Poor Dmytro (Firtash)?

Firtash may be caught by the throat, but most other oligarchs are feeding merrily still

Firtash may be caught by the throat, but most other oligarchs are feeding merrily still

Can one feel sorry for a multi-millionaire ($673M according to some, $2.3B according to alternative accounts, and $3.8B to others) suspected of bribery, who reportedly admitted consorting with wanted gangsters and once boasted of his close ties to Yanukovych? If so, then spare a thought for Ukrainian gas and titanium tycoon Dmytro Firtash, arrested in Vienna on a US warrant on bribery and organised crime charges. Why on earth might one feel any sympathy for him? Not for the philanthropy, not even for the massive donations to my alma mater at Cambridge to endow Ukrainian studies. Rather than Firtash would seem to be a businessman of the regular Ukrainian oligarchic variety. What does that mean? It means certainly not clean by Western standards, but nor, in any meaningful sense, an organised crime figure himself. So what might he have been?

When he first started building his energy empire, bringing Russian gas into Ukraine, the infamous financial crime lord Semen Mogilevich was a shadowy but indispensable fixer and broker. His  involvement was pretty much essential to make any Russo-Ukrainian gas deals work. So, of course, I was entirely unsurprised when the accounts (subsequently denied) of an admitted connection arose. If nothing else, there had been widespread rumours beforehand. Furthermore, Mogilevich–who has an interestingly unique role as, in effect, the boutique personal banker of choice to post-Soviet crooks of every stripe–would conceivably also have been a useful contact and service provider for subsequent sub rosa activities such as moving money abroad discreetly, evading taxes or doing any of the other patriotic parlour games at which post-Soviet plutocrats excel. (more…)

Some First Thoughts on Moscow’s options after the (latest) Ukrainian revolution

Flag-Pins-Ukraine-RussiaMoscow is, needless to say, distinctly unhappy to see people power dislodge its ally, client and satrap-to-be Yanukovych in Ukraine. To be sure, as of writing he is still calling himself president and recanting his resignation, but he is powerless and I suspect his main choices will be between prison in Ukraine or exile in Russia (he can go join the Barvikha set, even if he has to leave his grandiose faux-galleon behind). But what options does Russia have in the face of this undoubted and, to the neo-imperialists in the Kremlin, traumatic reversal? Does its toxic public rhetoric of a “neo-fascist coup” really tell us what it is likely to do?

A military option? There is talk of a Russian military intervention, Georgian-style, perhaps predicated on ‘saving’ Crimea or the like, but I don’t buy it. The Ukrainian military is four times the size of Georgia’s and rather more capable of fighting a conventional defensive war. I don’t believe it would fragment; there are ethnic Russian Ukrainians in the ranks, yes, but I don’t see that as meaning that they are necessarily quislings. The military seems to have a strong service ethic and it would fight. Besides, not only would the international fallout be massive–and Russia is in a much weaker situation than in 2008–but quite whom would it be protecting? Even in Crimea there are substantial minorities of ethnic Ukrainians and Tatars, and a very different situation from Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Unless the new government is deeply, deeply stupid and tries, say, to repudiate its agreement over the Sevastopol base for the Black Sea Fleet or allows inter communal violence to develop (and there’s no sign of that), then I don’t believe this will go beyond some sabre-rattling.

Economic war? Russia can not only withhold its promised economic assistance, which Ukraine can scarcely afford to lose, it can also be a bad neighbour in all kinds of other ways, not least by turning off the gas, as it has in the past. I wouldn’t be surprised if we see some pressure exerted this way, from halting joint ventures to banning certain imports/exports, but I suspect the main thing will be a refusal to take on Ukrainian debts. Energy embargoes, after all, alienate, anger and alarm Europe and also cost Russia money, money it can’t afford to lose. It would also hurt the east of the country, especially the Crimea (which is currently the fastest-growing destination for foreign direct investment), risking turning the oligarchic elite against Moscow. Still, this will put the pressure on the US and, especially, EU to help out, and I hope they rise to the challenge.

Regionalisation. It’s interesting that even the Russians seem implicitly to be discounting Yanukovych and any prospect of his return to power. Instead, they are backing the demands in the east of the country for a new, federalised structure which would thus give greater autonomy to the regions in which its influence is strong. The east could thus stave off the ‘worst’–from Russia’s view–of Kiev’s changes and represent a political fifth column, or at least a spoiler, in the Ukrainian political system. This is definitely a plan B from Moscow’s point of view, but given Yanukovych’s spectacular failure in handling Euromaidan, it’s the best option they have left.

Good neighbour. Oh yes, Moscow could also turn over a new leaf, accept Ukraine’s new direction with good grace, even position itself to benefit politically and economically from the drift towards the EU of a country which, after all, is also closely integrated with the Russian economy. This would be playing to the long game, wrong-footing Russia’s critics by showing maturity, restraint and above all a willingness to see geopolitics as more than a zero-sum game, building on whatever positive capital was earned through Sochi. Eh. It’s certainly possible, but sadly, I won’t be holding my breath…

Yanukovych’s gamble and Kiev’s burning

The opposition HQ: not a subtle message from the government

The opposition HQ: not a subtle message from the government

“I am in blood
 Stepp’d in so far that, should I wade no more,
Returning were as tedious as go o’er.”
— Macbeth, Act 3, Scene 4
 

Kiev is burning, both literally and metaphorically, as this revolution-counterrevolution-in-fits-and-starts hit one of its flash points last night. As the opposition radicalizes further and the security forces turn increasingly to lethal force, although I’m not a specialist on Ukrainian politics, I would want to make some observations about some of the aspects of the current crisis about which I do know something.

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Who were the Georgian gangsters arrested in Europe?

I’ll complete this list as more identities become available, but to date, these are the names of the various figures arrested in the June 18 swoop on the Georgian Kutaisi gang across Europe:

Hungary

  • Merab Dzhangveladze, “Dzhango,” vor v zakone and leader of the Kutaisi
  • ?

Italy

  • Guram Odisharia, “Buya,” vor v zakone
  • Roin Uglava, “Matevich,” vor v zakone
  • Gia Gurchiani, vor v zakone
  • Aleko Imedadze, vor v zakone
  • Beso Kuprashvili, vor v zakone
  • Akaki Tugushi, “Enzo Batumi,” vor v zakone
  • ?

Czech Republic

  • Alexander Kartsivadze, vor v zakone
  • ?

Lithuania

  • Givi Gordeladze, “Givi Tol’styi” (“Givi the Thick”), vor v zakone [Gordeladze is again at large; the Lithuanian court, for reasons still not wholly clear, released him on bail, not deeming him a flight risk on grounds of his age (65) and health. Surprise, surprise: he flew.]
  • Temur Nemsitsveridze, “Tsripa,” vor v zakone
  • Razhden Shulaya
  • ?
  • ?

Portugal

  • ?
  • ?

France

  • ?

(Last update: June 27, 2013)

Prague, Moscow, and the value of speaking firmly, clearly and with one voice

A cliché, yes, but a cool one

A cliché, yes, but a cool one

It is, of course, a hackneyed cliché to talk about the “Russian bear.” Nonetheless, it is fair to say that prodding either with a stick is equally ill-advised. However, the usual advice on encountering a bear is to give it its space, be submissive, be quiet. That doesn’t work so well with Moscow. By the same token it is a dangerous caricature to suggest (as some sadly still do) that force or assertiveness is “all Russia understands.” However, what is certainly true is that meekness and the appearance of division tend to encourage Moscow to become more confrontational. Consider, for example, the marked failure of the US government’s “re-set” policy, which has failed to deter Russia from buttressing Syrian tyranny, spying on and perhaps murdering its critics abroad, publicly outing US agents, hounding Ambassador McFaul and doing everything but kicking sand in Obama’s face.

In this context—and given that I’m in Prague for the summer, I’m especially interested in Czech-Russian relations—I was perturbed by the details of the extradition to Moscow of Russian businessman Alexei Torubarov in May, especially in the context of what seems a growing assertiveness by Russia in Central and Southern Europe.

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‘Zap’ Soghoyan, Post-Soviet Gangsters in the Czech Republic, and the new Criminal Merchant-Adventurers

He doesn't look worried. Sadly, he probably had good reason...

He doesn’t look worried. Sadly, he probably had good reason…

The conviction in absentia of Andranik Soghoyan in Prague Municipal Court in many ways exemplifies the place and role of Eurasian organized crime in Europe today.

Soghoyan (also known as ‘Zap’ or ‘Zaporozhets’, after the aged Russian car) is an Armenian gangster who has been convicted of the attempted murder of another Armenian in 2007. According to the indictment, he and his accomplices Gilani and Magomed Aliyev hired Ukrainian Timur Tretyakov, an assassin of bloody inclinations but poor aim. The would-be hitman stabbed one wrong man in Wenceslas Square (fortunately his life was saved by medical intervention). Then Soghoyan’s henchmen Arsen Kakosyan and Arsen Arakelyan gave him directions to the target’s house and a gun, respectively. Tretyakov managed to shoot and kill another innocent bystander, in this case a man who drove the same kind of car as the target.

Gilani Aliyev—a Chechen—was acquitted but otherwise Soghoyan’s accomplices received various sentences, with Tretyakov being sentenced to 22 years in prison. Soghoyan himself was charged with organizing a murder and blackmail. He was acquitted twice by the lower court over doubts about the only informant, himself a convicted extortionist, and the ambiguity of wiretap evidence (at which point he wisely left the Czech Republic), but convicted in the municipal court on appeal.

So, what does this case demonstrate?

1. Oranges are not the only fruit, but they are increasingly common. The 45-year-old Soghoyan is part of the ranks of the vory v zakone, the ‘thieves within the code’ who once represented the elite of Soviet organized crime, but is increasingly an empty honorific more often bought than earned. Soghoyan appears to have been ‘crowned’ a vor in Moscow in 1994, but nonetheless he seems not to be a traditionalist. His 20-year-old nephew was reportedly made a vor at a ceremony in Gyumri (Soghoyan’s home base) last year: there would have been no way such a youth would have been ‘crowned’ in the old days. Instead he is an apelsyn, an ‘orange’ as those gangsters who simply paid their way into the vor hierarchy are disparagingly known by the traditionalists. It seems that Soghoyan, like many gangsters from the Caucasus, is happy to retain the forms of the old vorovskoi mir (‘thieves’ world’) but not its rules. This is a general pattern; while the language of the vory survives, its forms do not, and the modern Eurasian criminal is either an avtoritet criminal-businessman or, like Soghoyan, a gangster increasingly hard to distinguish from his counterparts in Italy, Mexico or almost anywhere else.

2. There are gang, ethnic and phylum divisions. Ultimately, Russian criminals deal with Chechens, Uzbeks with Italians, Chinese with Mexicans. Nonetheless, within the global criminal economy there clearly are affiliations and groupings. Within Eurasian organized crime, there is a growing differential between the Slavic and Caucasus (‘mountaineer’) criminals, something all the more significant since Aslan Usoyan’s death earlier this year. Soghoyan, an Armenian, relied not just on other Armenians, but also the Chechen Aliyevs.

3. Russian organized crime, Russian-speaking organized crime, Eurasian organized crime… Soghoyan was an Armenian, but nonetheless some accounts have made this a ‘Russian organized crime’ story. Of course, there is Russian OC in the Czech Republic, and it may well be growing, but it is much more a criminal business, the world of the avtoritety rather than the bandits: wholesale drug trafficking, money laundering and the like. The rather clumsy term “Russian-speaking organized crime” gets used (is it true? I’d be surprised if Soghoyan talked to his fellow Armenians in Russian), with “Eurasian organized crime” favored by others, but it begins to raise the question of whether or not we can still talk about everyone from Belarusian smugglers and Russian avtoritety to Georgian gangsters and Tajik drug traffickers in the same breath. It’s something I’m thinking about as I write an Adelphi Paper on this, and just as “Post-Soviet organized crime” has an increasingly antiquated sound, I feel that the commonalities created by a shared political and economic model are of diminishing explanatory value.

4. Whatever you call it, it is a significant problem in Europe in general, Central Europe in particular. The initial onrush of the 1990s created a predictable moral panic, and not without reason. This was the age of the bandits, a sudden influx of gangster gangs turbocharged by seemingly inexhaustible economic resources and a guaranteed haven at home. However, the most aggressive inroads were beaten off, sometimes quickly, and we saw a rollback of Russian (etc) criminal power in Central Europe, Italy, the Baltic States.

Since then, though, they are back, even though with a new model gangsterism: has as merchant-adventurers rather than conquistadors. The Russians, Ukrainians, Armenians and so forth have sifted in sometimes as predators but more often offering criminal services—drugs, women, money-laundering, computer hacking, etc—to indigenous gangs and local populations. The overt violence, indeed the overt gangsterism overall, is far, far less in evidence. Even if we take this case, Soghoyan was targeting a fellow Armenian in Prague who had not paid over $500,000 the gangster felt he was due. It was also an attempt to intimidate the local Chechen criminals, or at least to strengthen the Aliyevs’ position within them. (Which raises the question of quite who was using whom…) In other words, this was a crime primarily within the Eurasian community, which only touched a Czech because Tretyakov was such an incompetent killer.

Otherwise, the Eurasian criminals tend to be much less obvious, much more prone to be the facilitators, suppliers and partners of local criminals. Of course, that doesn’t make them any less dangerous, but rather than their danger is measured as much as anything else through how they empower other gangs…

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