Moscow continues its Amerikanskaya chistka: Tom Firestone expelled

In 2010 they award him; in 2013 they expel him

In 2010 they award him; in 2013 they expel him

There seems to be an Americanskaya chistka, an American purge in Moscow. After January’s quiet expulsion of an alleged CIA agent, Benjamin Dillon, and this week’s rather less quiet PNGing of Ryan Fogle, comes news (broken in the NY Times) that Thomas Firestone, a former legal counsellor at the US Embassy who had moved into private practice in Moscow, was barred from returning to the city and sent back to the USA. Tom is, for my money, one of the sharpest–in every sense–critics of corruption in Russian business and the dark arts of reiderstvo, ‘raiding’ in particular. (The practice of stealing assets through falsified legal claims.) He spent two tours at the US Embassy as resident legal adviser, then joined the Moscow office of Baker & McKenzie as senior counsel. Not only was he given a certificate of merit in 2010 by Federal Anti-Monopoly Service chief Igor Artemyev “for his outstanding work in advancing U.S.-Russian cooperation in combating cartels and unfair competition,” he also wrote some of the seminal scholarly studies of reiderstvo, notably ‘Criminal Corporate Raiding in Russia‘ (2008).

Apparently, he was returning to Moscow on 5 May and was detained, held  for 16 hours and then put on a flight to the USA. The news only seems to have broken today (Sunday 19 May). The story–so far–is that this follows efforts by the Federal Security Service to recruit him as an agent. Tom clearly enjoyed Moscow, with all its crass energy and sharp edges, but I confess I am astonished if the FSB really thought he was likely to be open to recruitment. Honestly I’d see it as much more likely that, as a perennial thorn in the side of corrupt officials and ‘raiders’ alike, certain interests finally decided they wanted him out of their city and out of their hair. No doubt we’ll get a better sense of the picture over time.

Meanwhile, though, although this predates the Fogle case, when put together it does begin to paint a worrying picture of increasing xenophobia in Moscow. Even if there is no connection between the Firestone case and those of Dillon and Fogle, a willingness to exclude a specialist in Russian and international law and an avowed enemy of the very “legal nihilism” the government is meant to be opposing offers no encouragement. Instead, it almost begins to look as if the Kremlin’s is beginning to believe its current propaganda campaign about its encirclement by foreign foes.

A compendium of spookery: Fogle and further phantasms

President George W Bush visits CIA Headquarters, March 20, 2001.All the spookish shenanigans in Moscow this week have coincided with the end of the academic year, grading, packing to head to Prague for the summer and general chaos, hence the lack of blog posts. However, I have been writing or interviewed in a few places, so in lieu of anything substantial here, I offer a list and links (updated as and when) to these other pontifications of mine on the FSB, the CIA, Russian intrigues and more:

  • Patriot Games in Moscow News, on what the case says about Russia and the West

(And coincidentally, I’d also mention this unconnected piece on Russian organized crime at home and abroad in BNE)

The mystery that is Zaslon

Russian security guard in Iraq with a freed hostage, or a Zaslon operator? No way of knowing...

Russian security guard in Iraq with a freed hostage, or a Zaslon operator? No way of knowing…

There is quite a cult that has grown up around Russia’s Spetsnaz special forces, with books, movies and exposes both serious and farcical alike. Names such as Alpha and Vympel have become well known. Indeed, some could almost be considered franchises: as far back as the 1990s, veterans of the Alpha spetsgruppa had set up  private security firms, trading on their unit’s formidable reputation (see, for example, Tsentr-Al’fa). The one exception appears to be Zaslon (‘Screen’), a very shadowy unit established, by what accounts we have, in 1998 as a special forces unit for the SVR (Foreign Intelligence Service). Trained to operate abroad, in everything from hostage-rescue to assassination missions, it continues to shun publicity. Even while researching my forthcoming book, Russian Security and Paramilitary Forces since 1991 (yes, consider that a plug: out in August and available for pre-order), I was unable to find anything much on it in Russian and foreign sources alike, even a unit badge. They seem to deploy wearing civvies or the uniforms of other units, including embassy security details.

Now I hear a hint that a Zaslon team (the whole unit only seems to number some 280 or so operators) has been or is about to be deployed to Syria (I report on this here, for Blouin). That implies that Moscow either anticipates serious threats to its nationals (not just the embassy, but also numerous civilian and military advisers working with the Syrian government) or else, readying for an endgame, it wants special forces operators on the ground to spirit out Russian or Syrian officials and/or incriminating documents (as they reportedly did in Iraq) or high-tech equipment they don’t want falling into rebel and thus Western or Iranian hands… Watch this space.

The Great Memetic War

PZhiV-badgeToday’s Power Vertical podcast was a four-hander between Brian Whitmore, Kirill Kobrin, Sean Guillory and me on Russia a year after Bolotnaya. I thought it worked especially well, but one point on which I touched that I feel minded to write on at slightly greater length is the extent to which the political struggle taking place within Russia is in no way a conventional organizational one; there is no rival to Putin and the United Russia bloc within the regular electoral context. Instead, it is an asymmetric struggle by a range of actors to define, to brand themselves and their rivals and in the process Russia itself. This kind of memetic (as in relating to memes, ideas that spread from person to person) is one in which creativity and passion can be — almost — as effective as the size of a propaganda machine. And, of course, it happens to be an area in which the liberal middle class opposition have demonstrated considerable skill, especially the arch mememeister Alexei Navalny.

A particularly good index of this has been a recent Levada opinion survey, also somewhat covered in the Russian press, about attitudes to United Russia, Putin and the elite in particular. I reproduce them below, although in some cases I have eliminated some columns, especially of earlier samples, in the interests of space. This must be pretty uncomfortable reading in the Kremlin.

(more…)

‘War, Crime and the Privatization of Violence’ at the ISN website

logo_isnJust a quick cross-posted notice; this week the worthy and wonderful International Relations and Security Network (ISN) at ETH Zurich is running a five-part curated series by me on War, Crime and the Privatization of Violence (all subjects dear to my dark heart). Each part kicks off with a short essay and then assembles links to a wide range of reports and sources. To quote the introduction:

This week’s dossier explores some of the characteristics of the political-criminal nexus. The following installments consider first the world of the kleptocracy, how so many states thrive through organized plunder of their own resources and exploitation of their populations: in effect, nationalizing theft. Even if they avoid that temptation, they may find themselves conniving at or even instigating crime in the name of some greater good. Next, the focus shifts to warlords and pseudo-states, violent actors who may turn to crime to satisfy their political ambitions but also, in some case, rise as predators and later become politicians. How often do they become the builders of new polities, or are they generally the prime exponents of what one could call the “ crime-conflict nexus” instead?

However, the privatization of violence and the spread of criminalized conflicts is only part of the story, and the fourth section will consider the forces and actors facilitating this problem, from corruption at a local, national and international level to the arms dealers and other service industries of the global underworld. It is, after all, thanks to their entrepreneurial zeal that the gangsters, genocidaires and gunmen can be as effective as they so often are. Their efficiency, furthermore, ensures that they have uses to others, and so as well as the facilitators, it is vital to consider their clients, too. Nonetheless, there is always hope, and the final part of this series will instead look at solutions, from transnational programs to grassroots initiatives.

The first part, Introduction: A World of Thieves and Warriors, explores how “War and crime have forever been partners. In the modern world of often-fragile states, growing resource pressure and burgeoning transnational criminal economies, the relationship is stronger than ever” and asks “What is the difference between war and crime, between theft and looting, between corruption by an official and extortion by a gangster?”

The second, Nationalizing Villainy: Kleptocracies and State Crime, explores “what can happen if states succumb to kleptocracy and corruption, and especially how these problems induce and perpetuate war.”

Then The Crime-Conflict Nexus: Warlords and Pseudo-States starts with the view that “When a state is unable to maintain its monopoly on violence, power-vacuums inevitably arise” and considers “how organized criminals and warlords fill these vacuums in failed, weak and even pseudo-states.”

Fourth, Clients And Enablers explores the forces and actors facilitating this problem, from corruption to the arms dealers and other service industries of the global underworld,

Finally, in What Is To Be Done?, I look at possible  solutions. In particular, I note that “hope is increasingly coming not from grand transnational programs—which are often admirable, but historically often suffer from the problems of seeking consensus and settling for the lowest common denominator—but instead grassroots initiatives rooted in civil society.”

Why I don’t see any Russian plot behind the Boston bombings

I’ve been struck in the past 48 hours how many journalists’ queries I’ve fielded that seemed to take seriously the idea that the Russian state (or local agents in the North Caucasus) could somehow be responsible for the terrible Boston bombing. (I’m talking 6 serious journalists: not the kind of lunatics who, for example, claimed the real bombers were Navy SEALs.) The idea would seem to be that by encouraging, facilitating or downright arranging the attack, they demonize the Chechens, legitimize their brutal security campaign in the North Caucasus, and create a new, more favorable environment for dealing with the USA, in one fell swoop. A cute idea, worthy fodder for some lurid airport thriller, but in my opinion very, very hard to believe.

I can understand why the Tsarnaevs’ family and friends might want to believe that Tamerlan and Dzhokar were framed or set up. It’s the same impulse that leads to the disbelieving and perplexed statements that “he was a lovely man” or “he kept himself to himself” every time some serial killer or child abuser is arrested. Evil thoughts and plans, alas, do not always or even usually manifest themselves through sinister manner and demented cackles.

However, if we look at these particular suggestions (some of which also come from Russians), they seem to rest of a few basic assertions:

  • The FSB had suspicions about Tamerlan Tsarnaev, so the fact that they let him into the country shows that they had some ulterior motive.
  • Putin was willing to blow up Russian apartment buildings in 1999 for political purpose, so he’d have no more compunction seeing terror in Boston.
  • The Russians want to make the world stop hassling them about their tactics in the North Caucasus: this gives them a perfect way of demonstrating that they are simply fighting evil jihadists.
  • In the most ridiculously extreme cases, it’s asserted that the Kremlin just hates the USA anyway, and likes seeing mayhem there.

Of course Moscow will seek to make political capital out of this event; that’s what countries do (I remember when offers of assistance to the USSR after Chernobyl were also accompanied by patronizing suggestions about how this wouldn’t have happened if the Soviets were less Soviet and more Western). That certainly doesn’t mean that “hardliners in Russia might want another Cold War with America, and they may even secretly rejoice at the idea of mayhem in the West.” The pragmatic art of diplomacy is often about making the best from whatever fate presents.

The Kremlin has not shown itself averse to the use of violence in domestic and international politics (I’m inclined to accept the 1999 apartment bombings were state terrorism), but this is a world apart from actually trying to instigate an attack on US soil. The risks so outweigh the potential advantages that I don’t think it would even have been seriously considered. There is one basic rule of covert operations: at some point, they become covert no longer. If Tamerlan had been an active, aware agent, what would have happened if he had been captured? Even assuming that he was instead a dupe, groomed for the purpose by Russian undercover agents posing as jihadists, what happens when the US authorities–who, we can safely assume, are turning the full weight of their massive intelligence capacity onto this case–get a sniff of this? Any political advantages are likely to be transient (think how quickly the post 9/11 amity evaporated); any political risks astronomical.

Besides which, the FSB flags up potential individuals of concern all the time. They don’t necessarily bar them from the country. One could just as easily (and foolishly) suggest that the FBI’s failure to pick up on the brothers’ jihadist sentiments in 2011, after the FSB had passed on a warning about them, showed that somehow the US authorities were involved. (And for the record, while the inevitable inquiry will say for sure, we need not assume the FBI “failed” here–Tamerlan may not have been fully radicalized by then, the FBI get many such warnings, and in any case they are often rightly skeptical of FSB tip-offs as the Russians often claim people are “terrorists” on the flimsiest grounds or just to smear political oppositionists.)

The world is usually a simpler place than people think, and covert actions less common and less attractive than the movies suggest. We’ll wait and see, but to me this is a case of an alienated young man looking for answers and sadly finding them in the ideology of global jihad, and apparently bringing his brother into the cause. In some ways this is harder to understand than deep plots and cunning stratagems, because it requires us to accept that the Western liberal democratic model does not satisfy everyone and that we cannot control the vagaries of lost souls…

(Oh, by the way: North Korea has denied being behind the bombing, too. So that’s alright, then.)

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