Maybe not the smoking gun: that video of a Russian lt. colonel in Ukraine

The Russian (probably) lt. colonel (maybe)

The Russian (probably) lt. colonel (maybe)

Feelings are running high about Russia’s campaign of pressure and destabilisation in Ukraine and perhaps not surprisingly foreign journalists and pundits sympathetic to Kyiv are eager to pounce on anything which appears to offer proof about the much-discussed but surprisingly elusive direct Russian role. As a result, sometimes pictorial or video evidence is being taken at face value when it needed a little more cautious scrutiny: witness the video purportedly of Russian soldiers in Ukraine being blocked by plucky Ukrainians, which turned out to be Ukrainian troops being harangued by ethnic Russian militants. (The uniforms were a give-away then.) The latest “smoking gun” is a video in which a man in Russian camouflage introduces himself to the defecting Horlivka police as a lt. colonel in the Russian army and introduces them to their new chief. So far, so straightforwardly damning. However, while this may appear to the holy grail of proof, I’m afraid that I think it ought to be taken with some caution.

The soldier does indeed wear appropriate Russian camo, but–and I know here I sound like I am channelling Putin’s disingenuous comments when challenged about the “little green men” in the Crimea–that’s no great feat. I could pop to my local voentorg store and pick up the same. He has none of the other accoutrements of soldierly kit than one might expect, but this is not in itself vastly significant as it is not a combat situation. On the other hand, his cap is definitely not military issue; why is such a senior officer not at least wearing his issue camouflage baseball cap instead of something looking pretty civilian to me?

He presents has passport as “proof” of his status, even though it does nothing of the sort. All his passport can say is that he is a Russian: it would be like my presenting my passport to prove that I was a professor. Why is he not showing his military ID? Indeed, given the Russian emphasis on at leasts the appearance of punctiliousness, why not some rubber-stamped document from the Horlivka “mayor” confirming his authority?

This is potential political dynamite, and a relatively senior Russian officer trusted enough to be deployed in Ukraine as a kind of proconsul would presumably have some political savvy. So why is he allowing himself to be videoed doing this, as the filming doesn’t look as if it was covert?

I do not doubt that there are Russian government agents and covert operators in the field in eastern Ukraine, but I am unconvinced this guy is one of them. If I had to guess, I’d say that if he really is a lt. colonel, it’s in the reserve and he is just one of the growing number of Russian “war tourists” that Moscow is happy to encourage, without specifically directing, who’s just throwing his weight around in a complex and confusing situation. This is, after all, the nature of the current messy, semi-unguided ‘Great Game II’--Moscow can to a degree simply rely on chaos and autonomous actors, reserving direct action for crucial moments, while individuals can seize the moment and find themselves in unexpectedly important positions. (‘The Man Who Would Be King‘, anyone?)

My first comment piece for Business New Europe: on Putin’s guerrilla geopolitics

In what will be the first I hope of a regular series of comments for Business New Europe, today I explore to greater depth the way that Putin’s political techniques in Ukraine in many ways are a counterpart to the military tactics of the successful guerrilla. Here are the first and last paragraphs as a taster:

Successful guerrillas master the art of asymmetric warfare, making sure that the other side has to play the game by their rules and doesn’t get the opportunity to take advantage of its probably superiority in raw firepower. Appreciating the massive military, political and economic preponderance of the West, Russian President Vladimir Putin is demonstrating that he is a master of asymmetric politics.

In this new Great Game, spies and political operators will be every bit as crucial as tanks and helicopters. More to the point, it demands flexibility, ruthlessness and clarity of aim. This is, let’s be honest, the ideal kind of contest for Vladimir Putin and his Russia.

(I’ve also explored this theme from different angles elsewhere, including a blog post here on “Great Game II” to a consideration of the tools and techniques used not just by Russia but in what is, I think, a wider global trend, in Russia! magazine: “The New Great Gamers“.

 

On Russia, Ukraine, sanctions and war

Just a quick heads-up. There is now a report on my talk in parliament in London on ‘The Military Dimension of Russia’s Policy toward Ukraine: Should the West Be Worried?‘ under the auspices of the Henry Jackson Society here and also a full transcript of my opening remarks. Although the US government and NATO commander seems still to be suggesting Russian military action is imminent, my view is that the danger of that is receding; I hope I will be proved right. The next day, I spoke at the European Council on Foreign Relations about the political impact on Russia of sanctions, and you can hear a podcast of my comments here. I still suspect that future historians may conclude that when Putin took Crimea he lost not only Ukraine but, ultimately, the Kremlin.

What Would A Russian Invasion Of Ukraine Look Like?

Will the Russians stop?

Will the Russians stop?

I’ve been asked this question a lot, and had the chance to expound on it at a recent event in Parliament sponsored by the Henry Jackson Society, so thought I’d briefly outline my thoughts here. That said, though, I should stress that the more time passes, the less likely I think such an attack becomes, because of the shifting political situation and also–as Kyiv moves forces east and mobilises reserves and volunteers–the military calculus. However, it cannot be excluded, so it is worth still considering, not least as the preparatory phases I outline below have all been carried out; the Russian General Staff may well not yet know if it is going to be invading, but it has made sure that if the word does come down from the Kremlin, it will be ready.

In brief, the aim would be a blitzkrieg that, before Ukraine has the chance properly to muster its forces and, perhaps more to the point, the West can meaningfully react, allows the Russians to draw a new front line and assert their own ground truth, much as happened in Crimea (though this would be much more bloody and contested). This would not be a bid to conquer the whole country (the real question is whether they’d seek to push as far as Odessa, taking more risks and extending their supply lines, but also essentially depriving Ukraine of a coastline) but instead quickly to take those areas where there are potentially supportive local political elites and Russophone populations, and consequently pretexts (however flimsy) to portray invasion as ‘liberation.’

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Putin: Afghanistan Redux, by Dick Krickus

In the main, I use this blog for my own ruminations, but from time to time I am delighted to be able to use it as a platform for interesting and authoritative guest posts, such as this one from Dick Krickus, Professor Emeritus at the University of Mary Washington.

While Western officials have condemned Vladimir Putin for his invasion of Ukraine, they have cautioned the new government in Kiev not to fall into the trap that Georgian President Mikhail Sakashvilli did in 2008 and respond to Moscow’s provocation with force. Given the advantages that the Russian Army enjoys over its Ukrainian counterparts in terms of soldiers, air craft, tanks, artillery and other instruments of war, any violent showdown with Russia would end badly for the Ukrainians. No objective military analyst would challenge that assessment. But it rests on the judgment that the war will be fought along conventional lines and if this is Putin’s assumption, he is badly mistaken.

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Yanukovych’s gamble and Kiev’s burning

The opposition HQ: not a subtle message from the government

The opposition HQ: not a subtle message from the government

“I am in blood
 Stepp’d in so far that, should I wade no more,
Returning were as tedious as go o’er.”
– Macbeth, Act 3, Scene 4
 

Kiev is burning, both literally and metaphorically, as this revolution-counterrevolution-in-fits-and-starts hit one of its flash points last night. As the opposition radicalizes further and the security forces turn increasingly to lethal force, although I’m not a specialist on Ukrainian politics, I would want to make some observations about some of the aspects of the current crisis about which I do know something.

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