to me this is a case of an alienated young man looking for answers and sadly finding them in the ideology of global jihad, and apparently bringing his brother into the cause. In some ways this is harder to understand than deep plots and cunning stratagems, because it requires us to accept that the Western liberal democratic model does not satisfy everyone and that we cannot control the vagaries of lost souls…

(Oh, by the way: North Korea has denied being behind the bombing, too. So that’s alright, then.)

‘Russian Security and Paramilitary Forces since 1991’: writings and thoughts

One of Johnny Shumate's preliminary sketches for color plates in my forthcoming Osprey Publishing title Elite 197 'Russian Security and Paramilitary Forces since 1991', ISBN 978 1 78096105 7, to be published in August 2013

One of Johnny Shumate’s preliminary sketches for color plates in my forthcoming Osprey Publishing title Elite 197 ‘Russian Security and Paramilitary Forces since 1991’, ISBN 978 1 78096105 7, to be published in August 2013

Having been the kind of nerdy kid who frequented the library to scour the Osprey military history titles, who predictably enough grew up to be the kind of nerdy adult who buys them instead, it was a thorough delight to be able to write my first Osprey book, Russian Security and Paramilitary Forces since 1991, which is due to be published August 2013. (Elite series number 197,  ISBN 978 1 78096105 7). In part it gave me new respect for the series given the extensive detail and fact-checking involved, as well as the way the artists need to have a distinctive combination of the meticulous and the imaginative when producing the color plates which are such a feature of the books. The accompanying sketch, from the talented Johnny Shumate, is just the first rendering of an operator from the Saturn special forces group of the Federal Penitentiary Service (FSIN) in full riot kit. The color version is even more stunning…but you’ll have to wait and buy the book to see that!

However, the exercise also led me to think more about the rise in Russian security, special and paramilitary forces since the collapse of the USSR. The Soviets, after all, were hardly averse to maintaining large parallel armies and also sundry elite forces. However, there has been not just an increase in the numbers of many of these forces, there has also been a proliferation. There are OMON riot police (who do more than just quell riots), KSN/OMSN/SOBR special police response units, various special forces within the MVD’s Interior Troops, numerous commando ‘spetsgruppy’ within the security apparatus, from the FSB’s Alfa and Vympel to the SVR’s Zaslon. As if that were not enough, there are special forces within the FSIN, the FSKN anti-narcotics service, even of a kind within the MChS Ministry of Emergency Situations.

The irony is that the only special forces elements which have shrunk of late have been the regular military’s Spetsnaz — and even then, they still proportionately make up a larger share of the army than in Soviet times. The same is true of the security troops of the Interior Troops: there are fewer than in the Soviet VV, but more compared with the smaller size of Russia’s population.

(more…)

Moscow’s Military Maneuvers: enter Shoigu and Gerasimov

I do hope Shoigu doesn’t take to wearing a soldier’s uniform, Ustinov-style

When the axe falls, it falls with abandon. Serdyukov’s dismissal as minister of defense has been followed by the retirement of his Chief of the General Staff, Nikolai Makarov, and a series of other dismissals, with more likely to follow. Overall, I feel Serdyukov deserves great credit for being the first Russian defense minister to go beyond just talking about reform, but Sergei Shoigu could well be a worthy successor given his great success building and developing the MChS and doing so in the teeth of both budgetary pressures and internal conservatism. However, there are grounds for caution and concern:

1. What is Shoigu’s game plan? Is Shoigu just the enthusiastic and efficient troubleshooter or might he have higher ambitions now that Putin’s position seems a little less certain and the behind-the-scenes discussions about who should be Medvedev’s successor as prime minister have undoubtedly begun. As I comment in my first column for Russia Beyond the Headlines, if Shoigu has more than just military reform in mind, he might well be tempted not to pick the fights that taking that project to the next level will demand, above all with the defense-industrial lobby. (And it it worth noting that the lobby’s current champion, Dmitry Rogozin, might also be eyeing the prime ministerial slot, muddying the waters further.)

2. What are Shoigu’s orders (and limits)? It was striking that when Putin met Shoigu and his new CoGS Gerasimov, he stressed the importance of new equipment and good relations with the defense industries. I think that Alexander Golts is right to interpret that as an injunction not to follow Serdyukov’s line — he was openly (and justly) critical of the defense industries for producing poor weapons at high prices, too late and too little reflecting what Russia’s military actually needed. Hence the decisions to buy French ships, Italian armored vehicles and Israeli drones — both to provide capabilities lacking and also to make a point. It sounds as if Shoigu is being told to make nice to the metal-bashers, who after all are a powerful, hungry political lobby. If so, then his room actually to use his budget usefully becomes much more confined.

3. What is Gerasimov going to do? One lesson of the Serdyukov era was that it was crucial that a civilian defense minister (and though Shoigu technically holds a general’s rank, he is a civilian) needs a tough and local chief of the general staff as his adviser and, if need be, enforcer. Makarov was in many ways a good choice as he had reputation and rank, but was an outsider from the ‘Arbat Military District’ circles of the Muscovite military elite, as well as a specialist on training (a key problem needing to be addressed). His successor, Valery Gerasimov, 57, comes from Kazan and was a career army officer, a tank commander, who was commander of the 58th Army in Chechnya 2001-3, but nonetheless managed to earn the praise of Anna Politkovskaya for his role in the arrest of Budanov. He was Makarov’s deputy 2010-12, but the word is they did not get along and this helps explain his appointment this year to head the Central Military District. Gerasimov is described as a “conservative” but it is sometimes hard to know what that actually means — very few generals in any armies are free-thinking hippies, after all.

As a veteran tank commander, he may well be lobbying for that arm of service, which would actually place him on the same side as the defense industries. (And, I’d suggest, the other side from logic: Russia needs good light infantry, airmobile forces, and wheeled tank destroyers/fire support vehicles.) Beyond that, it is hard at this stage to know for what he stands. However, I suspect that he is much more of an insider and a shop steward for the generals’ lobby than Makarov ever was and I don’t think he’ll be pushing for further troop reductions and other radical steps. On the other hand, he was responsible for all those parades through Moscow, so even if Russia is going to squander the opportunities Serdyukov has opened up and return to a notion of ‘reform’ that really meant little more than ‘buying shiny new stuff,’ then at least we can be assured that they will be prettily showcased rumbling through Red Square…

4. Is anything going to be done about corruption? In many ways this is more a ritual observation more than a real question, as it is hard to see any great evidence that it will. Serdyukov’s downfall had everything to do with personal (very personal) politics and little to do with allegations of embezzlement. One slight shred of optimism is that it seems Main Military Prosecutor Fridinsky — who has done more than anyone in uniform to shed light on corruption and fraud within the MoD, saying that 20% of the State Defense Order disappears through theft and kickbacks — seems to have been the main figure behind the decision not to appoint macho order-more-than-law General Surovikin to head the new military police, which may suggest he has more traction than I realized. And if the Russian arms industries are still to be paid for their junk, then the MoD might need to find the money somewhere. But overall, it is still hard to be optimistic on this point.

Striding or Staggering? Kolokoltsev’s five steps towards police reform

Kolokoltsev: on hold or getting through?

Amidst the twin storms of Hurricane Sandy and midterm grading, I’m indebted to Kevin Rothrock of Global Voices for bringing to my attention a fascinating and important article by Sergei Kanev in Novaya Gazeta that I might well otherwise have missed, on police reform, silovik politics and other subjects close to my heart. The article, ‘Kolokoltsev’s Five Steps’ (Пять шагов Колокольцева), notes that Interior Minister Vladimir Kolokoltsev recently admitted that police reform had had limited success to date and in effect launched a renewed effort.

After all, while reform has led to a shrinkage in the force of some 200,000 officers, it is harder to see that this — and the much-vaunted change of name from militia to police — has had direct and positive effects on its efficiency and probity. To an extent, I feel sorry for Kolokoltsev, in that any change will be slow, even generational. No such reform program could have a quick impact, however much policy-makers and public alike might hope for them. Indeed, he deserves some credit for being willing to recognize that reform so far has been more a declaratory than practical act.

The article presents a nice snapshot of how Kolokoltsev — advised by his consigliere, outspoken ex-cop and academic Vladimir Ovchinskii — hopes to make reform work, his five-step plan:

  1. Further demilitarization of the police. This ranges from the cosmetic (making uniforms less like soldiers’) through to changing training and police procedure, doing away with army-style drill.
  2. Making contracts for good officers open-ended and flattening the pay structure. In addition, pay bonuses (currently a great motivator for report padding and forcing the innocent to confess) should be phased out, or replaced with essentially honorific awards such as certificates of merit.
  3. Doing away with the infamous palochka (‘stick’) quota system which again encourages officers to falsify reports and fabricate convictions in the pursuit of promotions and bonuses. Even Russian cops have begun complaining publicly about this system.
  4. At present, the police can refuse to open a criminal case and the public has very little recourse — or even right to know why. This is a perfect smokescreen for cops to take bribes to ensure a case remains closed or simply for them to keep a case which looks difficult or politically-sensitive from messing up their metrics. Kolokoltsev intends to do away with the current scheme and make the whole process much more transparent.
  5. Set up a website detailing — with photos — cops and MVD staff sacked for inappropriate conduct, and also banning them from being employed in other state agencies for life

These are all good, useful measures (even though the last smacks a little of gimmickry — I’ve never been a fan of “name and shame” as a policy). The fight against corruption is an implicit sixth element, but it could have done with being explicit, and in many ways will prove the most crucial in that without that, none of the others will have their desired effect.

Beyond that, there are 3 key issues I think worth noting:

1. The debilitating effects of reform, especially in the short term. In classic style, those with pull managed to avoid the purge, and one effect has been a shortage of street-level patrol officers and precinct inspectors. According to Kolokoltsev, 40% of rural settlements have no police in their districts. I have also heard tales of disarray within the police training apparatus, as some instructors find themselves unsure how to adapt to the new line espoused in the Law on Police. Generally, change will dismay some and confuse many, and transitions are rarely periods of efficiency. In the short term, things will seem worse before they get better.

2. The politics of the MVD. As Kanev rightly notes, any reform project can become a battlefield between ‘clans’ within the MVD itself. Kolokoltsev has far, far more authority than his predecessor, Nurgaliev, but that’s not exactly saying much. He will need to demonstrate both strength and political skill to carry his reform through. Many are doing very well from the status quo — especially the corrupt and the cynical who, alas, did well under Nurgaliev. At best, they will try to protect themselves, at worst they will seek actively to undermine Kolokoltsev and sabotage his reforms, if they begin to feel under threat.

After all, Kolokoltsev has already faced challenges from within the police. Fortunately for him, Nurgaliev had already dealt with rival contender for the ministerial position Mikhail Sukhodolsky (and in gratuitously brutal fashion, at that), but there are still those whispering that he would make a better minister. More to the point, attempts were made around the time of his elevation to smear and discredit him, largely through his son.

3. The politics of the Siloviki. Kolokoltsev will not only have to negotiate MVD politics but also those of the wider security elite. In part, this is for institutional reasons — as Kanev notes, the MVD is now overseen not just by the FSB (who snoop on everyone) but also formally by the Investigations Committee, which is also taking away the lion’s share of the MVD’s investigators. Bastrykin is a complex character who understands many of the philosophical reasons for a law-based state, but at present he seems consumed by the struggle against the opposition and it remains to be seen how he responds to police reform.

Indeed, even within the FSB, three separate and often-feuding elements watch and work with the MVD: Directorate M (specifically tasked with watching the law-enforcement agencies), the Interior Security Directorate (USB) and Directorate K (economic security). These have their own agents, allies and interests within the MVD and thus in my experience as often seem to combine with forces within the MVD to foil the plans of their FSB comrades as exert any meaningful oversight.

More generally, Kanev identifies the main blocs being one dominated by Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev and Sergei Naryshkin (and which also includes Deputy Interior Minister Sergei Gerasimov and Yuri Draguntsov, head of the MVD’s internal affairs directorate); another under head of the Presidential Control Directorate Konstantin Chuichenko and former Deputy Interior Minister (and now Medvedev advisor) Sergei Bulavin; and a third under Head of the Presidential Administration for Public Service and Human Resources Sergei Dubik. These might not be quite the same blocs I see, but the point on which I agree entirely with Kanev is that the wider power struggles within the siloviki — which are arguably resurgent — intersect with MVD politics and have a direct bearing on the progress of police reform.

Overall, it is hard to give a clear prediction as to whether this reform will succeed, but it is encouraging both that Kolokoltsev is willing to listen to the right people and say the right things and that there is informed and informative debate in the press. That is still a long way from success — but these are all necessary early steps.

In EUROPP on the political (ab)use of the law in Russia

 

Just to note, Once again, the law in Russia is becoming a tool of political control, a commentary of mine on the use of the law and the investigatory apparatus in Russia as a tool to silence and suppress the opposition — including figures such as Gennady Gudkov — is on EUROPP, the LSE’s European Politics & Policy blog, here.

 

Good Times for the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation (SKRF)

The Investigations Committee (SKRF) under Alexander Bastrykin has emerged as the focus of the maximalist, hardline school of thought within the Russian elite as regards the new protest movement. It is by no means a line universally shared, but if we were wondering how well it is playing to those who finally make the decisions, it is worth looking at the provisions of a new draft law.

A solid analysis in Izvestiya outlines how the law, snappily titled “On amendments to some legislative acts of the Russian Federation in connection with improving the structure of preliminary investigation,” will:

  • Give the SK prime responsibility for investigating some 2 million crimes a year.
  • Grant the SK wider powers to investigate VIPs: judges, prosecutors, parliamentarians, even siloviki from the military, intelligence services, police, even the FSB.
  • Transfer investigators from the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) and Federal Drug Control Service (FSKN) to the SK
  • See the SK expand from its present strength of 23,000 to some 60,000 investigators and staff. (As a corollary, it will have to acquire new premises, too.)
  • Increase the SK’s budget by 97.5 B rubles ($3 B).

The law has been passed from the Presidential Administration on to the government (showing the Kremlin’s support for it) and is meant to be fully in force by 1 January 2013. The MVD and FSKN will not lose all their investigators, but to rub in the current change in their fortunes, the SK will cherry-pick those it wants. The MVD will lose all its regional investigations units, while the FSKN is to lose some 5,200 staff by 2016, around 12% of its total complement.

So, the SK will acquire a particular role in deciding when criminal cases will be opened on serious charges, especially members of the opposition… and members of the elite. Obviously potential doesn’t always equal intent, but it does mean that the SK is becoming what Bastrykin appears to want to make it, the universal Kremlin enforcement, Putin’s Swiss army knife.

That said, Bastrykin ought not to be popping champagne corks quite yet. Progress in transferring investigators to the SK is moving more slowly than anticipated. In part this probably reflects a rear-guard action by the MVD and FSKN, as they hope this initiative can be foiled, delayed, diluted or reversed somewhere down the line. It is also because recent pay hikes for MVD staff mean that where once they were the badly-paid poor cousins (meaning that most people jumped at opportunities to move into more elitny and better-paid agencies like the FSB and SK), now they fear that they will actually suffer a pay cut.

Nonetheless, the SK is definitely on the rise. Combined with the recent elevation of hardline Moscow police ‘anti-extremism’ chief Timur Valiulin, then insofar as one can read anything from developments amongst the siloviki, the Kremlin seems to be preparing for a crackdown. The 15 September protests will be an interesting test case.

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