The ‘Gerasimov Doctrine’ and Russian Non-Linear War

A BELATED BUT HEART-FELT PS: When using the term ‘Gerasimov Doctrine,’ I was just going for a snappy title. I really didn’t expect (or want) it to become a more generally used term. Why? (a) Gerasimov didn’t invent this; if any CoGS deserves the ‘credit’ it would be his predecessor Makarov, but even so it is really an evolutionary, not revolutionary process; and (b) it’s not a doctrine, which is in the Russian lexicon a truly foundational set of beliefs as to what kinds of war the country will be fighting in the future and how it will win them — this is more an observation about a particular aspect of particular kinds of wars in the 21stC, there is certainly no expectation that this is the Russian way of war. So stop it, please!

But what happens when the bear looks like a stray dog, or a cute little kitten?

But what happens when the bear looks like a stray dog, or a cute little kitten?

Call it non-linear war (which I prefer), or hybrid war, or special war, Russia’s operations first in Crimea and then eastern Ukraine have demonstrated that Moscow is increasingly focusing on new forms of politically-focused operations in the future. In many ways this is an extension of what elsewhere I’ve called Russia’s ‘guerrilla geopolitics,’ an appreciation of the fact that in a world shaped by an international order the Kremlin finds increasingly irksome and facing powers and alliances with greater raw military, political and economic power, new tactics are needed which focus on the enemy’s weaknesses and avoid direct and overt confrontations. To be blunt, these are tactics that NATO–still, in the final analysis, an alliance designed to deter and resist a mass, tank-led Soviet invasion–finds hard to know how to handle. (Indeed, a case could be made that it is not NATO’s job, but that’s something to consider elsewhere.)

Hindsight, as ever a sneakily snarky knowitall, eagerly points out that we could have expected this in light of an at-the-time unremarked article by Russian Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov. In fairness, it was in Voenno-promyshlennyi kur’er, the Military-Industrial Courier, which is few people’s fun read of choice. Nonetheless, it represents the best and most authoritative statement yet of what we could, at least as a placeholder, call the ‘Gerasimov Doctrine’ (not that it necessarily was his confection, and it certainly isn’t a doctrine), although it is crucially about catching up with and defeating what he regards as a Western innovation. I and everyone interested in these developments are indebted to Rob Coalson of RFE/RL, who noted and circulated this article, and the following translation is his (thanks to Rob for his permission to use it), with my various comments and interpolations.

Military-Industrial Kurier, February 27, 2013

(My comments are indented and italicised and in red, and the bold emphases are also mine)


General Valery Gerasimov, Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Federation

In the 21st century we have seen a tendency toward blurring the lines between the states of war and peace. Wars are no longer declared and, having begun, proceed according to an unfamiliar template.

The experience of military conflicts — including those connected with the so-called coloured revolutions in north Africa and the Middle East — confirm that a perfectly thriving state can, in a matter of months and even days, be transformed into an arena of fierce armed conflict, become a victim of foreign intervention, and sink into a web of chaos, humanitarian catastrophe, and civil war.

There is an old Soviet-era rhetorical device that a ‘warning’ or a ‘lesson’ from some other situation is used to outline intent and plan. The way that what purports to be an after-action take on the Arab Spring so closely maps across to what was done in Ukraine is striking. Presenting the Arab Spring–wrongly–as the results of covert Western operations allows Gerasimov the freedom to talk about what he may also want to talk about: how Russia can subvert and destroy states without direct, overt and large-scale military intervention. However, the assumption that this is a Western gambit first and foremost does appear genuinely-held.

The Lessons of the ‘Arab Spring’

Of course, it would be easiest of all to say that the events of the “Arab Spring” are not war and so there are no lessons for us — military men — to learn. But maybe the opposite is true — that precisely these events are typical of warfare in the 21st century.

In terms of the scale of the casualties and destruction, the catastrophic social, economic, and political consequences, such new-type conflicts are comparable with the consequences of any real war.

The very “rules of war” have changed. The role of nonmilitary means of achieving political and strategic goals has grown, and, in many cases, they have exceeded the power of force of weapons in their effectiveness.

For me, this is probably the most important line in the whole piece, so allow me to repeat it: The role of nonmilitary means of achieving political and strategic goals has grown, and, in many cases, they have exceeded the power of force of weapons in their effectiveness. In other words, this is an explicit recognition not only that all conflicts are actually means to political ends–the actual forces used are irrelevant–but that in the modern realities, Russia must look to non-military instruments increasingly.

The focus of applied methods of conflict has altered in the direction of the broad use of political, economic, informational, humanitarian, and other nonmilitary measures — applied in coordination with the protest potential of the population.

All this is supplemented by military means of a concealed character, including carrying out actions of informational conflict and the actions of special-operations forces. The open use of forces — often under the guise of peacekeeping and crisis regulation — is resorted to only at a certain stage, primarily for the achievement of final success in the conflict.

This is, after all, exactly what happened in Crimea, when the insignia-less “little green men” were duly unmasked as–surprise, surprise–Russian special forces and Naval Infantry only once the annexation was actually done.

From this proceed logical questions: What is modern war? What should the army be prepared for? How should it be armed? Only after answering these questions can we determine the directions of the construction and development of the armed forces over the long term. To do this, it is essential to have a clear understanding of the forms and methods of the use of the application of force.

What Gerasimov is signalling here, and it may prove an important point, is that the Russian military needs to be tooled appropriately. This may mean a re-opening of the traditional hostilities with the politically more powerful defence industries (that want to pump out more tanks and the other things they produce) over quite what kind of kit the military gets. When former defence minister Serdyukov announced a moratorium on buying new tanks, Putin slapped him down and restated the order. Shoigu and Gerasimov will have to be more savvy if they want to make progress on this one. But it is also a call for continued high defence spending: his answer to fighting Western hybrid war is with massive and accurate conventional firepower.

These days, together with traditional devices, nonstandard ones are being developed. The role of mobile, mixed-type groups of forces, acting in a single intelligence-information space because of the use of the new possibilities of command-and-control systems has been strengthened. Military actions are becoming more dynamic, active, and fruitful. Tactical and operational pauses that the enemy could exploit are disappearing. New information technologies have enabled significant reductions in the spatial, temporal, and informational gaps between forces and control organs. Frontal engagements of large formations of forces at the strategic and operational level are gradually becoming a thing of the past. Long-distance, contactless actions against the enemy are becoming the main means of achieving combat and operational goals. The defeat of the enemy’s objects is conducted throughout the entire depth of his territory. The differences between strategic, operational, and tactical levels, as well as between offensive and defensive operations, are being erased. The application of high-precision weaponry is taking on a mass character. Weapons based on new physical principals and automatized systems are being actively incorporated into military activity.

All worthy enough, but in fairness nothing we haven’t heard before.

Asymmetrical actions have come into widespread use, enabling the nullification of an enemy’s advantages in armed conflict. Among such actions are the use of special-operations forces and internal opposition to create a permanently operating front through the entire territory of the enemy state, as well as informational actions, devices, and means that are constantly being perfected.

This, on the other hand, does show something of a different nuance, with the renewed emphasis on “internal opposition”, something which harkens back to Soviet-era playbooks rather than post-Soviet military doctrine, which was largely cleared of such language except in some specific contexts such as counter-insurgency. [Added later: although I think the impulse was mainly for domestic political reasons, this kind of thinking may also have contributed to the decision to establish the National Guard, as a larger and more coordinate force against attempts to create any kind of “domestic front” inside Russia.]

These ongoing changes are reflected in the doctrinal views of the world’s leading states and are being used in military conflicts.

Already in 1991, during Operation Desert Storm in Iraq, the U.S. military realized the concept of “global sweep, global power” and “air-ground operations.” In 2003 during Operation Iraqi Freedom, military operations were conducted in accordance with the so-called Single Perspective 2020.

Now, the concepts of “global strike” and “global missile defense” have been worked out, which foresee the defeat of enemy objects and forces in a matter of hours from almost any point on the globe, while at the same time ensuring the prevention of unacceptable harm from an enemy counterstrike. The United States is also enacting the principles of the doctrine of global integration of operations aimed at creating in a very short time highly mobile, mixed-type groups of forces.

In recent conflicts, new means of conducting military operations have appeared that cannot be considered purely military. An example of this is the operation in Libya, where a no-fly zone was created, a sea blockade imposed, private military contractors were widely used in close interaction with armed formations of the opposition.

Yes, these were all used in Libya, but whether they were that new is open to question. The key point for Gerasimov, I believe, is that actions such as the no-fly zone that were presented as (and have traditionally been) the preserve of humanitarian interventions were really used to favour one side in the conflict, the rebels. Combined with the use of mercenaries to support them, this makes Libya a convenient synecdoche for the kinds of operations the Russians are really contemplating, whether their own or the West’s, in which the mask of humanitarian intervention and peacekeeping can shield aggressive actions.

We must acknowledge that, while we understand the essence of traditional military actions carried out by regular armed forces, we have only a superficial understanding of asymmetrical forms and means. In this connection, the importance of military science — which must create a comprehensive theory of such actions — is growing. The work and research of the Academy of Military Science can help with this.

The Tasks of Military Science

In the main, I will comment less on this section, because often it really doesn’t connect so clearly with the first half. However, taken together it is worth noting that it presents a pretty scathing picture of modern Russian military thinking. I can’t help but wonder whether Colonel General Sergei Makarov, head of the General Staff Academy since only last year, must be feeling a little anxious about his prospects.

In a discussion of the forms and means of military conflict, we must not forget about our own experience. I mean the use of partisan units during the Great Patriotic War and the fight against irregular formations in Afghanistan and the North Caucasus.

These are interesting examples, not least because they omit other, equally or even more appropriate examples, such as the Soviet experiences fighting the basmachi rebels in 1920s Central Asia and supporting anti-colonial insurgencies in Africa, Asia and Latin America during the Cold War. In the latter, for instance, the Soviets tended to use military assistance, handfuls of specialists and trainers, third-party agents and extensive propaganda, influence and subversion operations to achieve political goals, ideally with as little direct conflict as possible and without letting Moscow’s hand be too obvious. Sound familiar?

I would emphasize that during the Afghanistan War specific forms and means of conducting military operations were worked out. At their heart lay speed, quick movements, the smart use of tactical paratroops and encircling forces which all together enable the interruption of the enemy’s plans and brought him significant losses.

Another factor influencing the essence of modern means of armed conflict is the use of modern automated complexes of military equipment and research in the area of artificial intelligence. While today we have flying drones, tomorrow’s battlefields will be filled with walking, crawling, jumping, and flying robots. In the near future it is possible a fully robotized unit will be created, capable of independently conducting military operations.

How shall we fight under such conditions? What forms and means should be used against a robotized enemy? What sort of robots do we need and how can they be developed? Already today our military minds must be thinking about these questions.

The most important set of problems, requiring intense attention, is connected with perfecting the forms and means of applying groups of forces. It is necessary to rethink the content of the strategic activities of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. Already now questions are arising: Is such a number of strategic operations necessary? Which ones and how many of them will we need in the future? So far, there are no answers.

There are also other problems that we are encountering in our daily activities.

We are currently in the final phase of the formation of a system of air-space defense (VKO). Because of this, the question of the development of forms and means of action using VKO forces and tools has become actual. The General Staff is already working on this. I propose that the Academy of Military Science also take active part.

The information space opens wide asymmetrical possibilities for reducing the fighting potential of the enemy. In north Africa, we witnessed the use of technologies for influencing state structures and the population with the help of information networks. It is necessary to perfect activities in the information space, including the defense of our own objects.

The operation to force Georgia to peace exposed the absence of unified approaches to the use of formations of the Armed Forces outside of the Russian Federation. The September 2012 attack on the U.S. consulate in the Libyan city of Benghazi , the activization of piracy activities, the recent hostage taking in Algeria all confirm the importance of creating a system of armed defense of the interests of the state outside the borders of its territory.

Although the additions to the federal law “On Defense” adopted in 2009 allow the operational use of the Armed Forces of Russia outside of its borders, the forms and means of their activity are not defined. In addition, matters of facilitating their operational use have not been settled on the interministerial level. This includes simplifying the procedure for crossing state borders, the use of the airspace and territorial waters of foreign states, the procedures for interacting with the authorities of the state of destination, and so on.

It is necessary to convene the joint work of the research organizations of the pertinent ministries and agencies on such matters.

One of the forms of the use of military force outside the country is peacekeeping. In addition to traditional tasks, their activity could include more specific tasks such as specialized, humanitarian, rescue, evacuation, sanitation, and other tasks. At present, their classification, essence, and content have not been defined.

Moreover, the complex and multifarious tasks of peacekeeping which, possibly, regular troops will have to carry out, presume the creation of a fundamentally new system for preparing them. After all, the task of a peacekeeping force is to disengage conflicting sides, protect and save the civilian population, cooperate in reducing potential violence and reestablish peaceful life. All this demands academic preparation.

Controlling Territory

It is becoming increasingly important in modern conflicts to be capable of defending one’s population, objects, and communications from the activity of special-operations forces, in view of their increasing use. Resolving this problem envisions the organization and introduction of territorial defense.

Before 2008, when the army at war time numbered more than 4.5 million men, these tasks were handled exclusively by the armed forces. But conditions have changed. Now, countering diversionary-reconnaissance and terroristic forces can only be organized by the complex involvement of all the security and law-enforcement forces of the country.

The General Staff has begun this work. It is based on defining the approaches to the organization of territorial defense that were reflected in the changes to the federal law “On Defense.” Since the adoption of that law, it is necessary to define the system of managing territorial defense and to legally enforce the role and location in it of other forces, military formations, and the organs of other state structures.

We need well-grounded recommendations on the use of interagency forces and means for the fulfillment of territorial defense, methods for combatting the terrorist and diversionary forces of the enemy under modern conditions.

Again, here defence also offence, as the two are sides of the same coin. I don’t dispute there is a genuine need for this kind of coordination, and it may reflect the confidence of a recently re-empowered General Staff in trying to reassert some kind of supreme authority over national defence after years in which the security agencies have been dominant. But primarily I read into this a recognition of the importance for the close coordination of military, intelligence and information operations in this new way of war. If we take Ukraine as the example, the GRU (military intelligence) took point over Crimea, supported by regular military units. In eastern Ukraine, the Federal Security Service (FSB), which had thoroughly penetrated the Ukrainian security apparatus, has encouraged defections and monitored Kyiv’s plans, the Interior Ministry (MVD) has used its contacts with its Ukrainian counterparts to identify potential agents and sources, the military has been used to rattle sabres loudly on the border–and may be used more aggressively yet–while the GRU not only handled the flow of volunteers and materiel into the east but probably marshalled the Vostok Battalion, arguably the toughest unit in the Donbas. Meanwhile, Russian media and diplomatic sources have kept up an incessant campaign to characterise the ‘Banderite’ government in Kyiv as illegitimate and brutal, while even cyberspace is not immune, as ‘patriotic hackers’ attack Ukrainian banks and government websites. The essence of this non-linear war is, as Gerasimov says, that the war is everywhere.

The experience of conducting military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq has shown the necessity of working out — together with the research bodies of other ministries and agencies of the Russian Federation — the role and extent of participation of the armed forces in postconflict regulation, working out the priority of tasks, the methods for activation of forces, and establishing the limits of the use of armed force.


You Can’t Generate Ideas On Command

The state of Russian military science today cannot be compared with the flowering of military-theoretical thought in our country on the eve of World War II.

Of course, there are objective and subjective reasons for this and it is not possible to blame anyone in particular for it. I am not the one who said it is not possible to generate ideas on command.

I agree with that, but I also must acknowledge something else: at that time, there were no people with higher degrees and there were no academic schools or departments. There were extraordinary personalities with brilliant ideas. I would call them fanatics in the best sense of the word. Maybe we just don’t have enough people like that today.

Ouch. Who is he slapping here?

People like, for instance, Georgy Isserson, who, despite the views he formed in the prewar years, published the book “New Forms Of Combat.” In it, this Soviet military theoretician predicted: “War in general is not declared. It simply begins with already developed military forces. Mobilization and concentration is not part of the period after the onset of the state of war as was the case in 1914 but rather, unnoticed, proceeds long before that.” The fate of this “prophet of the Fatherland” unfolded tragically. Our country paid in great quantities of blood for not listening to the conclusions of this professor of the General Staff Academy.

What can we conclude from this? A scornful attitude toward new ideas, to nonstandard approaches, to other points of view is unacceptable in military science. And it is even more unacceptable for practitioners to have this attitude toward science.

In conclusion, I would like to say that no matter what forces the enemy has, no matter how well-developed his forces and means of armed conflict may be, forms and methods for overcoming them can be found. He will always have vulnerabilities and that means that adequate means of opposing him exist.

This is an obvious, if necessarily veiled allusion to Russia’s relative weakness compared with the West today and, probably, China tomorrow. The answer is not to not have conflicts, but rather to ensure they are fought in the ways that best suit your needs.

We must not copy foreign experience and chase after leading countries, but we must outstrip them and occupy leading positions ourselves. This is where military science takes on a crucial role.

The outstanding Soviet military scholar Aleksandr Svechin wrote: “It is extraordinarily hard to predict the conditions of war. For each war it is necessary to work out a particular line for its strategic conduct. Each war is a unique case, demanding the establishment of a particular logic and not the application of some template.”

This approach continues to be correct. Each war does present itself as a unique case, demanding the comprehension of its particular logic, its uniqueness. That is why the character of a war that Russia or its allies might be drawn into is very hard to predict. Nonetheless, we must. Any academic pronouncements in military science are worthless if military theory is not backed by the function of prediction.


Leave a comment


  1. Col. C. Anthony Pfaff writing on Tom Ricks blog calls our attention to the work of two Chinese colonels, Qiao Liang and Wang Xiansui. Their book, Unrestricted Warfare, argued a that there were now a variety of forms of warfare : ” diplomatic, financial, network, trade, bio-chemical, intelligence, resources, ecological, psychological, economic aid, space, tactical, regulatory, electronic, smuggling, sanction, guerrilla, drug, news media, terrorist, virtual, ideological warfare, and many more.” Indeed any cursory review of American foreign policy would recognize many of these methods as tried and true. The key distinction is that in the U.S these are refered to as either “coercive diplomacy or intelligence/covert operations rather than warfare.

  2. As always, there is so much for so many people in this latest Mark Galeotti blog. Given the heavy influence of military thinking on law enforcement agencies in ex Soviet states, I hope the article and the comments and Mark’s additional comments are studied by western law enforcers who will work with their counterparts in ex Soviet states and especially with Russians themselves. They will have to consider possible political and strategic links with ” ordinary ” organised crimes and criminals. For liberal democratic institutions operating under the rule of law, that requires great care.

  3. Gudrun Persson

     /  July 6, 2014

    Dear Professor Mark Galeotti,

    Thank you for your insightful posting (as always).
    You also might want to look at my chapter here, published in December 2013: ‘Security Policy and Military Strategic Thinking’ in Jakob Hedenskog & Carolina Vendil Pallin (ed.) Russian Military Capability in a Ten-Year Perspective – 2013. Stockholm: FOI, 71-88.

    I developed it further in the recent ‘Setting the scene – the View from Russia’ (co-authored with Carolina Vendil Pallin) in Granholm, Niklas, et. al. A Rude Awakening, Stockholm: FOI: 25-34. There you will also find a figure that Gerasimov used to illustrate his article.

    Keep up the good work.

    Best wishes,
    Gudrun Persson

    Gudrun Persson
    Deputy Head of Research, Associate Professor
    Dept. for Security Policy and Strategic Studies
    Div. for Defence Analysis
    Swedish Defence Research Agency, FOI
    SE-164 90 Stockholm, Sweden

    Tel. +46 8 55 50 38 83
    Mobile. +46-73-444 77 26

  4. I came across Dugin’s characterization(?) of Strelkov: “What is most paradoxical is that no one [controls him]. No one stands [behind him]. No one gives [him] orders. There is no one else. His superiors are of a different kind. He considers himself conscripted, mobilized by a substance the existence of which is almost universally doubted. Strelkov was called to arms by the Russian Mir [the Russian World], the Russian People, the Russian civilization.” @

    What I have read regarding the use of asymmetrical force against Ukraine I keep going back to the military systemology that Capt [ret] Shevelev worked on in the early 1990’s as well as the research the late John Erickson worked on during the waning years of the Soviet Union.

    Oh well, am looking forward to the publication of your book on the Chechen war.


  5. Reblogged this on Andreas Umland.

  6. How about the idea that the Gerasimov Doctrine is in part a reaction to the ineffectiveness of Russian conventional military tactics?

    When I look at the activities of Russian troops [ahem: “Volunteers”] in the Donbas offensive, I am struck by how little they have evolved from those used by Zhukhov and others during WW2: massive, indiscriminate artillery and rocket bombardment, followed by massed tank attacks, accompanied by tank-riding infantry, to hold the ground acquired. Those tactics in turn copied verbatim from the ones used by General Henry Rawlinson’s Fourth Army in the Battle of Amiens on 08.08.1918 [the “Black Thursday” for the Kaiser’s Army], that led to the end of WW1.

    Even today, we hear the Russian Defence Ministry gloating over “good bombing weather” in Syria at this time of year. Implying that they do not have all-weather bombing capabilities. And we see Russian video footage in Syria of dumb bombs missing their intended targets by 100 metres or more.

    With a military of 4.5 million effectives incapable of better than this, the Gerasimov Doctrine is sorely needed

    • Mark Galeotti

       /  October 7, 2015

      Russian regulars ripped through their Ukrainian counterparts, and to be honest they are more interested in utility than functionality. I certainly wouldn’t want to underplay their capabilities — and they have 0.7 million not 4.5 million men under arms…

  7. Stephen Franke

     /  March 24, 2019

    Greetings to all in this thread.

    My thanks to Dr. Galeotti for his insightful, beneficial and interesting treatment of the “Gerasimov Doctrine that isn’t.”

    ** Invite and would appreciate, with all due credit provided as requested, private information / opinions / recollections / references which may be helpful to my current descriptive research in the “operational style” and effectiveness of (Cold War-era to the present) Soviet / Russian groups of military advisors, trainers and technicians, etc. resident and operating in various host countries in the Middle East, mostly recently those in Syria and Jordan, and earlier in Afghanistan (before and during the 1979 Soviet invasion and occupation).

    ** Parallel interest addresses how Russian military personnel serving in regular units were / are selected / invited / volunteer / involuntarily directed (or “voluntold” in U.S. Army “military-speak”) and then trained and otherwise prepared for such cross-cultural, and inherently-complex, duty with their foreign and non-Russian-speaking military counterparts.

    ** Have benefited from the few Russian-language memoirs and interviews of former members of the various respective “Group of Soviet Military Technical Specialists in (COUNTRY “X”)” earlier in Yemen, Iraq, Egypt, Sudan and Afghanistan. Also helpful have been comments by a few Russian nationals who performed their complusory military service in the Soviet Army as interpreters assigned to such overseas military advisory groups soon after their graduation from various universities with departments or institutes of foreign languages.

    ** Kindly send any response to my direct email address = < shfranke (at) hotmail (dot) com.

    Regards, Stephen H. Franke – San Pedro, California

  8. Reblogged this on Socrataristote's Blog and commented:
    A great summary of a very ongoing subject !

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  74. A Highly effective Russian Weapon: The Unfold of False Tales
  75. A Powerful Russian Weapon: The Spread of False Stories | Top Direct News
  76. A Powerful Russian Weapon: The Spread of False Stories | WikiNewspaper
  77. A Powerful Russian Weapon: The Spread of False Stories – New York Times | Europe News
  78. A Powerful Russian Weapon: The Spread of False Stories | News
  79. A powerful Russian weapon: The spread of false stories
  80. A Powerful Russian Weapon: The Spread of False Stories – New York Times – Sarkem Online
  81. HueWire is your site source for all things multi cultural
  82. Russia’s aggressive power is resurgent, online and off
  83. More old wine in a new bottle, this time it’s Russian vodka – Ted Campbell's Point of View
  84. A Powerful Russian Weapon: The Spread of False Stories | News For The Blind
  85. A Powerful Russian Weapon: The Spread of False Stories, says the New York Times | BlogFactory
  86. A Powerful Russian Weapon: The Spread of False Stories | INFONEWS
  87. What do Russian cyberattackers really want? – | 1913 Intel
  88. A Powerful Russian Weapon: The Spread of False Stories - LOOPTYLOP
  89. The Art of Maskirovka: Russian Intel linked to DNC & DCCC hacks | Emerging-Tech Blog
  90. Forget conspiracy theories. This is why Trump’s Russian connection is actually a problem. | NEWS
  91. Forget conspiracy theories. This is why Trump’s Russian connection is actually a problem. – The Fifth Column
  92. Fast Followers, Learning Machines, and the Third Offset Strategy
  93. America’s Post-Truth Reality: Hybrid Warfare Was the Real Winner in the Election | Ramen IR
  94. ‘A Powerful Russian Weapon: The Spread of False Stories’, by NEIL MacFARQUHAR, AUG. 28, 2016 – Media Center for Chechnia's Self-Determination Rights
  95. Falsuri la modă în lumea creştină (2): Rusia este bastionul creştinătăţii - În Linie Dreaptă
  96. Putin’s Real Long Game | Beatriz Simpkins
  97. Putin’s Real Long Game | Tom Williams
  98. Putin’s Real Long Game | Al Green
  99. Putin’s Real Long Game | BuzzJour
  100. Putin’s Real Long Game - USA News Today
  101. Suomi on kahden hybridisotijan ristitulessa – Eurooppalaisen identiteetin tarkastelua
  102. Defender Advantage. Hackers, Dragons and Bears ... Oh-Why!
  103. Russian military aircraft crash: who were its passengers? - (English)
  104. Ett störtat militärt passagerarflygplan och dess ombordvarande - InformNapalm på svenska
  105. The Moscow School of Hard Knocks: Key Pillars of Russian Strategy
  107. COMMENTARY: Means, goals and consequences of the pro-Kremlin disinformation campaign | EU vs Disinformation
  108. Kremlin disinformation campaign extremely successful — EU East Stratcom | Диванна Сотня
  109. Means, goals and consequences of the pro-Kremlin disinformation campaign – To Inform is to Influence
  110. Українські хакери і усвідомлення нової реальності ведення кібервійни країнами НАТО - (Українська)
  111. Українські хакери і усвідомлення нової реальності ведення кібервійни країнами НАТО - спостереження, новини, інтерв’ю, події
  112. Los piratas informáticos de Ucrania y la nueva realidad cibernética de los países de OTAN - (Español)
  113. Narrative, Cyberspace and the 21st Century Art of War | Fighting For Truth
  114. Украинските хакери и новата кибер реалност за страните от НАТО – (Български)
  115. Ukrajinští hackeři a nová kybernetická realita zemí NATO – (Čeština)
  116. For Those Scoffing at Russian Penetration into American Democracy |
  117. Trevor Loudon's New Zeal Blog » For Those Scoffing At Russian Penetration Into American Democracy
  118. For Those Scoffing At Russian Penetration Into American Democracy - #RedNationRising
  119. 500 million Yahoo accounts were hacked. The US just blamed it on two Russian spies. – News World Club
  120. #DAweek: Preparing For Decisive Action | From the Green Notebook
  121. الحلقة الثالثة والاربعون: إدارة التوحش-5 – الصورة الكبيرة – المنظومة الشيطانية
  122. 500 million Yahoo accounts were hacked. The US just blamed it on 2 Russian spies. - JP Quotes
  123. The Challenges of Achieving Military-Grade Cyber Attribution | Bhujang
  124. Comunicarea în război: cum menține un Guvern susținerea pentru un „război lung” sau Bătălia pentru „știrile bune” - Larics
  125. Iulian Chifu, Comunicarea în război: cum menține un guvern susținerea pentru un „război lung” sau bătălia pentru „știrile bune” – Studii de Securitate și Analiza Informațiilor
  126. Predicting future trends in warfare – Defence-In-Depth
  127. The Next Billion Seconds - Episode 2.10 Vaporised Media with Rob Tercek
  128. Vita husets påstående om att Ryssland inte hade någon inverkan på valet debunkades
  129. A War on Two Cold Fronts: the Real Enemy and the False – The Eccentric Flock
  130. Weapons of the weak: Russia and AI-driven asymmetric warfare(2018) - Avada Extreme Sports
  131. The Minsk Agreements and Merkel’s political amnesia
  132. Nomination du général Guerassimov à la tête des opérations en Ukraine : un tournant dans la guerre ?

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