November/December 2016 Publications Round-Up

I am remiss in getting to this (far too much that is more interesting has been going on), but all the same, here is a sampling of some of my publications from the end of 2016. As ever, to know what I’m writing, follow me on twitter (@MarkGaleotti) and/or the Mark Galeotti on Russia FaceBook page.

Watch Out Vladimir: There’s a New Putin in Town,’ Foreign Policy, 13 November

The ‘Ulyukaev Affair’ and Russia’s hybrid market‘, IntelliNews Business New Europe, 16 November

The World After Trump: Russia-Friendly, But for How Long?,’ Moscow Times, 17 November

“RepressIntern”: Russia’s security cooperation with fellow authoritarians‘, chapter for FPC book No shelter: the harassment of activists abroad by intelligence services from the former Soviet Union, reprinted here by od:Russia, 22 November

RUSSIA’S HYBRID WAR AS A BYPRODUCT OF A HYBRID STATE,’ War on the Rocks, 6 December

Putin Is Waging Information Warfare. Here’s How to Fight Back,’ New York Times, 14 December

Heavy Metal Diplomacy: Russia’s Political Use of its Military in Europe since 2014‘ – report for the ECFR, 19 December

Hacking Western democracy,’ Raam op Rusland, 19 December

«Pour faire face à Moscou, l’unité européenne est maintenant un enjeu de sécurité», Le Monde, 23 December

I’s also mention that my book Hybrid War or Gibridnaya Voina? Getting Russia’s non-linear military challenge right, is not only available as hard copy or PDF from Lulu, but is also now as hard copy from Amazon.

Sanctioning the GRU, a decent step, but hamstrung by the need for symmetry

GRU logoThe “Lame Duck” president has proven to have a surprisingly sharp and accurate peck, and as the USA strikes back against the Russian hacking and its role in the US elections with a welcome series of sanctions. Two point are worth bringing up: the way the issue instantly and depressingly becomes a partisan one. It also suggests that the incoming administration is woefully ill-informed about the Russian intelligence community, or willing to leap through rhetorical hoops to protect it; and the needless and limiting philosophy behind the sanctions.

The Sanctions and the GRU (more…)

One-and-a-Half Cheers for new Czech centre to resist Political Warfare

mvcrOn 1 January, the Czech Centre Against Terrorism and Hybrid Threats (CPTHH) is formally opened, within the Ministry of the Interior (MVČR). With a 20-strong staff, its main focus will be to tackle disinformation and political manipulation through the media–and yes, essentially this means Russia’s current ‘political war’ on the West–and to respond openly. My snap verdict is that this is a worthy start, but the Czechs, like other European countries, need also to move beyond this fashionable but essentially reactive approach and think more strategically and perhaps also robustly about fighting this political war.

(more…)

Ambassador Karlov’s security and the Zaslon red herring

Moscow is currently grumbling that their ambassador was put at risk because for ten years the Turks have not allowed them to send members of the Zaslon special operations group to Ankara to provide security. This is such a red herring.

Zaslon is part of the SVR – the Foreign Intelligence Service – and while it sometimes provides some diplomatic security in very extreme cases (as in Damascus, for example), it is essentially an intelligence/sabotage/assassination force. No wonder Ankara didn’t want them there, and in any case it would have been a colossal waste, akin to using the SAS or CIA Special Ops Group as permanent bodyguards. Most security for diplomats in anything short of a war zone (and an art gallery in Ankara is hardly that) is provided by locally-engaged private security guards.

If the Russians really want to ask what went wrong, they should start with explaining why, if for a decade they have thought Turkey such a dangerous posting it needed Spetsnaz protection, they did not hire any security themselves, like their US and indeed UK counterparts? Or maybe they should be chatting with their good friend Erdogan why on-duty Turkish police were not on hand to deal with their wayward off-duty comrade-turned-killer?

New ECFR report: Heavy Metal Diplomacy: Russia’s Political Use of its Military in Europe since 2014

heavy_metalMy latest report for the ECFR was published this week, Heavy Metal Diplomacy: Russia’s Political Use of its Military in Europe since 2014. It addresses Russia’s blunt and threatening use of its military as an adjunct to its more conventional diplomacy in Europe in pursuit of the “4Ds” — to divide, distract, dismay and dominate — within the context of its wider political war. Here is the summary:

Since 2014, Russia has mounted an extensive, aggressive, and multi-platform attempt to use its military and the threat of force as instruments of coercive diplomacy, intended to divide, distract, and deter Europe from challenging Russia’s activities in its immediate neighbourhood.

The main elements are threats of potential military action, wargames which pointedly simulate such operations, the deployment of combat units in ways which also convey a political message, and intrusions close to and into European airspace, waters and even territory.

The actual impact of these policies is varied, sometimes counter-productive, and they depend on coordination with other means of diplomacy and influence. But they have nonetheless contributed to a fragmentation of unity within both NATO and the European Union.

‘Heavy metal diplomacy’ is likely to continue for the immediate future. This requires a sharper sense on the part of the EU and its member states of what is a truly military move and what is political, a refusal to rise to the bait, and yet a display of convincing unity and cross-platform capacity when a response is required.

heavy-metal-diplomacy-map-final

Russian banks warned of risk of cyberattack: a crime or security concern?

russianhackerRussian banks are being warned by the FSB to prepare for possible cyberattacks. That may seem to be a given in these days of virtual criminality, and follows a recent theft of 2 billion rubles ($31.3 million) from correspondent bank accounts at Russia’s Central Bank, but actually Russian financial institutions have until now had it pretty easy. That’s not least because part of the unwritten deal between the state and the hacking community (along with the need to pitch in when ‘patriots’ are expected to attack some foreign target) is that they are fine so long as they don’t commit their crimes against domestic institutions.
 
However, I wonder if there is also a security dimension here. Just as the Central Bank was involved in recent mobilisation exercises, predicated (rightly) on the fact that any major conflict with the West would also be fought with economic instruments, I wonder how far Moscow is coming to terms with the fact that the one-way ‘political war‘ currently being waged against the West might become a two-way one, at least to a limited extent. Those who live by the hack risk dying by it, too.
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