11 alleged Russian spies indicted in New York: some first thoughts

Yesterday, eleven alleged Russian agents were indicted on charges of military technical espionage, specifically illegally exporting micro-electronics that are on an export control list (which can lead to a sentence of 20 years in prison without parole) through a Texas-based company. I reproduce the text of the FBI’s official release below, after the jump, and obviously we wait to see if the defendants are convicted in court. (Russian deputy foreign minister Ryabkov has said they’re not spies. Of course.)

Nonetheless, if it transpires that the prosecutors’ case is proven it says a few things worth noting:

  • Russian intelligence activity is sustained, aggressive and back to Cold War levels. It has been said before (not least, with great vigor, in Ed Lucas’s book Deception), but is worth saying again. It is striking how, after the decimation of their espionage apparatuses in the late 1980s and then 1990s, the Russians have rebuilt them, and also how much latitude they are granted. To be blunt, while Moscow would rather its operations not get publicly blown and complicate Russia’s international relations, it does not see this as important enough to restrain its activities. Nor does this apply just to the USA, with alarm bells ringing across the West, from Prague and Tallinn to Brussels.
  • Multiple Russian intelligence organizations operate in the USA. The agency involved in this case has not been named, but while most espionage is carried out by the SVR, the Foreign Intelligence Service, the specific purpose of this operation might suggest GRU, the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff — military intelligence. The domestic security service, the FSB (Federal Security Service) also operates in a very limited way abroad, though — largely monitoring real and perceived security threats such as supporters of North Caucasus terrorists and, rather less creditably, some allies of the opposition movement at home.
  • Economic and technical espionage is an increasing priority. At a time when the SVR is also investing money into systems to monitor and also influence the internet and social media, this is in many ways the new battleground. The Chinese intelligence community understood this first, but the Russians are renewing an interest in high-tech targets which had slipped somewhat in the closing days of the Cold War and since.
  • Russian intelligence seeks to use naturalized US citizens of Russian descent as agents. Most of the alleged agents were Russian-born, naturalized citizens. Of course, the overwhelming majority are good, loyal US citizens, but nonetheless there is likely to be an increased drive to seek to place or recruit such agents following the 2010 roll-up of a long-term illegals operation in the States.
  • This may have some political fallout back in Moscow. It is another potential intelligence debacle, after several others. If it does turn out to be the GRU, then that will add to the problems of a service already struggling to retain its status and relative autonomy. This may be the last straw and see it demoted to a regular directorate of the General Staff and perhaps lose portions of its networks to the SVR. But the SVR is likewise not in the best odor, especially after the recent arrest of two alleged agents in Germany. Although Mikhail Fradkov’s position as its director is probably not in jeopardy, there may be yet another round of inquests and find-the-scapegoat in its Department S, responsible for illegals — undercover agents abroad — or else its technical intelligence division. There may be another bid by the FSB to take it over, but I still don’t see this as happening. Either way, the spooks don’t seem to be giving great value for money at the moment.

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Shuffling the siloviki: who may be the winners and losers in 2012?

With Putin’s presidential election over, now the question becomes who will make it into the new government, at a time when some insiders are suggesting there may be some substantial change. On the whole, the siloviki tend not to experience particularly rapid reshuffles, but there are some who are looking more vulnerable. In a couple of columns for the Moscow News, I look first at the three key silovik ministers (Serdyukov at Defense, Nurgaliev of the MVD and Prosecutor General Chaika), and secondly at the chiefs of the main security and intelligence services (FSB, SVR, GRU, FSKN, FSO). After all, it’s not just about personalia: the decisions about who stays and goes and more to the point the nature and origins of any new hires will say a lot about what Putin plans for the future, and what he fears.

Tracing the Faultlines within the Russian Security Community

This week I’m speaking on ‘The Security Services and Russia’s Perceptions of Security Challenges and Threats’ at What Future for Russia?, which promises to be a very interesting event put on by NUPI. Apart from castigating myself for the bad planning of agreeing to go to Scandinavia in what seems to be the midst of Fimbulwinter, and flying there via Iceland, at that, this also got me thinking about the very notion of lumping ‘the security services’ together into one camp.

Of course, there are some broad traits which unite them, from a commitment to Russian national security to a common interest in talking up the challenges to it, in order to guarantee continued budgetary priority and political privilege. However, especially now that more and more the prospect of a post-Putin era is being contemplated — not that he’s likely to be going any day now, but people are no longer blithely regarding another twelve years as inevitable — then a variety of internal faultlines become increasingly significant.

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New GRU chief: Igor Sergun

Despite a little confusion (RIA-Novosti and Kommersant say yes, Rossiiskaya gazeta said no at first, then yes), it seems clear that, as predicted, Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) chief Colonel General Alexander Shlyakhturov, not seen at headquarters for months (despite claims that he’s been on duty), has stepped down on grounds of age. He’s 64 – an age at which remaining in post requires a clean bill of health and also presidential approval. Shlyakhturov will presumably be given a suitable sinecure, possibly as civilian adviser to the GRU, and/or Shlyakhturov would in the near future chairman of the board of directors of the Moscow Institute of Thermal Technology (MITT).

His successor is Major General Igor Sergun. (more…)

Moscow’s Praetorians: the Kremlin’s security forces

Given the protests in Moscow and the deployment of riot police and security troops, I thought this was a good time to provide a quick update as to the security forces available in the capital, not least as a counter to some of the more fanciful suggestions about the imminent victory of people power. (more…)

Viktor Bout’s conviction: first thoughts

So, arms dealer and get-anything-anywhere shipper Viktor Bout was today found guilt on all four counts of his indictment, that is:

  • conspiracy to kill US nationals;
  • conspiracy to kill US government officers;
  • conspiracy to acquire and use anti-aircraft missiles; and
  • conspiracy to provide material support to a foreign terrorist organization.

Of course Bout and his lawyers will appeal, and they are likely to have the continued support of the Russian government and ‘party of power.’ Voice of Russia has already flatly said that “The evidence against the businessman was quite ridiculous” and no doubt a chorus of similar disapproval will come from Russia, with the LDPR’s Leonid Slutsky dismissing the verdict as “a typical American propaganda ploy.” OK, he’s in the LDPR, but it is worth remembering that he is also first deputy chairman of the Duma’s Foreign Affairs Committee. Indeed, a collection of deputies in the Russian State Duma sent a letter to Presiding Judge of The Southern District of the Federal Court of New York Shira Scheindlin on October 7 inter alia stating that:

V. Bout’s case, according to his lawyers, is based mostly on non proven facts, speculation, dubious allegations, doubtful evidence and unpersuasive accusations, that have been proclaimed in the media for almost 10 years as the truth. Therefore, the formation of a negative international public opinion about V. Bout has started years before the provocative DEA operation [Relentless], which resulted in his arrest.

They claimed, needless to say, that Bout’s arrest was part of a shadowy plot to abort the ‘reset’ in Russo-American relations.

What is the big picture, though? I doubt it will have a major impact on US-Russian relations, even thought the ‘reset’ hasn’t really taken that much hold. Given that I suspect that Bout had a relationship with the GRU, military intelligence, I wonder if this will be another nail in the coffin of that organization, or at least dead-duck chief Shlyakhturov. If Bout was indeed a sometimes-agent or at least contact for the GRU, then it may also put a crimp in some of their operations.

But what about the global arms market, is that likely to feel the absence of Viktor? He’s certainly a character, but more than that was extremely good at what he did. I doubt his network can survive much more of an absence. There will, of course, be arms dealers – there always will. But they are unlikely to have the same range of connections, organizational capacities, attention to detail and ability to draw on Russian arms stocks as Viktor. So the capacities and efficiency of the global illegal arms market is degraded, if only slightly. But every little helps.

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