It’s easy to be dismissive, even derisory, about poor Dmitry Medvedev, the little engine that ultimately couldn’t. Installed as chair-warmer-in-chief by Vladimir Putin, to occupy the president’s office in the Kremlin until bis patron was ready to reclaim it. For a while, in 2010-11, I wondered if the experience of being behind the big desk had changed him, whether he was nerving himself up to challenge Putin. I suspect he was contemplating it, not least given that he started tentatively to occupy spaces which had largely been Putin’s turf, such as talking tough on the Kurils. We know that people like Surkov wanted him to serve another term, although as part of a deal with Putin rather than through a contested election. But it didn’t happen; Dima blinked and Vova came back. And Dima had to tell everyone how much better Vova was then him. Poor guy. And, to be honest, the rising volume of chatter in Russia about a possible dismissal from his consolation-prize prime ministerial position is probably also well-founded. When he was appointed I thought he had six months before he’d be moved out, and that comes up in November. We’ll see.
However, one of the reasons why I love taking part in the indispensable Russian politics wonkfest that is the Power Vertical podcast is that it helps me marshal my thoughts, and through yesterday’s conversation with Brian Whitmore I came to realize that when the histories of this turbulent era come to be written, it may well prove to be Medvedev who is credited for being the agent of Putin’s downfall: not Navalny, not Udaltsov, not even that wicked Mike McFaul and his coffers of State Department silver. Why? Because the challenges facing and ultimately possibly beating Putin today and to a large extent the products of policies and processes initiated under Medvedev. If the protesters of today are Putin’s children, they are also Medvedev’s foster-kids.
In the podcast, we discussed both the importance of Medvedev’s rhetorical and — more unusually — genuine commitment to a rule-of-law state as well as the economic and social developments which took place on his watch. There’s more, though. In no particular order or depth, I’d add:
There is no doubt more, but for a range of reasons (and certainly not with any Grand Plan), I do think that we can credit Medvedev with playing a key role in the rise of the forces now so troubling Putin and his chums.
