In 2010 they award him; in 2013 they expel him

There seems to be an Americanskaya chistka, an American purge in Moscow. After January’s quiet expulsion of an alleged CIA agent, Benjamin Dillon, and this week’s rather less quiet PNGing of Ryan Fogle, comes news (broken in the NY Times) that Thomas Firestone, a former legal counsellor at the US Embassy who had moved into private practice in Moscow, was barred from returning to the city and sent back to the USA. Tom is, for my money, one of the sharpest–in every sense–critics of corruption in Russian business and the dark arts of reiderstvo, ‘raiding’ in particular. (The practice of stealing assets through falsified legal claims.) He spent two tours at the US Embassy as resident legal adviser, then joined the Moscow office of Baker & McKenzie as senior counsel. Not only was he given a certificate of merit in 2010 by Federal Anti-Monopoly Service chief Igor Artemyev “for his outstanding work in advancing U.S.-Russian cooperation in combating cartels and unfair competition,” he also wrote some of the seminal scholarly studies of reiderstvo, notably ‘Criminal Corporate Raiding in Russia‘ (2008).

Apparently, he was returning to Moscow on 5 May and was detained, held  for 16 hours and then put on a flight to the USA. The news only seems to have broken today (Sunday 19 May). The story–so far–is that this follows efforts by the Federal Security Service to recruit him as an agent. Tom clearly enjoyed Moscow, with all its crass energy and sharp edges, but I confess I am astonished if the FSB really thought he was likely to be open to recruitment. Honestly I’d see it as much more likely that, as a perennial thorn in the side of corrupt officials and ‘raiders’ alike, certain interests finally decided they wanted him out of their city and out of their hair. No doubt we’ll get a better sense of the picture over time.

Meanwhile, though, although this predates the Fogle case, when put together it does begin to paint a worrying picture of increasing xenophobia in Moscow. Even if there is no connection between the Firestone case and those of Dillon and Fogle, a willingness to exclude a specialist in Russian and international law and an avowed enemy of the very “legal nihilism” the government is meant to be opposing offers no encouragement. Instead, it almost begins to look as if the Kremlin’s is beginning to believe its current propaganda campaign about its encirclement by foreign foes.

• Mark Galeotti on Today’s Spy Saga: Was today’s big Russia news a legitimate CIA embarrassment or Kremlin propaganda?: a snap response in The Interpreter.

• Mr Fogle and the Bizarre Case of Politics of Paranoia: a longer piece in Russia! magazine.

• Moscow ups ante in spy row by outing CIA station chief: on the Blouin Beat, following this further escalation

• Patriot Games in Moscow News, on what the case says about Russia and the West — to follow

• in Russia Beyond The Headlines, on prospects for security cooperation in the future — to follow

More to come!

(And coincidentally, I’d also mention this unconnected piece on Russian organized crime at home and abroad in BNE)

Russian security guard in Iraq with a freed hostage, or a Zaslon operator? No way of knowing…

There is quite a cult that has grown up around Russia’s Spetsnaz special forces, with books, movies and exposes both serious and farcical alike. Names such as Alpha and Vympel have become well known. Indeed, some could almost be considered franchises: as far back as the 1990s, veterans of the Alpha spetsgruppa had set up  private security firms, trading on their unit’s formidable reputation (see, for example, Tsentr-Al’fa). The one exception appears to be Zaslon (‘Screen’), a very shadowy unit established, by what accounts we have, in 1998 as a special forces unit for the SVR (Foreign Intelligence Service). Trained to operate abroad, in everything from hostage-rescue to assassination missions, it continues to shun publicity. Even while researching my forthcoming book, Russian Security and Paramilitary Forces since 1991 (yes, consider that a plug: out in August and available for pre-order), I was unable to find anything much on it in Russian and foreign sources alike, even a unit badge. They seem to deploy wearing civvies or the uniforms of other units, including embassy security details.

Now I hear a hint that a Zaslon team (the whole unit only seems to number some 280 or so operators) has been or is about to be deployed to Syria (I report on this here, for Blouin). That implies that Moscow either anticipates serious threats to its nationals (not just the embassy, but also numerous civilian and military advisers working with the Syrian government) or else, readying for an endgame, it wants special forces operators on the ground to spirit out Russian or Syrian officials and/or incriminating documents (as they reportedly did in Iraq) or high-tech equipment they don’t want falling into rebel and thus Western or Iranian hands… Watch this space.

A particularly good index of this has been a recent Levada opinion survey, also somewhat covered in the Russian press, about attitudes to United Russia, Putin and the elite in particular. I reproduce them below, although in some cases I have eliminated some columns, especially of earlier samples, in the interests of space. This must be pretty uncomfortable reading in the Kremlin.

WITH WHICH THESE STATEMENTS ABOUT THE PEOPLE WHO ARE IN POWER NOW DO YOU AGREE?

TO WHICH OF THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS ON CORRUPTION IN RUSSIA DO YOU AGREE?

WHAT, IN YOUR OPINION, IS MORE IMPORTANT TO THE PEOPLE WHO NOW HOLD POWER IN RUSSIA?

DO YOU THINK THAT PUTIN IS NOW MORE INTERESTED IN THE STATE OF THE COUNTRY OF HIS OWN INTERESTS?

DO YOU BELIEVE THAT THE INCOME DECLARATIONS OF SENIOR GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, MEMBERS OF THE FEDERATION COUNCIL AND STATE DUMA DEPUTIES REPRESENT ALL THEIR AVAILABLE INCOME AND PROPERTY TAXES OR ONLY PART OF THEM?

WHY DO YOU THINK THE RICHEST STATE DUMA DEPUTIES BELONG TO THE “UNITED RUSSIA” BLOC?

DO YOU AGREE OR DISAGREE WITH THE VIEW THAT “UNITED RUSSIA” IS THE PARTY OF CROOKS AND THIEVES?

Take, for example, the last, specific point about UR being the “Party of Crooks and Thieves”–something which was, after all, Navalny’s inspired “PZhiV” memetic salvo. Over half, 51%, of respondents definitely or generally agree. Remember, 51% are not also devoted Navalny groupies (most have not heard of him, and of those who have, most express dislike or mistrust of him), but nonetheless his meme has spread well beyond his own circle, and it is also supported by those separate indices that see United Russia as the rich man’s (or woman’s) home and the elite habitually understating their true incomes.

The steady rise of the PZiV meme

The sad and worrying thing about the present struggle for the hearts and minds of Russia, though, is that it is pretty much entirely negative. Navalny presenting the elite as self-serving and corrupt; the Kremlin trying to do the same to him. How long will it be before anyone is able to start presenting some positive visions for Russia’s future?

This week’s dossier explores some of the characteristics of the political-criminal nexus. The following installments consider first the world of the kleptocracy, how so many states thrive through organized plunder of their own resources and exploitation of their populations: in effect, nationalizing theft. Even if they avoid that temptation, they may find themselves conniving at or even instigating crime in the name of some greater good. Next, the focus shifts to warlords and pseudo-states, violent actors who may turn to crime to satisfy their political ambitions but also, in some case, rise as predators and later become politicians. How often do they become the builders of new polities, or are they generally the prime exponents of what one could call the “ crime-conflict nexus” instead?

However, the privatization of violence and the spread of criminalized conflicts is only part of the story, and the fourth section will consider the forces and actors facilitating this problem, from corruption at a local, national and international level to the arms dealers and other service industries of the global underworld. It is, after all, thanks to their entrepreneurial zeal that the gangsters, genocidaires and gunmen can be as effective as they so often are. Their efficiency, furthermore, ensures that they have uses to others, and so as well as the facilitators, it is vital to consider their clients, too. Nonetheless, there is always hope, and the final part of this series will instead look at solutions, from transnational programs to grassroots initiatives.

The first part, Introduction: A World of Thieves and Warriors, explores how “War and crime have forever been partners. In the modern world of often-fragile states, growing resource pressure and burgeoning transnational criminal economies, the relationship is stronger than ever” and asks “What is the difference between war and crime, between theft and looting, between corruption by an official and extortion by a gangster?”

The second, Nationalizing Villainy: Kleptocracies and State Crime, explores “what can happen if states succumb to kleptocracy and corruption, and especially how these problems induce and perpetuate war.”

Then The Crime-Conflict Nexus: Warlords and Pseudo-States starts with the view that “When a state is unable to maintain its monopoly on violence, power-vacuums inevitably arise” and considers “how organized criminals and warlords fill these vacuums in failed, weak and even pseudo-states.”

Fourth, Clients And Enablers explores the forces and actors facilitating this problem, from corruption to the arms dealers and other service industries of the global underworld,

Finally, in What Is To Be Done?, I look at possible  solutions. In particular, I note that “hope is increasingly coming not from grand transnational programs—which are often admirable, but historically often suffer from the problems of seeking consensus and settling for the lowest common denominator—but instead grassroots initiatives rooted in civil society.”

I can understand why the Tsarnaevs’ family and friends might want to believe that Tamerlan and Dzhokar were framed or set up. It’s the same impulse that leads to the disbelieving and perplexed statements that “he was a lovely man” or “he kept himself to himself” every time some serial killer or child abuser is arrested. Evil thoughts and plans, alas, do not always or even usually manifest themselves through sinister manner and demented cackles.

However, if we look at these particular suggestions (some of which also come from Russians), they seem to rest of a few basic assertions:

• The FSB had suspicions about Tamerlan Tsarnaev, so the fact that they let him into the country shows that they had some ulterior motive.
• Putin was willing to blow up Russian apartment buildings in 1999 for political purpose, so he’d have no more compunction seeing terror in Boston.
• The Russians want to make the world stop hassling them about their tactics in the North Caucasus: this gives them a perfect way of demonstrating that they are simply fighting evil jihadists.
• In the most ridiculously extreme cases, it’s asserted that the Kremlin just hates the USA anyway, and likes seeing mayhem there.

Of course Moscow will seek to make political capital out of this event; that’s what countries do (I remember when offers of assistance to the USSR after Chernobyl were also accompanied by patronizing suggestions about how this wouldn’t have happened if the Soviets were less Soviet and more Western). That certainly doesn’t mean that “hardliners in Russia might want another Cold War with America, and they may even secretly rejoice at the idea of mayhem in the West.” The pragmatic art of diplomacy is often about making the best from whatever fate presents.

The Kremlin has not shown itself averse to the use of violence in domestic and international politics (I’m inclined to accept the 1999 apartment bombings were state terrorism), but this is a world apart from actually trying to instigate an attack on US soil. The risks so outweigh the potential advantages that I don’t think it would even have been seriously considered. There is one basic rule of covert operations: at some point, they become covert no longer. If Tamerlan had been an active, aware agent, what would have happened if he had been captured? Even assuming that he was instead a dupe, groomed for the purpose by Russian undercover agents posing as jihadists, what happens when the US authorities–who, we can safely assume, are turning the full weight of their massive intelligence capacity onto this case–get a sniff of this? Any political advantages are likely to be transient (think how quickly the post 9/11 amity evaporated); any political risks astronomical.

Besides which, the FSB flags up potential individuals of concern all the time. They don’t necessarily bar them from the country. One could just as easily (and foolishly) suggest that the FBI’s failure to pick up on the brothers’ jihadist sentiments in 2011, after the FSB had passed on a warning about them, showed that somehow the US authorities were involved. (And for the record, while the inevitable inquiry will say for sure, we need not assume the FBI “failed” here–Tamerlan may not have been fully radicalized by then, the FBI get many such warnings, and in any case they are often rightly skeptical of FSB tip-offs as the Russians often claim people are “terrorists” on the flimsiest grounds or just to smear political oppositionists.)

The world is usually a simpler place than people think, and covert actions less common and less attractive than the movies suggest. We’ll wait and see, but to me this is a case of an alienated young man looking for answers and sadly finding them in the ideology of global jihad, and apparently bringing his brother into the cause. In some ways this is harder to understand than deep plots and cunning stratagems, because it requires us to accept that the Western liberal democratic model does not satisfy everyone and that we cannot control the vagaries of lost souls…

(Oh, by the way: North Korea has denied being behind the bombing, too. So that’s alright, then.)

…and, it seems, the Kremlin’s patience

В русском языке

At least the latest Russian response to the Magnitsky List wasn’t quite as petulant, spiteful and foolish as its previous asymmetric ‘tit for tat,’ barring US parents from adopting Russian orphans. That is, however, about the most positive thing one can say about the new “Bout List.” It targets 18 former and current officials involved in the cases of arms dealer Viktor Bout and convicted drug trafficker Konstantin Yaroshchenko (and a few connected with GITMO), including US Attorney for the Southern District of New York Preet Bharara, who led the Bout prosecution.

Whether this kind of response does anything but worsen already-poor US-Russian relations (it doesn’t) and make Russia look clumsy and ugly (it does) is grist for others’ mills for the moment. I wanted very briefly to note the irony of targeting Bharara. Sure, he oversaw the Bout prosecution. But what else has he done:

• Targeted insider trading and abuses within the US financial system, such that Time, in its usual understated way had a cover blaring that “This Man is Busting Wall Street.” Moscow has long complained about double-standards in US statements about Russian financial crime and called for the Americans to clean up their own act first.
• Highlighted abuses in NY State politics, warning that “It becomes more and more difficult to avoid the sad conclusion that political corruption in New York is indeed rampant,” as “a show-me-the-money culture in Albany is alive and well.” Frankly, give this man a slot on RT!
• Prosecuted Al-Qaeda terrorist Faisal Shahzad. Last time I checked, Moscow thought Al-Qaeda (which, rightly or wrongly, they see at work in the North Caucasus) was their enemy too.

I don’t know Bharara myself, and I’m sure he’s also driven by the usual combination of hubris, ambition and professionalism that pushes the rest of us, too. But what does seem clear is that he has done far more than most to identify many of the abuses and flaws within mighty US institutions. Of course, he has done so from the point of view of a believer in the system, looking to correct them, but nonetheless what Moscow needs, frankly, is not to ban and castigate people like him, but rather to find its own Preet Bhararas. After all, although I am hardly the greatest fan of lawyers, honest and effective prosecutors can be extraordinary forces for change and progress. Consider the Italian magistrates Falcone and Borsellino who did so much to undermine the Mafia in life and arguably even more after their deaths.

Ah. Maybe that’s the point.

Yes, Navalny needs YOU!

It’s been too busy a time for me of late to post, but nonetheless something that has struck me has been the relatively low-key response to Navalny’s imminent trial on what seem thoroughly spurious embezzlement charges. Of course, it’s been reported, especially since his declaration that he wanted to stand for president. However, the contrast with the massive and at times thoroughly hysterical and hyperbolic coverage of the Pussy Riot case, even before their trial, has been evident. I find this slightly surprising and distinctly alarming and a cause for what I might call some “navalny-gazing.”

No wonder, I suppose, that the subtitle on Navalny’s blog is “The final battle between good and neutrality.”

After all, while the Pussy Riot defendants were undoubtedly the victims of a kangaroo court (the very notion that they could be found guilty under the technical terms of hooliganism rather than some lesser charge was ridiculous) and comported themselves with impressive dignity in court, nonetheless they were hardly important in and of themselves. The importance, I would suggest, lay in what the trial said about the wider processes at work: the lawfare of the courts in their use against expressions of opposition thought and sentiment, the heavy-handedness of Putin’s state, the role of a conservative and assertive Russian Orthodox Church. Let’s be honest, had the authorities simply patronized them as publicity-seeking little women, slapped them with a fine, and used this as an opportunity to present the opposition as being full of blasphemers and exhibitionists, it would have been a two-day wonder.

Whether or not Navalny is the potential savior of the nation or a nationalist opportunist who has spotted a potential chance to rise is irrelevant (and for the record, while I don’t believe him to be perfect, I certainly believe him closer to the former than the latter). He is undoubtedly at present the driving force behind the opposition, however inchoate and drifting it currently may be. He has brought the issue of the corruption elite into the center of Russian politics, and has done more than anyone else to connect that with the United Russia bloc, that bastion of the cynical, the careerist and the corrupt. At present, there is no one else who can assume his mantle, no one else who has a chance–no more than a chance–of being able to turn the middle-class metropolitan opposition into a credible political force.

Which is, of course, why the Kremlin wants him out of the way, whether in prison or, much more likely, smeared and given a suspended sentence which will preclude him from standing for political office. It also explains why attack-dog Bastrykin–a man also with a clear personal animosity against Navalny–has been given such a long leash. They fear him in a way that they don’t fear socialite-seditionist Kseniya Sobchak or leftist firebrand Sergei Udaltsov.

Less comprehensible is quite why the Russian opposition is not more active and why Western democrats who want to see Russia move away from authoritarianism are nowhere near as excited as they were during the Pussy Riot case. Sure, maybe things will be different once the court case starts, but at present there seems little real enthusiasm for Navalny’s cry for protests on the streets in Russia, and far less media attention, let alone op. ed. outrage in the West.

Is it that everyone is getting tired of protest that seems to get nowhere, and Kirov is a way away rather than just a couple of streets away in Moscow? (If so, welcome to the real world: regime change is a hard slog, not a New Year’s resolution.)

Is it that people dislike or mistrust Navalny? (Sure, there are some questions to be asked, from his nationalist politics to what he’s doing on the Aeroflot board, but to be honest it’s hard to see any such antagonism towards him from any but elements of the elite.)

When it comes to the Western media and Russia-watchers, can it really be as banal as that one guy who blogs about corruption is a less exciting topic to discuss that balaclava-ed punkettes? That “People got interested in Pussy Riot on a global scale because it included so many themes – feminism, gay rights, religion” but that the bedrock issues of power and freedom aren’t as widely appealing? (Sadly, there is probably more than a little truth here.)

Whatever the reason, I cannot help but feel there is a potential opportunity here that risks being squandered. When Brian Whitmore and I were discussing the case in a Power Vertical podcast (you don’t subscribe to it? You should!) we agreed that the trial could represent a turning point for the opposition, a chance to get its act together after over a year of drift, a chance to cohere around a high-profile case, a chance to use it as a platform to seek to reach out to the disgruntled elements in the wider population (and we know they are there) and seek to build a common cause. Of course, that means they have to do it. And outsiders who want to encourage them–though ultimately this must be a domestic phenomenon, there certainly is no scope for the kind of “revolution plotted from abroad” beloved of pro-Kremlin conspiracy theorists–at the very least need to keep up the pressure and the attention, because that will help make this case significant, signal to the authorities that they cannot just pick off whomever they want with impunity.

This is unlikely to be the final battle, but it is an extremely important one. Given that “neutrality” is often a synonym in such cases for apathy or despair, perhaps this is time for action…