Russian Prison Reform: a B+ with promise but some concerns

Russia needs to incarcerate fewer of its citizens, and this is something acknowledged by the Kremlin and Justice Ministry on down. In March, Justice Minister Konovalov admitted that “people ending up in prison is not the answer” to crime. After all, prisons are expensive and unless run and resourced well – and frankly, Russia’s generally are neither – tend to do little to prevent recidivism, instead creating a marginalized, traumatized underclass that has only learnt how to do crime better. (It is no accident that one Russian prison slang term for prison is akademiya.) In Russia’s case they are also incubators for HIV and drug-resistant TB, which are then released into mainstream society with ex-prisoners. They are also incubators for violence, between inmates and by guards and suicides: in 2009, for example, 4150 prisoners died in Russia’s prisons from various causes, about 0.5% of the total (almost exactly double the USA’s figure, based on deaths in state prisons 2001-7).

In fairness, work has been done to address some of these issues. For much of the 1990s, the prison system received no more than 60% of the resources it needed just to survive, and while estimates vary, the figure is now closer to 90%, with some areas actually receiving enough of an excess to manage to build more modern facilities or upgrade existing ones. New medical treatment regimes have at least begun to slow the spread of TB according to the WHO. The culture of impunity for prison guards involved in extralegal violence has also been restricted, although while there have been prosecutions (especially if you beat a former FSB officer to death), there is still a long way to go. After all, given the overstretch facing the GUIN (Glavnoe upravlenie ispolneniya nakazaniya, Main Directorate of Administering Sentencing, but in effect Main Directorate of Corrections), prison officers often feel exposed and vulnerable, and resort to violence in part to assert their authority, a morally-reprehensible but frankly inevitable consequence. The same is true of the way that in some prisons, gangs of convicts are effectively handed de facto control of parts of prisons who then use violence and intimidation to maintain a form of order. Sometimes known as SPDs (Discipline and Enforcement Sections), this practice was formally banned at the end of 2009, but still persists in many cases. That even GUFSIN (the Federal Penitentiary Control Directorate) officers are now also sometimes being held to account, though, does suggest that change is on the way.

(more…)

‘The KGB Campaign against Corruption in Moscow, 1982-1987’ by Luc Duhamel

While mentioning book reviews in the pipeline, I ought also to mention Luc Duhamel’s The KGB Campaign against Corruption in Moscow, 1982-1987 (Pittsburg UP, 2010), which I’ve reviewed for the re-launched Soviet & Post-Soviet Review. Duhamel looks at Moscow’s two largest trade organizations: the Chief Administration of Trade (Glavtorg) and the Administration of the Moscow Fruit and Vegetable Office (Glavmosplodovoshprom – gotta love these Soviet-era constructions), which became engines of embezzlement, corruption and clientelism, and thus obvious targets for the KGB once its former chief, Yuri Andropov, had become General Secretary of the CPSU in 1982. After all, Andropov was not only something of a puritan Leninist, he also had a much greater awareness of the delegitimizing and dysfunctional impacts of corruption on the Soviet system. The campaign was also a handy way of removing and intimidating the Brezhnevites still dominant within the apparat and those who resisted Andropov’s program for limited reform. As Duhamel shows, early victories petered out before the trade organizations’ counter-attack, with accusations of abuses of investigative powers, dark allusions to Stalinist repression and careful exploitation of their networks and powers. The irony is that many of these venal but able wheeler-dealers were to be rehabilitated in the perestroika era precisely for their entrepreneurial skills.

Duhamel knows the trade organizations inside out, but although in the main I think his portrayal of the investigations and their political context is good, I was less comfortable accepting their detail in every respect. He draws on official court and investigation records, newspaper accounts and interviews, but I know from my own experiences researching crime and security issues that these are not always as reliable as we might hope. This was a time, after all, when the press was an organ of propaganda, when the courts were thoroughly politicized and when investigations often retailed rumor as fact when it was politically expedient. (It would be easy to make a cheap dig here about the modern situation, but in fairness however great the limitations of the modern Russia media and judiciary, they are a world away from the pre-glasnost’ Soviet model.)

As a rather surreal first, I even found myself quoting Rumsfeld on “known knowns” when asking the question of quite what can we be sure we know? These are the inevitable caveats of any attempt to research the underbelly of such a society, and it does not at all invalidate the book. I think Duhamel has done the scholarship a service with this study, which still has a great deal to commend it: I think it is better on the trade organizations and their corruption than about the politics and operational methods of the KGB, but there is much here for anyone who wants to understand quite how the late Soviet system really worked (or didn’t).

Luc Duhamel, The KGB Campaign against Corruption in Moscow, 1982-1987. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2010, xviii + 249pp., $26.95.

Bye-Bye Bagapsh: concerns about Abkhazia’s future

The death in a Moscow hospital of Abkhaz president Sergei Bagapsh is pretty bad news. In the interim, before new presidential elections are held (they have to be, within three months), Vice President Aleksandr Ankvab will take his place, but it will be difficult to fill his shoes. I had rather more time for Bagapsh than most of the Party-apparatchik-turned-nationalist-tribunes who have colonized post-Soviet Eurasia. He was an Abkhaz nationalist but in the main managed not to let that become xenophobia. When you compare him with his fellow leader of a Georgian splinter state, South Ossetia’s Edward Kokoity, under whose administration thuggery, paramilitarism and embezzlement appear to have become the order of the day (and who is desperately trying to hold on to power), and his achievement becomes all the more striking. Kokoity clashes with Russia as often as not when Moscow asks where all the aid they send disappears to; Bagapsh tried to maintain a degree of equipoise. The irony is that although Bagapsh was criticized for his deals with Russia, he had also, before the Russo-Georgian War, been about as open as an Abkhaz leader could be to some form of negotiation with Tbilisi. (It is a further irony that his critics also disliked his efforts to allow the region’s few remaining Georgians to seek Abkhaz citizenship, as well as attempts to encourage US investment.)

(more…)

Bad news: official Russian crime data are under-reports; good news: Russian academics are digging out the real data

There is a long and inglorious tradition of under-reported crime rates in Russia. In part, this sometimes reflects the state’s unwillingness to admit the scale of the problem; in part, the police themselves choosing to ignore crimes or report them as being less serious than they really are; and in part, ‘latent crime’ resulting from public unwillingness to turn to the authorities, whether out of mistrust or simply because they don’t think there is any point. Together, these can lead to all kinds of anomalies in the apparent crime rate.

(more…)

Wikileaks (3): Moscow – Luzhkov and the ‘other’ mafia

From the New York Times comes a wikileaked cable on since-deposed Moscow Mayor Luzhkov and his alleged (OK, rather credibly alleged) corruption and criminal connections:

(more…)

Wikileaks (2): Mogilevich and Ukrainian gas

In many ways, Semyon Mogilevich is an atypical Russian organized crime figure. He does not command an army of thugs, does not shake down storefronts or traffic drugs, does not even fit within any of the gangs or networks dominating the Eurasian underworld. Instead, he is first and foremost a service provider, a one-stop shop for laundering and moving money and criminal finance of every kind. However, he also has an interesting role within Russia’s gas industry, and especially exports to Ukraine, something noted, if not explored that deeply, in two new leaked US State Department cables published in the Guardian.

(more…)

Follow

Get every new post delivered to your Inbox.

Join 3,760 other followers

%d bloggers like this: