Is Russia Really The World’s Most Heavily Policed State? No.

I suppose counting these guys would lead to those elevated figures...

I suppose counting these guys would lead to those elevated figures…

There’s a common assumption that Russia is packed with police officers, most recently given form in a Most Heavily Policed: Countries that has Russia topping the table with 564.6 cops per 100,000 population, followed at some distance by Turkey with 474. Can it really be that Russia has so many more police per head of population than everyone else in the world, that it is so much cop-dense? And if so, why do they have to raid the training academies and Interior Troops just to police parades in Moscow, the city with the greatest concentration of them?

Well, first of all it is worth noting that the table, which is based on UNODC data, excludes such countries as Belarus, Azerbaijan, North Korea and Uzbekistan which might well be expected to topple Russia from its pinnacle. But it still dramatically overstates the size of Russia’s police force. This is a common and recurring theme; I wrote this over a year ago for my article ‘Purges, Power and Purpose: Medvedev’s 2011 police reforms‘ in the Journal of Power Institutions in Post-Soviet Societies:

On the surface, the police force was a bloated bureaucratic leviathan reminiscent of its Soviet and even tsarist predecessors. Its 1.4 million staff as of 2010 included many paper-pushers and official busybodies, and a cut seemed an obvious move, especially given that it would free up resources for qualitative improvements. However, the real problem is not over-staffing but inefficient use of resources. If anything, given the size of the country and the scale of the challenges, a case could be made for more officers, not fewer. On the face of it, the MVD’s 2010 establishment strength meant a relatively high ratio of one police officer for every 101 citizens (compared with the UK’s 1:254, for example), but this was deceptive. That 1.4 million included 180,000 Interior Troops, an unknown number of unfilled positions (the highest estimate would be around 40,000) and a larger proportion of office workers compared with active police officers (defined as those who carry a badge and can make an arrest). Again to draw the comparison with the UK, there over half the total strength of 240,000 in 2010 were genuine police. While it is hard to come up with precise figures, the Russian figure was probably closer to 40-45%. This would suggest that the “1.4 million cops” were actually only some 530,000. Still more than in smaller, more advanced states (the true police officer to citizen ratios in the UK and US are 1:429 and 1:380, respectively, compared with 1:267 for Russia) but not quite so ridiculously excessive as might have originally appeared. (For the references to sources, please see the original article)

The UNODC data on which Bloomberg draws likewise, although claiming to exclude support staff, seem to include in practice uniformed officers, and many of the jobs which in Western countries would be carried out by civilian and contract staff are instead handled by uniforms in Russia. That does not mean they are ‘police’ — they are neither trained nor equipped to go out on the beat. But they do artificially drive the total strength upwards. Likewise, the Interior Troops must be discounted–although they are sometimes used for policing public events and the like, they are no more ‘cops’ than the New York National Guardsmen on the concourse I see every time I take a train from NY Penn Station. They are not like the Italian Carabinieri and French CRS, who blend military, public order and police roles.

The MVD now has a strength of around a million, factoring in unfilled positions. This includes the now around 170,000 Interior Troops, leaving 830,000. Nonetheless, although it would be possible to make a back-of-the-envelope calculation about the number of real cops across Russia as a whole, perhaps a better exercise would be to compare the Moscow GUMVD (Main Directorate of the Ministry of Interior Affairs ), which is rather more extensive and close to establishment strength (94.1% staffed, according to Moscow police chief in his 2012 report to the Moscow City Duma) with the London Metropolitan Police Service.

As of the end of 2011, the Met had 48,661 staff, of whom 31,478 (65%) were sworn police officers, 3,831 (7.7%) police community support officers (uniformed but civilian officers used for patrol and neighborhood support roles) and 13,350 civilian staff. Let’s be generous and lump the PCSOs in with the real police; that means that the Met is 73% cop, 27% civilian staff, with 430 officers per 100k population (and incidentally the Bloomberg figures give the UK a figure of 262.1).

In comparison, the Moscow GUMVD has an establishment strength of about 80,000; let’s assume it’s now at 95% strength, so 76,000 in reality. The Russians don’t provide a neat break-down of police to staff, but considering that the Met is one of the more efficient and lean services around, I very, very much doubt the Russians can match it. So, arbitrarily, I’ll assume a 65% tooth-to-tail (cop-to-civilian) ratio, which would still make MGUMVD distinctly more efficient than most other Russian police commands. That would suggest some 49,000 police, responsible for a city with a notional population of 11.5 million, although in reality it might be as high as 17M. Still, sticking to the official census data, that suggests that Moscow, the most heavily policed city in Russia bar Grozny, has 426 officers per 100k population. That’s about where the Bloomberg table puts Algeria, below Kazakhstan.

These are rough, back-of-the-envelope figures but honestly, they feel right. Certainly the notion that Russia today is some police state knee-deep in cops just doesn’t hold true, especially once one looks beyond Moscow and St Petersburg. Russia’s irony has often been, after all, that for its size, heterogeneity and challenges, it has often been under-policed, not least as the more numerous and powerful political police–which meant the Okhrana and Gendarmerie of tsarism as much as the Cheka, NKVD and KGB of Soviet times–would often annex police resources to their own ends.

Is Navalny a Revolutionary? If So, Which One?

Navalny-cartoonReplaced with an updated version here.

“On writing Elite 197: Russian Security and Paramilitary Forces since 1991”

ELI197-smallcoverJust a brief cross-post: I wrote a short blog for the Osprey Books website on some of the experiences of writing my new book Russian Security and Paramilitary Forces since 1991, which you can read here. I also had a Q&A with Andrew Bowen of The Interpreter on some of the issues raised in the book, ‘An Expert’s Guide to Russia’s Security Apparatus: from riot police to secret intelligence units’, which you can find here. (There are also some earlier observations here).

On a tangent: ‘The Future of Drones’

dnews-files-2013-01-schools-sleeper-drones-cormorant-uav-660Not least as an inveterate science-fiction reader, I was very pleased to be the lead analyst for a recent Wikistrat exercise exploring The Future of Drones, both in terms of how they will be used–everything from allowing humanitarian organizations to work in unsafe zones to fighting low-intensity naval wars–but also, and of even greater interest, how they will affect human society. Consolidating the various input from some 90 analysts, I posited four potential narratives, from the upbeat notion that they would simply allow us to do more of what we currently do, better and more cheaply, through increasingly darker and disruptive scenarios. The Executive Summary is available here (the full report is, I believe, available from Wikistrat to paying customers).

Are the Russians brilliant diplomats, or are the Americans desperate?

Advantage Putin

Advantage Putin

I confess I have been amazed and impressed with the chutzpah behind Russia’s most recent proposal for a US military strike to be forestalled by Syria’s agreement to place its chemical weapons stockpile under international control. And likewise struck by the rather pathetic enthusiasm with which the US government–which until very recently was charging towards some kind of military action and grumbling about the Russians being the pals and protectors of mass murderers–has hailed this as a potential “breakthrough“. (It should be a warning sign when Damascus says that “We fully support Russia’s initiative”.)

Let’s think this through. Accept that Assad either ordered the use of gas or at the very least retrospectively sanctioned it (in case, for example, it was an initiative of his brother Maher, who apparently makes Bashar look like a cuddle-bunny). So Washington says that whereas the 200,000-or-so previous deaths from this civil war were reprehensible, the 400, thousand, however many may have been killed by gas are inexcusable. OK; it may not make sense but the rules of the international system are that gas is Very Bad and so those who use it must be punished. Then, having cranked up the engine of war, readied the cruise missiles that can deliver a relatively safe and relatively accurate strike (admittedly for about $1.4M a pop), the White House suffers an acute crisis of confidence. The Russians have dug in their heels, the Brits, previously always willing to lay blood and treasure on the altar of the “special relationship”, decide that this night they are washing their hair. The Republicans have become born-again peaceniks and don’t propose to give Obama an easy war.

Suddenly, the USA is willing to accept that surrendering the capacity to launch another gas strike is a suitable punishment. In real terms, Damascus loses nothing: no capabilities that it could credibly use again (without making a US strike unavoidable).

That’s a little like my being shot and wounded and saying that it would be quite enough if my would-be assassin loses his gun.

I’ve been deeply skeptical about the value of US military action in Syria, not because I don’t want to see an evil regime swept away (I do), but because I don’t think that an arm’s length military intervention–the only sort this administration appears presently willing to stomach–would do anything but harm in the long run, precipitating a slide into regional anarchy. Cruise missiles blow things up; they do not build functioning, stable states. If Bashar al-Assad “must go” as US figures from Obama down have asserted, then bite the bullet; those cruise missiles can also do a good job of assassination, if need be. If creating a stable and peaceful Syria is that important, then the USA or the international community needs to accept another long and–witness Iraq, Afghanistan, etc–in the short- and medium-term miserable job of “boots on the ground” and “body bags coming home” nation-building.

So on the one hand I suppose I am pleased by this eleventh-hour flip-floppery. But it is the nature of the compromise and the optics that alarm and depress me. I’m honestly not sure how far this is the product of brilliant brinksmanship by Putin and his foreign minister, Lavrov (and in fairness, they have proven a distinctly effective combination, playing an equally distinctive and effective game of creative obstruction), and how far it is a critical weakness in the White House, but it very definitely leaves Putin looking like the victor. A US president unwilling to take a lead and commit himself to what would undoubtedly be a controversial military strike has now been rescued by the very Russian counterpart whom he snubbed on his G20 visit.

Putin will no doubt consider this a victory, and be buoyed by it, rendered more confident. And Putin is not a man to let momentum and an advantage go to waste.

Policing Politics in Ekaterinburg: local elites turn to cops for “stop Roizman” campaign

SOBR: Special Rapid Response Detachment. The latest thing in political technology

SOBR: Special Rapid Response Detachment. The latest thing in political technology

It seems churlish to be cynical about Russian police operations against organized crime, but my curiosity has been piqued by news of a recent operation against purported gangsters in Ekaterinburg, that pearl of Siberia (given that pearls are really spheres of dried gunk formed by irritation and aggravation..). The news was that on 1 September, the full might and majesty of the law–the local organized crime department, backed by a SOBR SWAT team–descended on a cafe to disrupt a skhodka, a sit-down, attended by fully 48 luminaries of the local underworld, there to discuss “a new division of the criminal market.” They included residents of Ekaterinburg, Ufa, Chelyabinsk and Norilsk,although most were ethnic Azeris. Furthermore, the majoroty were apparently members of the gang led by Temuri Mirzoev, also known as “Timur Sverdlovskii”, a nephew of the infamous (and deceased) Aslan Usoyan (“Ded Khasan”) and a member of his network, now led by his cousin Dmitry Chanturia. (Mirzoev, incidentally, was one of the Khasan-connected criminal kingpins specifically targeted by the US Treasury in 2012.)

So far, so straightforward–although an operation so directly targeting the Network-Formerly-Known-As-Khasan’s (seriously, no one is calling it Chanturia’s) suggests some interesting dynamics within the underworld-upperworld power relationship.

However, what gives this an added dimension is that in Ekaterinburg there is taking place that other election, the one that says something interesting but that does not involve Navalny, in which wildcard Evgeny Roizman–anti-drug campaigner, neighborhood paterfamilias, ex-jailbird, art historian, former Duma deputy, community arbiter and alleged one-and-maybe-present gangster–is standing against United Russia’s placeman. Perhaps because the rambunctious Roizman doesn’t have Navalny’s finely-calibrated soundbite skills, perhaps because Ekaterinburg is far from the Moscow press corps, it seems that the authorities are willing to be a little more rough-knuckled in their campaign against him. (more…)

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