Russia conspicuously absent in US ‘foreign policy’ presidential debate

Given the extent to which tonight’s third presidential debate was shamelessly hijacked by both candidates for a reiteration of their usual domestic campaign setpieces, it should hardly surprise that Russia received almost no attention. After all, Europe was ignored to an even greater extent beyond Romney’s invocation of Greece as some apocalyptic fate facing America. Nonetheless, it was a disappointment to see this opportunity for there to be actual debate on actual substance relating to actual foreign policy squandered, though. As it was, Mali seemed to received more detailed analysis than Russia, and those comments relating to Russia were either cheap shots or empty words.

Romney sought to make capital from Obama’s on-mike aside to Medvedev and strike a tough pose when he said:

“I have clear eyes on this. I’m not going to wear rose-colored glasses when it comes to Russia or Mr. Putin and I’m certainly not going to say to him, ‘I’ll give you more flexibility after the election.’ After the election, he’ll get more backbone.”

However, an Obama who was assertive to the point of sounding querulous, got in a counter-punch of his own obliquely referring to Romney’s now-infamous comment about Russia being the USA’s “number one geopolitical foe“:

“Gov. Romney, I’m glad that you recognize that Al Qaeda is a threat because a few months ago when you asked what’s the biggest geopolitical threat facing America, you said Russia – not Al Qaeda – you said Russia. The 1980s are now calling and asking for their foreign policy back, because the Cold War has been over for 20 years. But Governor, when it comes to our foreign policy, you seem to want to import the foreign policies of the 1980s, just like the social policy of the 1950s and the economic policies of the 1920s.”

Nice line, for sure, but does it get us anywhere? Not at all. It should hardly surprise, after all. Obama has little reason to want to talk about US policy towards Russia because it can hardly be said to have been especially successful. Conversely, not only has Romney little maneuver room given his geopolitical gaffe, he has little to say. His foreign policy seems to be “I’d be like Obama, but more so.”

While election debates are probably the last places to look for any useful foreign policy discussion or omens, nonetheless this does suggest that when it comes to US-Russian relations:

1. It scarcely matters who is the next US president. Behind a rhetorical smokescreen, policy towards Russia will be cautious, pragmatic and, to be blunt, open to being dominated by a more assertive Moscow.

2. Moscow plays a very small role in Washington’s worldview, something I cannot help but feel is pretty short-sighted. Even when Romney called it America’s main adversary, it is hard to believe that he really saw this as something around which to anchor any meaningful foreign policy.

3. No one in Washington really knows what to do with Russia.

NYU Center for Global Affairs opens search for Clinical Professor or Global Affairs

I’m very excited that we are opening a search for a new addition to our full-time faculty, a senior scholar-practitioner whose background is within any aspect of global affairs and which ideally straddles both academe and practice. Details are below and we will start reviewing applications in November and hold the search open until we engage a suitable candidate.

CLINICAL PROFESSOR OF GLOBAL AFFAIRS

Center for Global Affairs

NYU School of Continuing and Professional Studies (NYU-SCPS)

The SCPS Center for Global Affairs at New York University is a hub for leading-edge, professionally-oriented education in international affairs. With a thriving Master of Science in Global Affairs program, a robust continuing and executive education initiative and a wide range of public events, its mission is to combine scholarship, professional experience and cutting-edge research to create a community of global citizens able to respond to the challenges and opportunities of the day, and tomorrow. Its program meets the highest academic standards but is also intensely practical, taught often by practitioners with substantive field experience in global affairs as well as academic expertise.

As part of its development, the Center is looking for an exceptional individual to join its faculty of scholar-practitioners in 2013. This is a 9-month, non-tenured, one-year renewable faculty appointment effective fall 2013. The successful candidate will have an advanced degree, doctorate preferred; an extensive and distinguished career in public service or other relevant fields, and a high profile as a global affairs policy-maker, executive, scholar or commentator. He or she will have a commitment to scholarship, teaching and mentoring students, and public outreach. We are global in outlook and welcome applicants from all countries and backgrounds, but would especially welcome candidates with a strong presence and network in Washington DC.

To apply for the position, go to
www.nyuopsearch.com/applicantsCentral?quickFind=51375

Submission Deadline: The search committee will begin reviewing applications on November 5, 2012; the position will remain open until filled. NYU appreciates all applications but can only respond to qualified candidates.

NYU encourages applications from women and members of minority groups.

Putin, Kudrin and the real Stolypin

There has been a lot of discussion lately about history, historical parallels and the historicization of the contemporary Russian ferment. I’ve played with parallels to 1905 and more recently Fiona Hill and Clifford Gaddy have written thoughtfully in the National Interest about Putin’s ‘historical turn’ and his self-identification with repressor-modernizer prime minister Pëtr Stolypin. In a conversation yesterday with RFE/RL’s excellent Brian Whitmore, we touched on the historical parallels (I suggested that in some ways he might be a Nicholas I figure – intellectually able to understand the need for reform, viscerally unable to sanction anything he felt weakened the state or brought the risk of instability).

Combined with the – in my opinion – likely accession of Kudrin as prime minister in the new Putin presidency, it got me wondering whether Putin really understood the historical parallel he likes to draw. Kudrin is personally close to Putin, but a technocrat rather than a silovik, more interested in modernization that statism. Unlike Medvedev, Kudrin has the stature, personal leeway and character to go nose-to-nose with Putin and demand a degree of control over policy. Furthermore, although I think Putin will will March’s presidential election, it will probably be in a second-round run-off and leave him weaker than he has been at any point since 1999. In short, he will need Kudrin and through him the technocrat wing of the political elite and in turn through them, some relationship with the aspirant middle class who represent the base of the current protests.

Kudrin will want to modernize by economic liberalization, which will have powerful socio-economic and thus political implications. It will lead to a drift of power away from the modern chinovniki, the bureaucrats of the state and security apparatuses, and towards the middle class. This is in some ways akin to Stolypin’s “wager on the strong” in the countryside, seeking to privilege a rural yeoman classes a new social backbone of tsarism, while modernizing the urban economy.

Perhaps the real Stolypin would actually be Kudrin. So who does that leave Putin? Possibly Nicholas II, turning to his self-confident (even arrogant) and able prime minister in desperation, despite having little personal sympathy for or understanding of his strategy. The real Stolypin failed to save autocracy from itself. Nicholas was unable or unwilling to support him against increasingly disgruntled aristocratic elites and ultimately may have turned a blind eye to the plot to assassinate him. It remains to be seen whether history offers any repetitions, but I can’t help but wonder how far Putin – no historian – is kidding himself about his own place in history.

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Here’s an excerpt:

The concert hall at the Syndey Opera House holds 2,700 people. This blog was viewed about 47,000 times in 2011. If it were a concert at Sydney Opera House, it would take about 17 sold-out performances for that many people to see it.

Click here to see the complete report.

Bye-Bye Bagapsh: concerns about Abkhazia’s future

The death in a Moscow hospital of Abkhaz president Sergei Bagapsh is pretty bad news. In the interim, before new presidential elections are held (they have to be, within three months), Vice President Aleksandr Ankvab will take his place, but it will be difficult to fill his shoes. I had rather more time for Bagapsh than most of the Party-apparatchik-turned-nationalist-tribunes who have colonized post-Soviet Eurasia. He was an Abkhaz nationalist but in the main managed not to let that become xenophobia. When you compare him with his fellow leader of a Georgian splinter state, South Ossetia’s Edward Kokoity, under whose administration thuggery, paramilitarism and embezzlement appear to have become the order of the day (and who is desperately trying to hold on to power), and his achievement becomes all the more striking. Kokoity clashes with Russia as often as not when Moscow asks where all the aid they send disappears to; Bagapsh tried to maintain a degree of equipoise. The irony is that although Bagapsh was criticized for his deals with Russia, he had also, before the Russo-Georgian War, been about as open as an Abkhaz leader could be to some form of negotiation with Tbilisi. (It is a further irony that his critics also disliked his efforts to allow the region’s few remaining Georgians to seek Abkhaz citizenship, as well as attempts to encourage US investment.)

(more…)

Profile in the launch issue of Law, Crime & History

An indulgent moment, but not wholly so: SOLON, the UK-based network for the interdisciplinary study of law, crime and history has relaunched its online journal as, appropriately enough, Law, Crime & History. The first issue, out today, contains all kinds of good stuff, amongst the least of which is a little profile of my work and trajectory. For those of you who come across this post and who work on the intersections of history, criminology, law and deviance, SOLON is well worth following.

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