Wikileaks (4) – DEA and Russian authorities cooperate in OPERATION BALTIC STRIKE drug busts

Continuing my episodic trawl through Wikileaks for crime-related cables, this and this DEA-related ones caught my eye, relating to OPERATION BALTIC STRIKE, a joint initiative against traffickers smuggling cocaine from Latin America (especially Ecuador) to Russia. As with yesterday’s post, they offer an encouraging glimpse into how cooperation with the Russian police can work (even if it doesn’t always, this is still much better than a few years ago). Direct cop-to-cop cooperation is much more effective than we might fear – and often works informally at levels over and above what the protocols technically allow for, and this is a good thing.

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Gangster ‘Osya’ Butorin finally sent down: good news all round

One of the most personally dangerous gangsters in the Russian underworld – in the sense of a willingness to get his hands dirty in his own ‘wet work’ as well as giving the orders to others – has just been sentenced to life in a Moscow court. Sergei Butorin, known as ‘Osya’, was convicted of 29 murders. 29! As if that were not enough, he and his gang claimed the scalps of some of Russia’s most notorious gangsters himself, including the contract killer Alexander Solonik and the over-reaching Georgian godfather Otari Kvantrishvili (shot by Butorin’s right-hand man Alexei Sherstobitov, ‘Lyosha the Soldier’).

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Russia’s new Military Police – about time, and about order

One of the (many) problems of the Russian military has been its lack of a proper military police force, and the extent to which this has encouraged or at least done little to stop rampant criminality, including the brutal hazing of dedovshchina. Instead, the Main Military Procurator’s Office (GVP) largely has to work through unit command structures (which are often more interested in concealing than revealing crimes) and the Commandant’s Service, which is largely a guard and traffic-control service and again under local commanders.

In October 2010, and after some hesitations and back-and-forths, Defence Minister Anatoly Serdyukov  and Chief of the General Staff Makarov announced that by 2012, Russia would have a proper military police force (VP: Voennaya politsiya), some 20,000 strong, and this year is seeing a rolling introduction. (more…)

New Moscow News post: Mythologizing the ‘mafiya’

Just a quick note: my latest Siloviks & Scoundrels post has been published in Moscow News, ‘Mythologizing the “mafiya.”‘ It picks up on some of the points in my previous IMS blogpost, worrying about the impact of a continued misunderstanding of Russian organized crime.

US takes on the Russian organized crime ‘Brothers’ Circle’. Who?

The US administration has rolled out its new Strategy to Combat Transnational Crime with an associated Executive Order on Blocking Property of Transnational Criminal Organizations. Great – it is time to put TOC higher up the threat ladder (just as the terrible Oslo events underline the dangers in focusing too much on jihadist terrorism) and while this does not represent a silver bullet solution in and of itself, it is a useful overall strategy and does unlock further resources as well as, one hopes, mark the shift of budgetary allocations towards the struggle.

The Strategy on the whole talks in broad terms, but it does make it clear that its main concern about Russian/Eurasian gangs is the threat of the penetration and destabilization of the US economy by kleptocrat criminal-businessmen:

Russia/Eurasia: Russian and Eurasian organized crime networks represent a significant threat to eco­nomic growth and democratic institutions. Russian organized crime syndicates and criminally linked oligarchs may attempt to collude with state or state-allied actors to undermine competition in strategic markets such as gas, oil, aluminum, and precious metals. At the same time, TOC networks in the region are establishing new ties to global drug trafficking networks. Nuclear material trafficking is an especially prominent concern in the former Soviet Union. The United States will continue to cooperate with Russia and the nations of the region to combat illicit drugs and TOC.

I’m a little skeptical about the whole question of dominating strategic assets (not least because the Kremlin tends to regard that as its job, and whatever you say about Russian OC, it’s outgunned by the state). Arguably a greater threat to US economic wellbeing is the extent and professionalism of Russian medicare fraud operations. Sure, rather less sexy that nuclear trafficking, less headline-grabbing than drug dealing, but a substantial drain on an already overstretched public good.

My main surprise, though, was in reading the list of specific entities targeted in the Executive Order:

1. THE BROTHERS’ CIRCLE (f.k.a. FAMILY OF ELEVEN; f.k.a. THE TWENTY)
2. CAMORRA
3. YAKUZA (a.k.a. BORYOKUDAN; a.k.a. GOKUDO)
4. LOS ZETAS

The Camorra are indeed the most violent and dynamic of the Italian-based OC groups. The Yakuza have suffered major setbacks, and are rather less overtly violent, but retain massive economic clout and social capital. Los Zetas, ex-special forces turned narcos, are among Mexico’s most dangerous groups.

But the Brothers’ Circle, aka Family of Eleven, aka The Twenty? Who are these? (more…)

Sergei Kudeneyev takes over as Moscow chief prosecutor

The position of chief prosecutor is meant to rotate every five years and thus it is unsurprising that Yuri Semin (Syomin), who was appointed in 2006, has stood down and is being replaced. I find it hard to regret Semin’s departure (I’d only call him a heavyweight tongue-in-cheek), who did little to prevent his office being politicized in terms of the cases brought to court and, arguably at least as important, the cases which were not, and, I felt, handled racial violence especially poorly. Of late, the Moscow region and city procuracies alike have also been embroiled by investigations, not least one relating to links with gambling bosses which tarnished his deputy, Alexander Kozlov who is also under investigation for an illegal privatization. Semin was presumably seen as having proven himself a safe pair of hands, though, as he has moved on to head the General Procurator’s Office’s department overseeing anti-corruption legislation – a great place to protect the Kremlin’s friends.

Although technically his candidature has to be confirmed tomorrow by the Moscow Duma, with today’s announcement of his candidacy, the choice of Sergei Kudeneev to replace him is essentially a foregone conclusion. It is quite an  interesting choice, though. (First Deputy Prosecutor Vyacheslav Rosinsky at the same time was transferred out to become deputy head of the GerProkuratura’s department for criminal prosecutions – perhaps either as a consolation prize for not getting the top spot or else because Kudeneyev wanted a clean slate.) Kudeneyev, was previously prosecutor of the Mordovian republic (this is presumably the same S V Kudeneev who wrote his 2005 thesis on ‘Pressing questions of maintenance of legality at municipal level: On the Republic Mordovia example’?) and then Orel, where he played a role in laying the foundations for the anti-corruption campaign that followed the removal of long-time regional boss Yegor Stroyev. Most recently, he headed the Prosecutor General’s Office for the Supervision of the Legality of the Execution of Criminal Penalties, which hardly sounds like an exciting position, but is a significant one and a stint at the central GenProkuratura is an essential part of the cursus honorum of a rising star. There, he proved rather more open than some of his predecessors, in February even admitting to a 6% rise in deaths in Russian prisons last year. I can’t say this with absolute surety, but I also get the sense that he was genuine in trying to extend the use of parole in non-violent crimes, too.

Orel is hardly cleansed, and I’d hesitate to identify Kudeneyev as some kind of paladin ready, willing and able to swoop in and cleanse Moscow. I’d like to think so, but we don’t yet know him well enough – and how free a hand he will have. The first indicator, though, will be what happens in the Moscow procuracy itself. That needs to be cleansed thoroughly for any wider systemic progress: watch this space.

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