One of the most personally dangerous gangsters in the Russian underworld – in the sense of a willingness to get his hands dirty in his own ‘wet work’ as well as giving the orders to others – has just been sentenced to life in a Moscow court. Sergei Butorin, known as ‘Osya’, was convicted of 29 murders. 29! As if that were not enough, he and his gang claimed the scalps of some of Russia’s most notorious gangsters himself, including the contract killer Alexander Solonik and the over-reaching Georgian godfather Otari Kvantrishvili (shot by Butorin’s right-hand man Alexei Sherstobitov, ‘Lyosha the Soldier’).
All posts by Mark Galeotti
Gangster ‘Osya’ Butorin finally sent down: good news all round
Posted by Mark Galeotti on September 6, 2011
https://inmoscowsshadows.wordpress.com/2011/09/06/gangster-osya-butorin-finally-sent-down-good-news-all-round/
Suicide bombs in Grozny: signs of rebel politics, not unity
Back in July, Chechen rebel websites were proclaiming peace in our time – not so much peace in the North Caucasus (that is as distant as ever) but peace in the internal dispute between standing rebel leader Doku Umarov and a collection of rivals who felt that he had lost his way. At a Sharia court, challengers such as Aslanbek Vadalov and Hussein Gakayev reportedly renounced their schismatic ways and reaffirmed their personal oath of loyalty to Umarov. He hurriedly reorganized the ‘armed forces of the Province of Nokhchicho’, specifically abolishing the former eastern and south-western ‘fronts’ and replacing them with he western and eastern ‘military sectors’ under Amir Khamzat (also the commander of the ‘Riyad-us-Saliheen Martyr Brigade’) and Hussein Gakayev, respectively.
Posted by Mark Galeotti on September 1, 2011
https://inmoscowsshadows.wordpress.com/2011/09/01/suicide-bombs-in-grozny-signs-of-rebel-politics-not-unity/
‘State Building in Putin’s Russia: policing and coercion after Communism’ by Brian Taylor (2011)
Another quick foreshadowing of a forthcoming review, this time in the Russian Review. Read the review for my full comments, but in brief, State Building in Putin’s Russia: policing and coercion after Communism is an excellent and deeply-researched book on the MVD and other institutions of internal control under Putin. Brian Taylor (Maxwell School, Syracuse University) very usefully conceptualizes the siloviki of the military and security interests as at once a cohort (a distinct social body with certain common traits and values), clans (competing factions) and corporate (bureaucratic and institutional) interests. However, the core of this book is devoted to assessing the overall contribution of the police and security institutions to the development of the Russian state, demonstrating that state capacity only improved to a very slightly, a process largely limited by an inattention to what he calls “state quality” – essentially, good governance and the satisfaction of society’s needs. Taylor doesn’t really dig into how far poor governance reflects a failure of Putin’s state-building project and how far it is because Putin wasn’t interested in this kind of thing but wanted to create a centralized hybrid state. What this first-class book proves, though, is that even if Putin thinks he got what he wanted from the siloviki, if his aim was lasting, effective and reliable state building, then he was wrong.
(In fairness, though, I’d in any case always be a sucker for a book that declares itself to be committed to “bringing the gun back in” to the comparative literature on states.)
Taylor, Brian D. State Building in Putin’s Russia: Policing and Coercion after Communism. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011. xviii + 373 pp. $95.00. ISBN 978-0-521-76088-1.
Posted by Mark Galeotti on August 30, 2011
https://inmoscowsshadows.wordpress.com/2011/08/30/state-building-in-putins-russia-policing-and-coercion-after-communism-by-brian-taylor-2011/
Good Bye OMON, Hello KON
My latest Moscow News column, Retooling Russia’s Riot Police, is out today. I riff off the responses to the recent UK riots (and in particular to the perceived weakness of the initial police response) to talk a little about Russian public order forces, and why – as usual before elections – they are being strengthened. The OMON, by the way, are not becoming OPON now that the militsiya are the politsiya, but KON: Komanda osobennogo naznacheniya (‘Special Designation Commands’). I plan to discuss the reforms to the public order and security forces here in a few days.
Posted by Mark Galeotti on August 22, 2011
https://inmoscowsshadows.wordpress.com/2011/08/22/462/
Russia’s new Military Police – about time, and about order
One of the (many) problems of the Russian military has been its lack of a proper military police force, and the extent to which this has encouraged or at least done little to stop rampant criminality, including the brutal hazing of dedovshchina. Instead, the Main Military Procurator’s Office (GVP) largely has to work through unit command structures (which are often more interested in concealing than revealing crimes) and the Commandant’s Service, which is largely a guard and traffic-control service and again under local commanders.
In October 2010, and after some hesitations and back-and-forths, Defence Minister Anatoly Serdyukov and Chief of the General Staff Makarov announced that by 2012, Russia would have a proper military police force (VP: Voennaya politsiya), some 20,000 strong, and this year is seeing a rolling introduction. (more…)
Posted by Mark Galeotti on August 19, 2011
https://inmoscowsshadows.wordpress.com/2011/08/19/russia%e2%80%99s-new-military-police-about-time-and-about-order/
Medvedev’s Police Purge (1): the Ministers
It certainly looks as if Medvedev’s cull of the police is moving apace. The plan under the new Law on the Police was to cut the MVD’s force by 22% and bring it down to a strength of of 1,106,472. As of 1 August, he was able to announce that 183,000 officers had been dismissed and 48,000 more were soon to be cut, for a total reduction of 231,000 or around 17%.
Not bad, but these figures pale into insignificance in comparison with the losses at the top of the command structure. (more…)
Posted by Mark Galeotti on August 3, 2011
https://inmoscowsshadows.wordpress.com/2011/08/03/medvedev%e2%80%99s-police-purge-1-the-ministers/
